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U N I T E D N A T I O N S 
L A T I N A M E R I C A ' S F O R E I G N T R A D E I N T H E E A R L Y M O N T H S O F 1957 
The deterioration in the terms of trade for some of 
Latin America's primary export commodities, which has 
been observable ever since 1954, continued during the 
early months of 1957. The explanation lies, on the one 
hand, in the relative weakness of world market prices 
for these commodities, and, on the other, in the higher 
quotations for manufactured goods imported by Latin 
America. It would therefore seem that foreign exchange 
income in 1957, in so far as it depends on relative prices, 
will be affected by the aforesaid deterioration. In 1955 
and 1956, this adverse circumstance was more than 
counterbalanced by an increase in the volume of exports, 
thanks to Latin America's larger output of exportable 
goods and the decidedly favourable economic situation 
in the major industrial countries. Unfortunately, the 
same does not seem to be true of 1957. In fact, half-
way through the year the most representative indices 
suggested that the trend towards expansion in world 
economic activity had come to a halt ; indeed, an actual 
contraction in foreign demand for many of Latin Ame-
rica's primary commodities has already been noted. 
Furthermore, as a result of certain developments in 
the world economy, some long-standing and others of 
more recent date, new and complex elements have come 
to the fore affecting the evolution of Latin America's 
export trade. The technological progress of agriculture 
in European countries, together with certain measures 
of economic policy, has resulted in an increase in their 
domestic production of foodstuffs and agricultural raw 
materials, which has not only rendered the countries 
concerned relatively self-sufficient with respect to some 
items, but has also afforded them an opportunity of 
entering the market as exporters. This has had repercus-
sions on sales prospects for Latin America's exportable 
surpluses. Moreover, in 1955 and 1956 the United 
States surplus disposal policy led to a readjustment of 
world prices for certain commodities, especially cotton, 
and a rerouting of trade in these products. 
All this raises a question as to the future develop-
ment of Latin America's foreign trade in general and 
its export trade in particular, since these are in fact 
determined by the absorption capacity of the major 
industrial countries. Hence, before a specific analysis of 
Latin America's foreign trade is embarked upon, a clear 
indication must be given of the evolution of the world 
economy during 1957 to date. 
1. THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION 
In mid-1957 there was a break in the upward trend 
of such important indices of world economic activity 
as those of industrial output, building and the value 
of total exports. Strictly speaking, by the middle of 
1957 these indices had in the main reached levels some-
what higher than those recorded for the corresponding 
period in 1956, but they showed no appreciable change 
in relation to the figures reached in the last quarter of 
1956 and the first of 1957. This was most noticeable 
in the case of the indices of industrial production (manu-
facturing and mining), which during the two preceding 
years had risen almost uninterruptedly both in the United 
States and in western Europe. 
This change of trend is deserving of more careful 
study. Towards the close of the second quarter of 1957, 
the gross national product of the United States was 
increasing at a distinctly low rate. Within the country's 
production as a whole, the manufacturing index was 
barely maintained at the same level as in previous 
months. This stability reflected, on the one hand, a 
slight expansion in the production of consumer goods 
— durable and non-durable — and, on the other, a 
contraction in important heavy industries, mining, 
building and petroleum extraction. The share of the 
United States in Latin America's trade is so large that 
the level of economic activity in the former country 
constitutes the most important of the factors determining 
demand for Latin American commodities. For this 
reason, stress must be laid on the fact that the economics 
situation prevailing in the United States implies for the 
moment no more than a period of readjustment in certain 
sectors of the internal economy. But one significant 
change has taken place. While in the two preceding 
years production increased to a relatively greater extent 
than final sales — that is, a policy of enlarging inventories 
was pursued — in the early months of 1957 the situation 
was reversed, so that producers and distributors have 
been operating with a smaller volume of stocks. This 
change has been particularly noticeable in such lines as 
metallurgy, and largely explains the marked contraction 
in demand for some raw materials, chiefly metals. 
The agricultural and surplus disposal policy pursued 
by the United States since 1955 seems to have influenced 
prices and the direction of world trade in the case of 
specific commodities, especially cotton. It is forecast 
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that harvests in 1957 will reach much the same excep-
tionally high level as in the preceding year, which means 
that the efforts made to reduce them substantially will 
prove to have been unavailing. In the first place, the 
decrease in the area under cultivation amounted to only 
a little over 3 per cent of the whole, although the soil 
bank had financed an 8 per cent contraction. Secondly, 
the favourable weather conditions and bigger yields 
virtually offset the smaller sowings. Consequently, the 
effects of the agricultural surplus disposal policy on 
the world market will be much the same as in 1956, or 
even more pronounced if the surpluses accumulated are 
taken into account. According to some estimates, sales 
will amount to 1,600 million dollars during the fiscal 
year 1957/58. 
The United States' balance-of-payments position, in 
its turn, reflects certain aspects of the current develop-
ments in the world economy. Up to the third quarter 
of 1956 the aggregate annual receipts accruing to countries 
trading with the United States from their trade and 
financial transactions with this latter, totalled some 
1,500 million dollars. During the last quarter of that 
year the earnings in question were converted into outlays 
in favour of the United States to a value of 300 million 
dollars, rising to 500 million during the first quarter 
of 1957. This surplus in the United States' balance of 
payments, together with the credit balance shown by 
Germany, was reflected in a curtailment of many coun-
tries' reserves or in heavy disbursements on the part 
o f the International Monetary Fund to cope with the 
situation.'^ 
Whatever the incidental factors that may have deter-
mined the course of events, there is at the present time 
a trend towards the consolidation of the United States' 
balance-of-payments surplus. If the economic activity of 
the United States were to continue expanding along the 
same lines as in 1955 and 1956, the shortage of dollars 
would be less acute, since presumably the United States 
demand for imports would remain high. In 1953 and 
1954, the rest of the world as a whole benefited by a 
considerable inflow of dollars. But the present situa-
tion is different, and therefore any falling-off in sales 
to the United States might result in a loss of reserves 
or in heavier foreign commitments. Moreover, since 1953 
exports from the United States have been increasing 
more than its imports. The former expanded in global 
figures by some 9,000 million dollars, and the latter by 
only 6,000 million. This deterioration in the other 
countries' aggregate trade balance with the United States 
was offset financially by a marked increment in United 
States private investment abroad and a much less signifi-
cant increase in foreign aid and defence expenditure. 
The unreliability of these last two sources of compen-
satory funds is manifest. So far as the immediate future 
is concerned, a reduction of foreign aid is forecast for 
the fiscal year 1957/58.2 
Broadly speaking, prevailing conditions on the Euro-
pean market seem to differ little from those described 
for the United States ; in most of the countries of Europe 
1 The countries concerned include Argentina, Belgium, Colom-
bia, France, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
^ See The Financial Times, London, 26 June 1957. 
industrial activity is developing at high levels, which, 
however, in many instances do not appreciably exceed 
those registered for the last quarter of 1956. As regards 
trade with Latin America, certain price increases and 
specific balance-of-payments disequilibria are to be noted, 
which may to some extent affect such trade during the 
rest of the year. 
Industrial production figures for the United Kingdom 
were slightly higher in the first quarter of 1957 than 
during the corresponding period of 1956, despite the 
28 per cent decline in the manufacture of motor-cars. 
Building activities, on the other hand, expanded by 
13 per cent. In Germany a vigorous upward trend was 
once again registered in industrial production, which 
increased by 9 per cent, whereas a relatively sharp 
falling-off was noted in the building industry. Industrial 
activity seems to have continued to develop satisfactorily 
in Belgium, France and other European countries, but 
by the middle of the year its levels were not much higher 
than in the first quarter. 
With respect to the financial policy of the European 
countries towards the Latin American market, it may 
be emphasized that the United Kingdom is displaying 
increasingly keen interest in investing in the Latin 
American countries, and that Germany's satisfactory 
financial and balance-of-payments situation, in conjunc-
tion with its interest in placing capital in the countries 
of this region, is inducing it to invest there on a 
larger scale. This trend will probably become more 
marked in the near future, since Germany is planning 
to abolish current restrictions on capital exports. It 
should be pointed out that Japan is following in the 
footsteps of these two European countries ; Japanese 
investors are at present attaching more importance to 
Latin America than to southern Asia. Furthermore, 
Japan is concentrating more on exports of capital goods 
on medium-term credit terms. 
To sum up, it does not look as if the world economic 
situation in 1957 — especially up to the middle of the 
year — is very much better than at the close of 1956. 
Thus world demand for imports seems likely to remain 
relatively stable. Nevertheless, demand for certain speci-
fic commodities — non-ferrous metals — has undergone 
a sharp decline, which has tended to depress the prices 
concerned. On the other hand, for other commodities, 
the relative inelasticity of world supply in face of slightly 
increasing demand has brought about a rise in world 
prices. At the same time, the slow but steady price 
increases registered in many industrial countries have 
raised the cost of Latin America's imports, and this trend 
seems to be gaining in intensity in the second half of 1957. 
2. WORLD MARKET CONDITIONS FOR CERTAIN PRIMARY 
COMMODITIES 
The trends noted in price levels for the main primary 
commodities are, of course, widely divergent. Except for 
the non-ferrous metals group, which is passing through 
a period of definite deterioration, fluctuations in prices 
for the other primary commodities have been relatively 
moderate and somewhat erratic. This applies especially 
to coffee, cacao, wheat, hides and beef. On the contrary. 
prices for sugar, cotton and crude petroleum have 
followed clearly defined trends during 1957, either 
towards higher levels, as in the case of sugar and petro-
leum, or, where cotton is concerned, in the direction 
of relative stabilization. 
As has been seen in earlier studies,® the decline in 
cotton prices since 1955 is linked to world market sales 
of the large United States surpluses. Not only has the 
world price of cotton fallen, but a contraction has also 
taken place in the production and exports of certain 
Latin American countries, which have been to some 
extent displaced from their traditional markets. Actually 
the sale of United States surpluses has considerably 
augmented the world supply of cotton. In the farm 
year 1955/56, United States exports of this fibre amounted 
to 2.2 million bales, and it is estimated that they may 
reach 7.6 million in 1956/57. Thus this country is rapidly 
approaching the exceptional export levels of 1926/27 
(11 milhon bales), when the world distribution of pro-
duction of course followed a pattern very different from 
its structure at the present time. There seems little 
immediate prospect of any radical changes in the situa-
tion on the world cotton market, where, moreover, 
prices have so far become relatively stabilized in 1957. 
The position of sugar on the world market improved 
perceptibly up to May 1957, but weakened in the sub-
sequent months. Although the rise in sugar prices was 
partly due to the poorer harvests in some European 
countries in 1956, it was also largely attributable to 
heavier consumption and to the virtual disappearance 
of the large stocks accumulated in several of the major 
producer countries, which had constituted the dominant 
feature of the world market during the past few years. 
According to recent estimates, in the course of 1957 
world supplies will amount to 6.7 million and require-
ments to approximately 6 million tons. Thus, the present 
relative balance between world supply and demand 
seems likely to be uspet in the near future, and this in 
turn will bring prices down.^ Meanwhile, the United 
States has increased its aggregate quota of imports by 
100,000 tons, of which 29,000 were allocated to Cuba, 
4,900 to the Dominican Republic, 43,330 to Peru and 
5,100 to Mexico. 
The temporary blockage of the Suez Canal raised 
crude petroleum prices on account of the production 
losses, supply difficulties and heavier freight charges 
which this event entailed. These transient circumstances, 
however, did no more than intensify what was already 
an intrinsically predictable development, since price 
increases were regarded as inevitable in view of the 
gradual rise in production costs.® 
The stability registered by coffee prices during the 
® See, for example, the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1956 
(E/CN.12/427), United Nations publication. Sales No. : 1957.II.G.1. 
^ The fact that such a price decline was already registered in 
June and July bears witness to the trend indicated. 
® The rise in world market prices for crude petroleum took 
place in January 1957 and constituted the second over-all increase 
in the last 9 years. The preceding increment had been in force 
since June 1953. Apart from this, it should be noted that freight 
charges for this commodity substantially decreased in the second 
quarter of 1957. 
last quarter of 1956 and the first of 1957 was followed 
in recent months by a downward movement which 
lowered them about 3 per cent, and which was chiefly 
due to an increase in supplies. At the present time, 
exportable production is estimated at 41.8 milhon bags 
as compared with 36.3 milhon in the trade year 1956/57. 
That of Brazil amounts to 18 million bags, while in the 
crop year 1956/57 it was 12.5 milhon. In Colombia, 
exportable surpluses have risen to 7.2 million bags as 
against 6.4 million in the preceding period. The producer 
countries of Central America have maintained the levels 
registered in the coffee year 1956/57. In Africa the trend 
towards an expansion of production is patent. It must 
be taken into account that in the first half of 1957 United 
States imports of African coffee were 50 per cent higher 
than during the corresponding period in 1956. Africa's 
production competes mainly with that of Brazil, and 
currently satisfies 15 per cent of total United States 
demand for coffee. 
The price of cacao, severely depressed during the 
interval between mid-1955 and the first quarter of 1957, 
rose by more than 20 per cent in the second quarter. 
This development was apparently inñuenced by Brazil's 
minimum price policy. 
It was previously pointed out that the most striking 
downward trend in world prices was to be noted in 
the non-ferrous metals group. Although all four of the 
metals which play a principal part in Latin American 
exports — copper, tin, lead and zinc — were affected by 
the depression, it was copper prices that suffered most, 
owing to the fact that the weakening of demand coincided 
with a considerable expansion of productive capacity 
in the chief exporter countries. During 1957 large-scale 
producers in the United States and some in Africa 
reduced their output, but without succeeding in checking 
the price decline. The most recent decrease, which took 
place at the beginning of September, brought United 
States market prices down to a level barely comparable 
with that of early 1953, when the United States abohshed 
copper price controls. At the close of May 1957, world 
copper stocks were 49.5 per cent larger than in the same 
month in 1956, totaUing 376,000 tons. During the first 
5 months of 1957, deliveries of refined copper in the 
United States amounted to only 572,000 tons, a figure 
which compares unfavourably with the 692,000 tons 
delivered during the corresponding period in 1956. 
Nevertheless, the reduction in Africa's output during 
the second quarter of 1957, as well as the rise in the price 
of aluminium, may improve market prospects. 
For the purpose of studying over-all price trends, the 
main primary commodities exported by Latin America 
were classified as shown in table 1. As can be seen, 
those from the River Plate countries — wheat, meat, 
wool and hides — displayed relatively shght fluctuations, 
and, in the aggregate, prices during the first half of 
1957 differed little from those quoted in 1955 and 1956. 
The same cannot be said of the tropical agricultural 
commodities, viz., coffee, cacao, sugar and cotton. For 
them no common denominator can be estabUshed, since 
alongside the relatively moderate fluctuations in coffee 
prices, an increase in those of sugar and some degree 
of stabihty in those of cotton are to be noted. 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA ; INDEX OF FOREIGN MARKET PRICES FOR PRIMARY EXPORT COMMODITIES 
(1954 = 100) 
1956 1956 1956 1956 1957 1957 
1955 1956 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter 1st quarter 2nd quarter 
Wheat 97.8 97.2 96.1 97.8 97.8 97.2 97.2 95.0 
Wool 92.2 89.0 82.6 89.5 90.9 93.2 100.1 111.3 
Hides 107.8 106.0 91.4 107.8 120.7 104.3 82.8 92.2 
Meat 103.3 81.4 82.3 87.6 83.9 71.1 80.3 80.3 
Group 97.4 93.1 88.6 94.4 96.0 93.3 94.7 95.4 
Coffee 72.8 74.5 71.1 73.1 76.9 76.9 76.9 74.7 
Cacao 65.0 45.8 46.9 44.0 47.6 44.5 39.9 48.8 
Sugar 99.4 106.7 100.9 102.5 102.1 122.1 181.9 190.2 
Cotton 96.1 81.3 82.9 86.0 77.7 78.7 76.1 77.1 
Group 80.0 78.6 75.9 77.6 78.8 82.0 90.6 91.3 
Copper 124.3 140,3 150.0 153.3 133.3 124.3 113.3 106.7 
Tin 102.7 109.7 110.9 105.3 107.3 115.3 109.3 107.3 
Lead 107.1 113.5 113.5 113.5 113.5 113.5 113.5 108.5 
Zinc 114.3 125.0 125.0 125.0 125.0 125.0 125.0 111.6 
Group 117.9 130.8 137.1 138.5 126.1 121.3 113.6 107.4 
Crude petroleum 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 108.9 108.9 
TOTAL 8 9 . 8 89.7 88.2 90.0 89.8 90.8 97.3 96.7 
Source: ECLA. 
The position of the non-ferrous metals and crude 
petroleum has already been discussed. It therefore only 
remains to give some idea of the situation as regards 
the over-all index. If petroleum, quotations for which 
remained stationary in 1955 and 1956, is excluded from 
the total index, the upward or downward fluctuations 
of the remaining twelve primary commodities tended 
to offset one another. Consequently, during those two 
years the over-all level of prices for Latin America's 
basic export commodities (excluding petroleum) remained 
virtually unchanged, but was approximately 10 per cent 
lower than in 1954 (see table 1). With minor variations, 
the same was true of prices during the first half of 1957, 
since the over-all index, if petroleum is excluded, dis-
played a marked degree of stability. 
3. LATIN AMERICAN IMPORT PRICE LEVELS 
The import price situation is in sharp contrast with 
that just described in relation to prices for Latin America's 
main exports of primary commodities.® Wages and cost 
increases in the United States and several European 
countries — France, Belgium, Netherlands, etc. — were 
transferred to prices, thus intensifying the inflationary 
processes in the economies concerned. In the United 
States inflation is tending to increase at an estimated 
rate of 3-4 per cent annually — faster, that is, than the 
' In default of complete statistics for Latin America, the follow-
ing analysis was based on the unit value indices for exports from 
the United States, Canada and European countries. 
average rate at which prices are rising in the European 
countries. Such price increments in the industrial coun-
tries have been of an over-all nature, and have affected 
the manufactured products — capital goods, intermediate 
materials and durable consumer goods — which form 
the major part of Latin America's imports. 
To obtain some idea of the approximate magnitude 
of these increments, it will suffice to examine table 2, 
which shows, by quarters, for 1955, 1956 and the first 
3 months of 1957, price indices in the United States, 
Canada and five of the industriaUzed countries of Europe. 
The average rise in prices in the countries mentioned 
slightly exceeded 3 per cent, this figure being principally 
determined by the higher quotations registered in the 
United States. In Canada, the upward movement was 
almost imperceptible during the first quarter of 1957, after 
the fairly considerable increments recorded during 1956. 
In Europe, on the other hand, where prices rose but 
little during the latter year, their rate of growth became 
more rapid in 1957, and within the space of 3 months 
prices increased on an average by 2 per cent. If, however, 
from the index given in table 2 prices for Germany are 
excluded, those corresponding to the other European 
countries covered in the table rose in the aggregate by 
about 3 per cent.^ 
' In France a 20 per cent devaluation has just been decreed, 
which is intended, in combination with other measures, to meet 
balance-of-payments difliculties and promote exports. The United 
Kingdom in its turn has raised the bank discount rate by two 
points. 
Table 1 
INDICES OF F.O.B. EXPORT PRICES IN COUNTRIES SUPPLYING 
LATIN AMERICA 
(1954 = 100) 
United States Canada Europe a Total 
1955 I 100.0 100.8 100.5 100.1 
II 101.0 102.0 101.3 101.1 
I l l 101.0 101.9 102.0 101.3 
IV 102.0 101.6 103.0 102.3 
1956 I 105.0 191.5 104.4 104.8 
II 105.0 104.4 105.3 105.1 
I l l 104.0 105.6 105.7 104.5 
IV 105.0 107.0 105.8 105.3 
1957 I 109.1 107.9 107.8 108.8 
Source: OEEC, Statistical Bulletin and Survey of Current Business. 
Note: The total index was weighted by each country's relative share in Latin America's total 
imports. 
" Including the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. 
It must further be pointed out that the upward trend 
in prices revealed by these indices only partly reflects 
the increase in the financial burden represented by 
imports for all the Latin American countries, since incre-
ments in freight and other import costs are not taken 
into account. For example, for countries which purchase 
large quantities of fuel from abroad, the rise in import 
prices during the first quarter of 1957 must have been 
considerably sharper than is suggested by the figures 
in table 2, since during that period petroleum prices 
and freight costs underwent a relatively marked increase. 
It should be noted that midway through the second half 
of the year petroleum freight charges dropped sub-
stantially, and this has no doubt eased the balance-of-
payments situation of those Latin American countries 
which import oil on a large scale. 
4. THE TERMS OF TRADE BY COMMODITIES 
Although the lack of certain basic statistical data 
precludes an exact appraisal of the evolution of the 
terms of trade for Latin America as a whole during 
the first part of 1957, the behaviour of export prices 
by commodities and over-all import prices as described 
above undoubtedly indicates a further deterioration. The 
same inference is suggested by a comparison of price 
indices for Latin America's primary export commodities 
with those registered for exports from the industrialized 
countries that provide the region with the bulk of its 
imports. The results of this comparison are given in 
table 3, which, within its limits, shows the terms of trade 
for the principal primary commodities which go to make 
up Latin America's exports. 
As can be seen in this table and in figure I, during 
the first quarter of 1957 the terms of trade for most 
of the commodities under consideration — with the 
exception of wool, sugar and crude petroleum — fell 
below their 1955 and . 1956 levels. It should be noted, 
furthermore, that for many primary commodities relative 
prices also deteriorated in relation to 1954, most intensive-
ly in the case of hides (24 per cent), wool (26 per cent), 
coffee (29 per cent), cacao (63 per cent) and cotton 
(30 per cent). In reality, for Latin America as a whole, 
the downward movement began in 1954, as has been 
pointed out in previous ECLA studies.® In 1955 and 
1956, however, total foreign exchange income was not 
affected, thanks to the increase in the quantum of exports. 
In other words, the decreases of 7 per cent and 3 per 
cent in the terms of trade for 1955 and 1956 were more 
than offset by the 6.5 per cent and 7.2 per cent incre-
ments in the quantum of total exports o f goods and 
services. 
It is worth noting that the growth of the export quantum 
reflected a change of policy on the part of some of the 
Latin American countries — principally Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile — in the direction of increased attention to 
the export sector. At the same time, this tendency 
coincided with intensive activity in the great industrial 
countries, whose demand for raw materials in general 
expanded during the years in question. As the world 
economic situation is no longer so favourable and has 
shown signs of changing in mid-1957, serious doubts 
arise as to Latin America's prospects of offsetting the 
deterioration of its terms of trade by an expansion of 
exports. 
Enough data are not yet available for a direct and 
convincing evaluation of the present situation as regards 
foreign exchange income — including movements of 
capital — in Latin America as a whole. Yet movements 
of monetary reserves constitute an indirect and approxi-
® See, for example, the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1955. 
(E/CN.12/421/Rev.l). United Nations publication, Sales No. : 
1956.II.G.1, and the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1956. 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA : TERMS OF T R A D E FOR P R I M A R Y EXPORT COMMODITIES • 
(1954 - 100) 
1956 1956 1956 1956 1957 
1955 1956 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th quarter 1st quarter 
Wheat 96.6 92.7 91.7 93.0 93.6 92.3 89.3 
Wool 91.1 84.8 78.8 85.2 87.0 88.5 92.0 
Hides 106.5 101.0 87.2 102.6 115.5 99.0 76.1 
Meat 102.1 77.6 78.5 83.3 80.3 67.5 73.8 
Coffee 71.9 71.0 67.8 69.5 73.6 73.0 70.7 
Cacao 64.2 43.7 44.7 41.9 45.6 42.3 36.7 
Sugar 98.2 101.7 96.3 97.5 97.7 115.9 167.2 
Cotton 95.0 77.5 79.1 81.8 74.3 74.7 69.9 
Copper 122.8 133.7 143.1 145.9 127.6 118.0 104.1 
Tin 101.5 104.6 105.8 100.2 102.7 109.5 100.5 
Lead 105.8 108.2 108.3 108,0 108.6 107.8 104.3 
Zinc 112.9 119.2 119.3 118.9 119.6 118.7 114.9 
Crude petroleum 98.8 95.3 95.4 95.1 95.0 95.0 100.1 
Source: ECLA. 
" The terms of trade given here are those resulting from the price Indices for Latin America's basic export commodities, as shown in 
table 1, and the price indices for exports from the United States, Canada and Europe, as presented in table 2. They are consequently not 
identical with the relationships which would result from applying official Latin American Import and export values. 
mate means of approach to the subject. In the first 
six months of 1956 Latin America's total monetary 
reserves increased by 268 million dollars. During the 
first five months of 1957, on the other hand, the corre-
sponding increment amounted to only 101 million. But 
both these figures were influenced by the special position 
of Venezuela's reserves. In fact, if these are excluded, 
a rise of 186 million dollars and a reduction of 75 mil-
lion result for the periods indicated in 1956 and 1957 
respectively. 
5. TRADE VALUES 
Total Latin American trade values during the first 
quarter of 1957 show increases of slightly more than 
110 million dollars (5 per cent) for exports and of 310 mil-
lion (17 per cent) for imports over the respective figures 
for the corresponding period of 1956. Furthermore, the 
total value of exports and imports in the first quarter 
of 1957 surpassed that of any three-month period in 
the previous year. With regard to imports, the rise in 
value corresponds to an increment in volume since their 
prices did not increase by more than 3 per cent during 
the period in question.® Although higher freight charges 
account for 5 per cent of the over-all increase, the rise 
in value of total imports presupposes an expansion of 
over 10 per cent in the volume of purchases abroad. 
It can be confidently stated that the volume of Latin 
American exports also increased, although on a smaller 
scale, in spite of the fact that the export value figures 
® The index of unit value for Latin American imports is based 
on the corresponding weighted index for exports from the United 
States, Canada and 5 European countries. See table 2, footnote ». 
Note table 5, p. 238. 
conceal many very important discrepancies which are 
due to the divergent and, at times, contradictory 
tendencies displayed by the external prices and volume 
of the principal exports. 
In order to show the differences in current export 
value more clearly, countries with similar types of exports 
have been grouped together (see table 4). 
In the first place it may be observed that the only 
group of countries whose exports declined was that 
comprising Mexico and Peru which together registered 
a drop of 23 per cent during the first three months of 
1957 as against the figure for the corresponding period 
in 1956. The exports from this group during the early 
months of 1956 consisted largely of cotton. This item 
was unusually large, as Mexico thereby hoped to forestall 
any adverse effects of the United States' surplus disposal 
policy. In spite of these exceptionally large sales, however, 
the joint exports o f this group are estimated to have 
dropped by more than 5 per cent. 
In the second place, it should be pointed out that the 
group of countries — numerically in the majority — 
which export mainly tropical agricultural commodities, 
recorded an increment in value of some 4 per cent only. 
In view of world market prices for their principal exports 
— coffee, cacao, sugar and cotton — it is more than 
likely that this increment was primarily a reflection of 
price behaviour and not an indication of any over-all 
expansion in the volume of sales abroad. 
The group of countries exporting forest products 
and agricultural and livestock commodities from the 
temperate zones recorded an appreciable increase, thus 
maintaining the upward trend begun during the last 
quarter of 1956. This increase may be attributed princi-
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA : CURRENT VALUE OF EXPORTS, BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES 
(Millions of dollars) 
Group of countries 
1956 




between first quarters 
Millions 
of dollars Percentage 
Exporters of tropical agricultural commodities 
Exporters of temperate-climate agricultural com 
modities and forest products ' 
Exporters of minerals " 
Exporters of more highly diversified commodi 
ties 0 
Venezuela 
Total for Latin America 
8 9 1 . 8 
3 0 1 . 0 
1 1 9 . 5 
3 2 8 . 9 
5 1 0 . 1 
9 0 6 . 3 
2 7 4 . 3 
1 8 4 . 7 
2 5 6 . 3 
5 1 0 . 4 
8 3 1 . 2 
2 7 4 . 0 
1 5 4 . 1 
2 8 8 . 9 
5 3 5 . 3 
7 7 8 . 1 
3 4 2 . 3 
1 9 5 . 0 
3 0 2 . 5 
5 6 7 . 2 
2 , 1 5 1 . 3 2 , 1 3 2 . 0 2 , 0 8 3 . 5 2 , 1 8 5 . 7 
9 2 5 . 3 
3 4 3 . 2 
1 4 3 . 5 
2 5 2 . 8 
5 9 7 . 6 
2 , 2 6 3 . 0 
3 3 . 5 
4 2 . 8 
2 4 . 0 
- 7 6 . 1 
8 7 . 5 
1 1 1 . 7 
3.8 
1 4 . 2 
20.0 
- 2 3 . 1 
1 7 . 2 
5 . 2 
Source: ECLA, on the bsisis of official statistics. 
• Including Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Panama. 
" Including Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 
« Including Bolivia and Chile. 
' Including Mexico and Peru. 
pally to the volume of exports, in view of the price 
trends for such commodities on the international market. 
The current value o f sales abroad was also considerably 
higher for the group formed by the principal mineral 
exporters, although prices slumped during the first 
quarter of 1957. The increment in the volume of exports 
was considerably larger than that o f the current value 
of total sales for both Chile and Bolivia, although it 
was much greater in the case o f the former. 
Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA : VARIATIONS IN CURRENT VALUE OF 
EXPORTS IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1957 IN RELA-
TION TO THE CORRESPONDING PERIOD IN 1956 
Increase or decrease 
(millions of dollars) Percentage 
Argentina 54.6 24.3 
Chile 25.4 25.3 
Ecuador 3.4 20.4 
Peru 0 .5 0 .7 
Venezuela 87.5 17.2 
Cuba 21.3 12.1 
Nicaragua 6.4 39.8 
Panama 0 .5 6.1 
Dominican Republic 5 .2 14.6 
Bolivia - 1 . 4 - 7 . 4 
Brazil - 1 . 7 - 0 . 5 
Colombia - 5 . 7 - 3 . 9 
Paraguay —2.1 —23.3 
Uruguay - 9 . 7 - 1 4 . 5 
El Salvador - 2 . 7 - 4 . 9 
Guatemala - 0 . 4 - 1 . 0 
Mexico - 7 6 . 6 - 2 9 . 4 
Other countries 6.7 15.3 
TOTAL 1 1 1 . 7 5 . 2 
Source: ECLA. on the basis of official statistics. 
Finally, the current value o f Venezuelan exports rose 
steeply once again, partly owing to the situation o f the 
world petroleum market after the events in the Suez 
Canal zone. 
Table 5 shows the exact export situation of each Latin 
American country during the first quarter o f 1957 and 
confirms the foregoing statements in greater detail. It 
also reveals the discrepancies between the countries' 
export trends, which were strongly influenced by price 
fluctuations, on the one hand, and by the efforts made 
to expand the volume o f exports, on the other. 
6. TRADE BETWEEN LATIN AMERICA AND THE PRINCIPAL 
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 
After the recovery of the European and Japanese 
markets in the post-war years, Latin America's trade 
with the United States, Europe and other geographical 
areas tended to follow a set pattern, 60 per cent going 
to the United States, a little more than 30 per cent to 
western Europe and the remainder to the other areas. 
The changes that have occurred latterly in these propor-
tions have been short-lived and have amounted to no 
more than incidental adjustment o f reciprocal demand 
even though trade competition between the regions has 
become progressively keener. 
In the first place, Latin American imports into the 
United States, Western Europe, Canada and Japan 
during the first quarter o f 1957 underwent some relatively 
important changes in comparison with the same period 
in 1956. For instance, the United States share o f the 
total dropped from 57 to 53 per cent in 1957, while that 
o f Western Europe rose from a little more than 32 per 
cent in the first quarter o f 1956 to almost 40 per cent 
in the equivalent period in 1957. This was mainly due 
to the increase recorded by certain European countries, 
particularly France, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. 
Figure I 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : E X P O R T S A N D I M P O R T S B Y C O U N T R I E S 
(SEMI-LOGARITHMIC SCALE) 
IMPORTS FROM 
L A T I N AMERICA 
EXPORTS T O 
L A T I N AMERICA 
UNITED STATES FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
2001 
FRAMCE UNITED KINGDOM 
Table 6 
IMPORTS F R O M LATIN AMERICA 
(F.o.b. values in millions of dollars) 


















States Canada Japan Total 
Brazil 1956 I 19.0 5 .4 10.4 9 .0 5 .7 13.0 11.1 3.3 104.4 204.4 6 .7 13.5 329.0 
1956 Average 25.0 6 .6 13.1 7.5 6 .6 16.3 12.8 3.1 119.6 186.3 7 .7 10.9 324.5 
1956 IV . 28.7 9 .2 13.8 7 .7 8.8 14.9 15.0 3 .7 132.1 161.9 8 .6 9 .8 312.4 
1957 I 23.1 7.1 15.1 7.0 8 .0 13.3 12.3 4 .3 119.9 215.3 7 .0 10.1 352.3 
Colombia 1956 I 10.3 2.1 0.8 0 .8 3.1 1.3 3.8 0 .9 26.0 117.7 5 .9 0.5 150.1 
1956 Average 9.5 1.9 0.7 0 .6 2.7 1.0 3.5 1.1 23.3 102.3 5.1 0.4 131.1 
1956 IV 8.5 1.5 0.8 0 .6 2 .0 1.9 3.7 0 .6 21.2 19.\ 4 .2 0.6 105.1 
1957 I 7.1 2 .0 1.3 0 .2 3 .0 4.1 3.3 1.0 23.4 96.3 4 .0 0.7 124.4 
Other exporters of coffee and cacao . . 1956 I 13.5 5.5 3.2 3.1 2 .2 8.8 1.9 1.7 43.4 102.7 3.5 3 .0 152.6 
1956 Average 22.8 4 .9 2.0 3.1 2.8 9 .9 2 .0 2 .5 52.5 73.5 3.7 7.1 136.8 
1956 IV 25.5 2 .6 1.5 3.4 2 .2 5.4 2.0 2.3 48.0 81.3 4.1 2 .0 135.4 
1957 I 25.2 5 .4 5 .4 3.5 8 .2 19.5 2 .0 4 . 2 llA 94.4 4.3 0 .9 177.0 
Total for exporters of coffee and 
cacao 1956 I 42.8 13.0 14.4 12.9 11.0 23.1 16.8 5.9 173.8 424.8 16.1 17.0 631.7 
1956 Average 57.3 13.4 15.8 11.2 12.1 27.2 18.2 6.7 195.4 362.2 16.5 18.4 592.5 
1956 IV 62.7 13.3 16.1 11.7 13.0 22.2 20.7 6 .6 201.3 322.3 16.9 12.4 552.9 
1957 I 55.4 14.5 21.8 10.7 19.2 36.9 17.6 9 .5 220.6 406.0 15.3 11.7 653.6 
Argentina 1956 I 28.5 0 .4 13.8 12.6 3.3 66.0 1.0 1.4 138.1 47.4 0 .6 8.7 194.8 
1956 Average 31.8 7.3 16.7 15.9 7 .4 56.4 1.6 2.8 150.9 33.2 1.0 7.8 192.9 
1956 IV 43.2 8 .6 12.9 22.6 11.2 53.8 1.5 3 .6 167.1 24.9 1.1 5.9 199.0 
1957 I 30.0 8 .0 13.2 20.3 22.5 69.1 2 .9 4 .0 184.4 39.2 0 .7 3 .4 227.7 
Uruguay 1956 I 5.3 1.9 5.6 2.8 4 ,2 12.6 0 .6 1.4 37.2 11.6 0.3 49.1 
1956 Average 7 .4 1.5 3 .2 2 .6 3.7 7.5 0 .6 1.2 30.1 6.3 0 .2 0.8 37.4 







1956 IV 1.5 0.3 3.8 1.7 3.5 7.5 1.6 0 .4 28.6 71.3 0 .8 19.0 119.7 
1957 I 6.3 0.3 3.9 1.2 0 .9 9 .4 2.3 1.1 32.4 122.2 2 .0 9.3 165.9 
1956 I 8 .0 2.7 2.8 2.7 20.2 23.6 10.9 0 .2 75.7 165.0 41.5 0.1 282.3 
1956 Average 10.9 3.9 5.8 4 .6 24.8 23.9 9.8 0 .6 88.5 174.4 46.1 0 .4 309.4 
1956 IV 16.3 5.6 8.5 7.7 24.6 27.5 12.5 1.0 107.5 192.5 51.8 1.4 353.2 
1957 I 18.3 4.3 13.0 9 .8 33.0 42.1 14.3 1.4 138.5 228.8 51.8 1.8 420.9 
1956 I 28.0 6.2 4.7 3.3 3 .0 5.3 4 .4 2.3 61.6 123.3 17.0 21.6 223.5 
1956 Average 22.6 4.1 3.7 2 .9 2.3 4 .0 3 .2 2 .8 48.0 100.1 9 .2 27.8 185.1 
1956 IV 21.1 3.9 4 .0 2 .2 1.6 3.7 3.8 4 .4 45.8 89.1 2 .8 43.1 180.8 
1957 I 14.7 4 .4 9.8 2 .4 2.8 4.3 1.7 3 .6 44.6 121.1 3 .2 31.5 200.4 
1956 I 17.2 0.6 2 .0 9 .0 0 .3 13.6 0 .7 1.6 50.5 48.0 0.1 0.5 99.1 
1956 Average 19.5 0 .6 2 .0 6 .7 0 .8 18.3 0 .6 2 .2 55.1 58.9 0 .4 1.0 115.4 
1956 IV 19.5 0 .9 1.7 7 .7 0 .6 19.2 0.1 2.3 56.5 65.1 0 .8 1.2 123.6 
1957 I 19.7 0 .6 3 .0 4 .2 0 .6 22.3 1.6 1.9 58.3 54.0 0.3 2 .6 115.2 
1956 I 7.8 1.4 2 .2 0 .5 1.9 9 .7 0 .4 2.1 28.5 34.5 0.3 3.9 67.2 
1956 Average 9 .7 2.7 2.3 0 .8 1.8 10.2 0 .4 2.9 32.4 33.5 0 .6 5.6 72.1 
1956 IV 10.3 3.6 3.0 1.6 1.7 11.0 0 .4 4 .8 38.5 32.1 0 .8 10.3 81.7 
1957 I 11.0 2.9 2 .5 2.3 0 .7 8 .9 0.8 1.6 34.5 32.6 0 .6 6.6 74.3 
1956 I 0.8 0.3 _ 0.1 7.3 8.8 10.9 0.3 20.0 
1956 Average 0 .7 0 .2 — — 0 .2 6.8 — — 8.0 10.4 — 0.5 18.9 
1956 IV 0 .7 0 .2 — — 0.1 8.3 — — 9 .4 9 .0 — 0.6 19.0 
1957 I 0.7 0.3 — — 0.3 11.5 — — 12.8 4 .2 — 0 .2 17.2 
1956 I 146.6 27.1 47.6 44.1 46.3 174.8 36.9 15.6 616.4 1,003.6 80.0 56.8 1,756.8 
1956 Average 167.5 34.6 52.2 46.1 55.8 165.3 36.7 20.5 648.3 907.3 80.0 76.0 1,711.6 
1956 IV 184.1 37.8 53.2 58.7 59.8 160.1 41.1 24.2 686.3 818.1 77.7 95.2 1,677.3 
1957 I 164.7 37.7 73.1 55.2 86.6 218.0 42.2 24.9 777.7 1,030.1 76.6 67.5 1,951.9 




















States Canada Japan Total 
Brazil 1956 I 12.2 3.8 6.7 7 .4 1.3 7 .9 8.3 4 .0 77.2 74.7 2 .5 11.3 165.7 
1956 Average 19.5 3 .6 8.2 6 .6 2 .0 10.6 10.3 4 .7 91.9 73.2 3.3 11.3 179.7 
1956 IV 30.3 3.9 12.2 7 .9 2 .7 13.0 13.5 6 .2 118.8 16A 4.1 11.2 210.5 
1957 I 25.6 3.6 10.9 8 .2 3 .0 12.9 11.9 5.3 107.5 87.2 5.5 5 .4 205.6 
Colombia 1956 I 17.8 3.7 3.1 1.2 2.1 5 .6 3.3 2 .9 42.5 89.6 4 . 2 1.8 138.1 
1956 Average 16.6 3 .0 3 .4 1.5 1.7 5 .6 3.3 2 .5 40.2 78.8 4 .5 1.9 125.4 
1956 IV 14.9 1.9 2.8 2 .0 1.5 5.5 2 .4 2 .7 35.7 55.6 4 .1 2 .0 91A 
1957 I 6 .9 3.0 3.4 1.5 1.6 2 .7 1.9 1.6 24.3 44.2 4.3 1.1 73.9 
Other exporters of coffee and cacao . 1956 I 9 .5 3.4 1.9 3.9 2 .4 7.5 0 .7 1.5 32.4 86.5 5 .4 3.8 128.1 
1956 Average 11.4 3.1 2.6 3 .4 2.8 7 .2 1.2 1.7 35.1 87.6 5.5 3 .4 131.6 
1956 IV 12.2 2 .4 3.4 3 .7 2.8 7 .6 1.3 1.9 36.7 91.7 5 .4 3 .6 137.4 
1957 I 13.3 3.1 3.5 3.5 4 .0 6.8 0 .9 1.7 38.7 90.8 5 .8 4.1 139.4 
Total for exporter? cf coffee and 
cacao 1956 I 39.5 10.9 11.7 12.5 5.8 21.0 12.3 8 .4 152.1 250.8 12.1 16.9 431.9 
1956 Average 47.5 9 .6 14.2 11.5 6.5 23.4 14.8 8 .9 167.1 239.5 13.3 16.6 436.5 
1956 IV 57.4 8 .2 18.4 13.6 7 .0 26.1 17.2 10.8 191.2 223.7 13.6 16.8 445.3 
1957 I 45.8 9.7 17.8 13.2 8.6 22.4 14.7 8 .6 170.5 222.2 15.6 10.6 418.9 
Argentina 1956 I 24.0 1.2 7.3 11.9 9 .4 11.2 1.9 3 .4 78.6 45.8 0 .9 17.8 143.1 
1956 Average 24.7 3.9 7.9 12.2 5.4 12.4 6 .6 4 . 6 86.5 53.1 1.6 9 .7 150.9 
1956 IV 24.1 5.3 8.5 16.8 3 .2 14.9 14.0 6 .1 102.5 60.5 2.3 2.5 167.8 
1957 I 24.2 3.9 9.7 14.4 3.3 19.0 8.8 5 .9 98.3 76.2 2.3 2 .8 179.6 
Uruguay 1956 I 3.8 0 .7 1.2 3.1 0 .9 3 .4 1.7 1.6 18.1 7.3 0 .6 1.6 27.6 
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1956 IV 6.2 2 .9 3.4 1.6 2 .0 
1957 I 6.1 2 .2 4.4 1.4 1.2 
Venezuela 1956 I 18.3 8.6 6,6 7.9 5.6 
1956 Average 22.1 7 .2 7.9 8.7 7.3 
1956 IV 26.5 5.7 8.6 11.4 7.5 
1957 I 24.6 7.3 9 .0 10.4 6.3 
Mexico 1956 I 10.8 2.7 3.0 7.6 2 .2 
1956 Average 13.1 2.8 3.0 6.9 1.8 
1956 IV 13.8 3.7 3 .2 7 .6 2 .2 
1957 I 14.3 2.8 4 .0 7 .0 2 .0 
Chile 1956 I 7 .2 0 .4 0.7 2.5 0 .5 
1956 Average 9.4 0 .6 2.9 1.5 0 .7 
1956 IV 12.4 0 .7 3.7 1.9 0 .6 
1957 I 14.0 0 .6 2.0 1.4 0 .6 
Peril 1956 I 5.3 1.9 3.3 1.4 1.0 
1956 Average 7.4 2 .0 2.8 1.5 1.8 
1956 IV 9.1 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.8 
1957 I 8.4 2 .0 2.8 1.6 1.6 
Bolivia 1956 I 2.8 0 .6 0.6 0.3 0.3 
1956 Average 2.9 0 .4 0.8 0 .4 0 .5 
1956 IV 2.8 0 .4 0.6 0.5 0 .2 
1957 I 2.6 0 .4 0 .4 0 .2 0.3 
Latin America 1956 I 123.2 29.5 36.9 48.8 28.0 
1956 Average 141.7 32.3 45.8 48.6 26.9 
1956 IV 159.7 31.7 51.2 65.8 26.4 
1957 I 148.6 32.7 59.8 51.0 25.2 
Source: ECE, United Nations Statistical Papers, Series T ; United States Department of Commerce. 
5.7 0.4 1.6 29.0 146.2 4.6 1.0 180.8 
5.5 0.7 1.6 28.0 158.0 4.4 0.9 191.3 
30.3 2.6 3.7 88.0 153.9 7.7 3.4 253.0 
23.4 2.6 4.0 88.0 162.9 8.8 4.0 263.6 
21.4 2.5 4 .2 92.9 191.4 12.1 4.9 301.3 
22.3 2.5 3.4 90.4 209.7 7.1 4.2 311.4 
6.3 1.9 3.0 44.8 191.6 7.9 1.1 245.4 
6.7 3.0 3.9 45.4 210.1 10.1 1.8 267.4 
7.2 2.3 4.3 47.9 236.4 11.9 3.1 299.3 
7.6 3.0 3.9 47.5 217.7 11.8 2.1 279.1 
3.2 1.3 1.5 21.5 26.5 0.7 1.5 50.2 
3.7 2.4 1.4 25.5 38.6 1.1 1.9 67.1 
5.1 3.4 1.8 31.8 50.2 1.4 1.9 85.3 
4 .0 2.0 1.5 28.1 49.4 1.2 2.8 81.5 
10.0 1.2 1.7 26.7 36.6 1.8 1.7 66.8 
9.8 1.5 1.7 30.1 39.7 2.9 2.1 74.8 
8.9 1.7 1.7 30.1 43.5 4.3 2.7 80.6 
8.3 1.5 1.8 30.0 51.6 2.3 3.8 87.7 
1.5 0.3 0.3 6.8 12.0 0.3 0.2 19.3 
1.1 0.4 0.6 7.3 11.8 0.4 0.7 20.2 
1.0 0.5 0.6 6.9 11.1 0.3 0.6 8.9 
1.1 0.5 0.3 5.9 9.5 0.3 0.8 16.5 
84.0 24.0 25.3 461.3 881.5 36.1 42.4 1,421.3 
91.3 34.2 28.7 522.0 920.1 45.1 41.0 1,528.2 
99.0 44.7 34.3 577.0 1,007.4 57.6 37.9 1,679.9 
109.5 36.5 28.8 553.4 1,036.8 58.6 34.7 1,683.5 
A comparison of the statistics for exports from the 
United States, western Europe, Canada and Japan to 
Latin America does not reveal any major changes. 
Exports from the first two regions remained at the same 
level during the first three months of 1956 and 1957, 
while those from the United Kingdom and the Federal 
Republic of Germany increased appreciably. If, however, 
the last quarter of 1956 is compared with the first quarter 
of 1957, the United States contribution to the total is 
seen to have risen, while that of western Europe, with 
the exception mainly of the United Kingdom and France, 
fell appreciably. It remains to point out that in the 
majority of cases exports during the first quarter of 1957 
surpassed the average quarterly figure for 1956, the 
United States accounting for the greater part of this 
increment. 
A comparison of the figures for this group of countries' 
exports to Latin America with those of their imports 
from the same region is extremely important (see tables 6 
and 7 and figure II). While western Europe's imports 
from Latin America exceeded its exports, resulting in 
a favourable trade balance for Latin America as a whole, 
the United States sold more than it bought in Latin 
America. Moreover, in 1956 the United States bought 
less from Latin America while its sales to that region 
gradually increased. This confirms the earlier assertion 
that the United States has consolidated its positive trade 
balance with regard to Latin America. 
These statements have been summarized in tables 6 
and 7 and figure II referred to above. Table 6 gives 
statistics on imports from Latin America by European 
countries, the United States, Canada and Japan, while 
table 7 shows the exports from these countries to Latin 
America. It should be borne in mind that both tables 
give f.o.b. values, and include only 88 and 70 per cent 
of Latin American imports and exports respectively, 
although they cover almost all imports of agricultural, 
industrial and mining machinery and vehicles. For these 
reasons, the figures in the tables for over-all Latin 
American trade differ from those cited in the foregoing 
pages. 
7 , THE TRADE PATTERN OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
The changes that took place in Latin America's over-
all foreign trade pattern reflect the different trends that 
it displayed in each country. The lack o f statistics and 
detailed information on the individual countries prevents 
a more exhaustive analysis from being entered upon 
here, but it has nevertheless been possible to collect 
some foreign trade data for five of them which will be 
discussed in the following pages. 
(a) Argentina 
To judge by preliminary information, the aggregate 
value of Argentine exports during the first half of 1957 
amounted to 520.7 million dollars, or 77.5 million more 
than the total for the equivalent period in 1956. At the 
same time, imports rose to 615.7 million during the same 
period, exceeding the figure for the first half of 1956 by 
41.3 million. According to these statistics, the trade 
deficit fnr the firsf fi mnnthx o f 1957 wniild he 95.1 million 
dollars as against 131.2 and 124.7 million for the same 
periods in 1956 and 1955 respectively. This reduction 
was apparently attained without imposing further controls 
on imports than those already in force in previous years. 
These import restrictions, introduced because of Argen-
tina's inadequate capacity to import in recent years, 
were one of the main impediments to the development 
of the economy, the normal evolution of which had 
been retarded by the acute shortage of imported raw 
materials and intermediate products and by the inade-
quacy of the import substitution measures adopted in 
respect of primary commodities, and the difficulties 
arising from the unsatisfactory energy supply and trans-
port facilities. 
Argentina's aggregate foreign trade balance reveals 
important discrepancies if a comparison is made between 
the two main areas into which this trade is divided. 
For instance, it had a credit balance with the multilateral 
payments area, while its deficit with the United States 
rose from 28 million dollars in 1956 to 71 million in the 
first five months of 1957. It was obliged to draw on a 
certain amount of its gold reserves, while simultaneously 
its foreign exchange credits with the multilateral payments 
area increased and some previous debts with the same 
area were liquidated. 
As already stated, the shrinking trade deficit was the 
result of increased exports, mainly cereals, meat, wool 
and edible oils. It should be noted that the volume of 
wheat exports during the first quarter of 1957 was ap-
proximately the same as in the same period in 1956, 
although the 1956/57 harvest was slightly over 7 million 
tons, or 35 per cent more than in the foregoing period. 
It was agreed to sell 1,200,000 tons to Brazil during 
the current year at the prevailing world market price, 
for an estimated value of some 65 million dollars. Similar 
contracts were signed with Chile for the sale of 200,000-
300,000 tons. 
As the expectations for the disposal of the exportable 
maize surplus did not materialize, sales abroad will be 
no higher than in the preceding year, and the loss is 
estimated at over 40 milUon dollars. 
The value o f meat exports rose by 24 million dollars 
in 1957 — an increase of 13 per cent over their value 
for the first half of 1956 — while their volume expanded 
by 16 per cent. These two percentages show that, during 
the first half o f the current year, the average price of 
meat fell again slightly, whereas meat exports maintained 
the pronounced upward trend that had characterized 
them in 1956, when 11.2 million head of cattle were 
slaughtered, or 1 million more than those produced. 
Practically the entire increase in the various kinds of 
meat exported by Argentina consisted of chilled beef, 
the volume of which doubled as compared with 1956, 
while exports of the other kinds either expanded slightly 
or remained stationary. 
With regard to imports, attention should be drawn 
to the continuous increase in purchase of fuel and 
lubricants. In the first 6 months of 1957, their value was 
estimated at 149 million dollars (24 per cent of the total) 
as against 103 million (18 per cent) for the same period 
in 1956. Imnorts of textiles and textile manufactures 
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also rose from 13 million dollars in the first half of 1956 
to 27 million in 1957, increasing their relative share of 
the total from 2.2 to 3.8 per cent. On the other hand, 
imports of foodstuffs and of iron and iron manufactures 
recorded a decline. No significant changes were observed 
for the other items. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that Argentina 
received 56.1 million dollars during the first half of 
1957, as part of a loan from the Export-Import Bank 
to finance the purchase of machinery and industrial 
equipment. Including this loan, the credits extended to 
Argentina by the Bank totalled 216.1 miUion dollars. 
(b) Brazil 
During the first half of 1957, Brazil's foreign trade 
situation deteriorated, showing a deficit of more than 
100 milhon dollars in contrast to its credit balance of 
171 miUion during the first half of 1956. Moreover, 
Brazil has to pay approximately 188 miUion dollars, 
worth of foreign exchange in 1957 for servicing of 
debts. Its international holdings shrunk from 612 million 
dollars in December 1956 to 573 million at the end of 
March 1957. 
This deterioration in the trade balance, which began 
in the first quarter of 1957, became more pronounced 
during the next three months. In fact, although aggregate 
exports for January-March were approximately equiva-
lent to those for the same months in 1956, they were 
considerably less than the totals for the three remaining 
quarters. From April-June 1957, exports of the three 
main items — coffee, cotton and cacao — decreased 
although for different reasons. In the case of coffee, 
of which 2.2 million bags — 22.6 per cent — less were 
sold in the first half of 1957 than in the same period in 
1956, the cause of the decline lay in the reduced demand 
for Brazilian coffee on the world market. Exports of 
this crop to the United States dropped 22.5 per cent 
in the periods indicated, while to other parts of the world 
they fell off by 24.6 per cent. This decline did not coincide 
with a similar falling-off in world demand for coffee. 
Global imports amounted to 18.7 milhon bags in the 
first half of 1957 i.e., only 3.2 per cent less than the 
19.3 million bags imported in the first half of 1956. 
During the same periods, the United States imported 
a total of 10.4 and 11.2 miUion bags respectively i.e., 
only 7 per cent less in 1957. Thus the greater part of the 
decline in BraziUan exports was due to the fact that other 
coffee exporters were able to compete more favourably 
on the world market. In this respect, some reference 
should be made to the continuous expansion of the 
African contribution to United States coffee imports, 
which constituted 15 per cent of the total in the first 
half of the current year as against only 10 per cent in 
the first half o f 1956. 
Cotton exports were scarcely a third of their volume 
for the same period in 1956. This phenomenon was a 
resuh of the heavy reduction in suppUes following an 
appreciable drop in production. This drop induced the 
Brazilian Government to fix maximum export quotas 
for the first months of 1957 in order to give priority 
to the supplying of the internal market. 
The drop in cacao exports, which from January 
to May 1957 were 39 per cent lower than for the same 
months in 1956, was due mainly to the fixing of official 
maximum export prices which were considerably higher 
than those quoted on the international market. This 
measure was naturally adopted when Brazilian exports 
constituted the principal and most immediate source of 
supply (the African crops reaching the market in the 
second half of the year), but even so buyers showed 
considerable resistance and the high quotations for 
Bahia cacao were of a purely nominal character. 
Although insufficient data are available on imports, it 
is known that during the first quarter of 1957 they were 
slightly higher than during the first and second quarters 
of 1956. As yet, there has been no sign of any intensifica-
tion of import restrictions designed to offset the appre-
ciable trade deficit for the first half of 1957. 
(c) Chile 
The slump in world copper prices during the current 
year has constituted a serious obstacle to the fulfilment 
of the ChUean Government's economic stabilization 
programme, since the income from exports of this metal 
is vital to the economic life of the country. Although 
Chile has succeeded in defending itself to a certain 
extent against the depressive effect of the status of its 
primary export on the world market by increasing its 
export volume and thereby partiaUy compensating for 
the faU in prices, its success during the first quarter of 
1957 was purely relative and could not be maintained 
during the second quarter. Actually not only did copper 
prices abroad continue to faU during the latter period, 
but there was also a substantial contraction of demand. 
Thus, although copper exports during the first quarter 
of 1957 were 25 per cent above their level during the 
same period in 1956, the increment for the whole period 
January-June was no more than 19 per cent. Furthermore, 
no official decision was taken to restrict copper produc-
tion which, in the first half o f 1957, exceeded its volume 
for the first half of 1956 by 6.7 per cent. If a comparison 
is made between the first quarters only, this increment 
amounted to 20 per cent. 
In contrast to the 19 per cent rise in copper exports 
during the first half of 1957, the average price for copper 
in New York dropped 27.5 per cent below that for the 
first half of 1956. In the following months, prices con-
tinued to fall and it was not untU mid-September that the 
market appeared to have achieved a certain degree of 
stabihty, although the prevaiUng price of 28.5 cents 
per pound in New York was 32.3 per cent lower than 
the average price in 1956. 
The second most important Chilean export — nitrate — 
also passed through a critical period. Production in the 
first 4 months of 1957 feU 10 per cent below its level 
during the equivalent period in 1956, in which year it 
had already been considerably lower than in 1955. An 
even greater reduction took place in the volume of 
exports which, in the first five months of 1957, was 
19 per cent lower than in the same period in 1956. 
According to data for the first quarter of 1957, Chile 
had a favourable trade balance of 19 million doUars. 
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If this is compared with its balance for the first quarter 
of 1956, when there was a deficit of 6 million dollars, 
the situation appears to be very favourable. It should 
be remembered, however, that the deficit for the first 
three months of 1956 was completely absorbed during 
the course of the year and that a credit balance of 
191 million dollars was recorded at the end of 1956. 
In view of prevailing trends in the copper market there is 
no likelihood that this situation will recur, and it is 
to be feared that the small credit balance accumulated 
during the first quarter of 1957 will be reduced in the 
following months. 
The total value of imports during the first quarter 
o f 1957 —106 million dollars — was exactly equal to 
their total value for the first quarter o f 1956. Yet in 
view of the deterioration in the copper market in recent 
months, the authorities raised the percentage for advance 
deposits in respect of a large number of goods, a measure 
which will undoubtedly succeed in maintaining imports 
at their 1956 level, if not in substantially reducing their 
volume. 
(d) Colombia 
During the fiurst five months of 1957, the pattern of 
Colombia's trade showed very different tendencies from 
those observed during the similar period in 1956. The 
total value of exports dropped to 215 million dollars 
— 1 0 per cent lower than the corresponding figure for 
the first five months of 1956 — while imports amounted 
to only 155.8 million dollars i.e., 47.2 per cent less than 
in January-May of the previous year. This exceptional 
decline in imports enabled the country to devote a greater 
proportion of its current foreign exchange earnings to 
the payment of the large trade debts it had contracted 
in 1955 and 1956. At the beginning of 1957, the Colom-
bian authorities came to an agreement with their foreign 
creditors to liquidate 60 per cent of their debts in cash 
and to pay the remaining 40 per cent by means of bonds 
maturing in 2 years. The very appreciable reduction in 
purchases abroad has led to the gradual liquidation of 
the majority of these outstanding trade debts and 
Colombia's international reserves showed a decrease 
of only some 10 million dollars at the beginning of July 
in comparison with their level at the end of December 
1956. 
In mid-June of the current year the Colombian Govern-
ment adopted several measures to improve the economic 
situation of the country and its balance of payments by 
introducing a large-scale exchange reform. The main 
object of this reform was to eliminate the complicated 
system of quantitative restrictions and multiple rates of 
payments in force, and to place foreign currency quota-
tions on a more realistic basis. Hitherto almost all 
imports — 95 per cent in 1955 and 81 per cent in 1956 — 
were paid at the official exchange rate which, in spite 
of the various surcharges levied, was still considerably 
lower than the rate of payment for imports on the free 
market. This over-valuation of the peso acted, to a 
large extent, as a strong stimulus to imports. When the 
reform entered into force, the official rate of exchange 
was abolished and replaced by a free market on which 
foreign currency quotations were governed by the laws 
of supply and demand. The operation of the new system 
may be summarized briefly as follows : 
(fl) All export earnings in foreign currency are 
exchanged in the Banco Central for " exchange certifi-
cates " or " foreign exchange securities" issued in 
United States dollars and liable to a 15 per cent export 
tax ; 
(b) These certificates and securities are freely nego-
tiable on the market within a period of 15 days at the 
prevailing market rate,ii but they are valid only for the 
payment of items appearing on the list of free imports, 
for imports that have been previously authorized, or 
for certain payments on the invisible items account ; 
(c) All imports are liable to a 10 per cent duty which 
has to be paid in dollars when the importers present the 
securities or certificates to be exchanged for drafts payable 
abroad to cover the respective imports ; 
id) The various percentages representing the advance 
deposit, which importers had to make depending on 
the value of their imports, were standardized at the rate 
of 20 per cent. 
The reform thus has two fundamental aspects : to 
exporters it implies a considerable increase in national 
currency earnings that will be appreciable even after 
payment of the 15 per cent export duty. As a result of 
this increment, the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros 
was able to raise supporting prices for coffee within the 
country. With regard to exports o f secondary importance, 
there was no fundamental change in the situation, since 
at the end of 1956 they were already protected by a 
device similar to the " foreign exchange securities" 
system. So far as importers are concerned, the restrictive 
effect of the reform is partly attributable to the higher 
exchange rate ^^  and partly to the additional 10 per cent 
duty on drafts payable abroad. Nevertheless, the part 
played by the free rate of exchange as a means of 
restricting imports is, to a certain extent, only supple-
mentary to the basic control device consisting of an 
expanded list of prohibited imports arid a smaller list 
of imports requiring prior authorization. 
Income derived from export and import duties was 
set aside for the creation of an exchange stabilization 
fund to cushion the effects of fluctuations in foreign 
exchange security quotations on the free market. 
The repercussions of the exchange reform adopted in 
mid-June cannot be fully assessed in so short a time. 
Nevertheless, mention may be made of the fresh impulse 
given to coffee exports which, from February onwards, 
had shown a decided downward trend. Between March 
and June the monthly volume of exports, which normally 
varies between 400,000 and 500,000 bags, dropped to 
1® N o information is available on the amounts still outstanding. 
After 15 days, the exchange certificates may be sold only 
to the Banco de la República at the prevailing seller's rate, and at 
a 2 per cent discount. One of the main purposes of these certificates 
is apparently to prevent exporters from accumulating foreign 
exchange for speculative purposes. 
Foreign exchange securities were quoted in recent wieks at 
more than 100 per cent above their previous official quotation. 
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less than 300,000. Yet the total number of bags exported 
increased considerably in July, reaching more than 
600,000. In spite of this improvement, the total number 
exported during the first 7 months of 1957 was 2.7 miUion, 
i.e., 16 per cent less than the figure of 3.2 miUion registered 
for January-July 1956. In contrast, other exports such as 
petroleum, cement, tobacco, and cotton textiles increased, 
although the last three items still represent a very small 
proportion of total exports. 
External credits totalling 87 miUion dollars were 
one of the decisive factors in the development of the 
Colombian economy during the present year. These 
credits were used to liquidate all outstanding trade debts 
to United States creditors up to 1 May, from which it 
may be assumed that Colombia's trade credit was fully 
re-established by the second half of the year. Furthermore, 
at the end of June the International Monetary Fund 
granted a stabilization loan of 25 miUion dollars (under 
the Stand-by Agreement), in order to enable the monetary 
authorities to operate in the free market for foreign 
exchange securities, and to reduce the scale of the 
fluctuations in the quotations for the latter. 
(e) Mexico 
In contrast to 1956 — when various abnormal factors 
came into play which affected in particular the export 
value of certain commodities — Mexico's foreign trade 
during the first half of 1957 reflected market trends and 
seasonal variations in agricultural production more 
faithfully. In so far as exports are concerned, the main 
changes affected cotton. In order to forestaU the possible 
adverse effects of the United States surplus disposal 
pohcy and to begin the new agricultural year with no 
cotton stocks on hand, Mexico stepped up its cotton 
exports during the first few months of 1956, and con-
tinued to export large quantities during the remainder 
of the year as a result of the bumper crop. On the other 
hand, cotton sales dropped considerably during the 
first half of 1957, for the reasons mentioned above and 
because of a somewhat poorer harvest in the correspond-
ing agricultural year. Apart from the special situation 
of cotton, other factors led to a decUne in exports of 
copper, among other items, with the result that the total 
value of Mexican exports from January to June 1957 
amounted to no more than 334.5 miUion doUars i.e., 
25 per cent less than during the same period in 1956. 
If cotton is excluded, however, this decrease represented 
only 3.3 per cent. 
Imports were also affected by certain exceptional 
factors in 1957, especiaUy an unusual rise in the import 
values of scrap, petroleum derivatives and maize, that 
of the latter being due to a poor harvest during the year 
in question. Consequently, total imports from January 
to July, which amounted to 569.8 miUion dollars, were 
10 per cent higher than those in the first half of 1956. 
The adverse trade balance of 235.3 miUion doUars was 
offset partly by the net income from tourist traffic, which 
wás estimated at some 150 miUion doUars, and partly 
The Export-Import Bank, Washington, granted 60 million, 
and other United States banks 27 million. 
by remittances from Mexican seasonal workers abroad 
which amounted to approximately 12 million. 
The total balance-sheet of goods and services, exclud-
ing returns on foreign capital invested in Mexico, showed 
a deficit of more than 70 miUion dollars for the first 
six months of the year. It should be pointed out, however, 
that the cost of some of the more important import 
items, which was estimated at a little more than 20 miUion 
dollars, was defrayed through medium- and long-term 
foreign loans and credit. 
The total volume of exports registered a drop of 
28.5 per cent in the first half of 1957 in comparison 
with the same period in 1956, but, if cotton is excluded, 
this becomes an increment of 6.8 per cent. Foreign 
tourist traffic showed an annual rate of growth simUar 
to that of 1956, which was approximately 15 per cent. 
The volume of imports was larger by 12.2 per cent, but 
their prices rose 4.1 per cent on the average, while 
those of exports increased only 3.6 per cent. As a con-
sequence of this, and in view of a decline of 0.5 per cent 
in the terms of trade together with a decrease in the 
volume of total exports, the capacity to import was 
reduced by 28 per cent. 
Nevertheless, if the special factors affecting foreign 
trade in 1956, and which gave rise to the sharp contrasts 
in the statistics for the first half of 1957 and for the 
preceding period, are borne in mind, the situation of 
this sector during the whole of the current year does not 
appear to be as unfavourable as in the first few months. 
As already pointed out, the marked decline in exports 
was due mainly to the falling-off in cotton sales ; reduc-
tions in such items as minerals and manufactured goods 
were also partly responsible and were not offset by 
increased sales of such important commodities as 
sulphur, coffee and livestock. 
From the first half of 1956 to the first half of 1957, 
cotton exports declined 74.7 per cent in volume and 
77.7 per cent in value, these figures primarily reflecting 
the unusually large sales during the first half of 1956. 
Clearing operations, designed to offset the impact of 
the unfavourable world market for this fibre, and which 
provided for certain imports to be paid for in Mexican 
exports, involved exports and imports to the value of 
71 miUion dollars in both cases in the course of 1956, 
almost 90 per cent being constituted by cotton. In May 
1957, Mexico stiU had some 17 milUon dollars' worth 
of cotton to export from the balance of the clearing 
operations carried out in 1956. In view of the large 
scale of these operations, the system of sales through 
clearing accounts wiU probably remain in force through-
out 1957. 
Coffee exports underwent a substantial increase. In 
comparison with the first half of 1956, the corresponding 
sales in the first half of 1957 showed increments of 
11 per cent and 10 per cent in volume and value respec-
tively. In order to ensure the maintenance of this level, 
the Government fixed a new official price for coffee 
which was lower than that previously in force and 
which was intended to reduce the effect of the ad valorem 
duty on this commodity. Coffee nevertheless remained 
the second most important Mexican export after cotton. 
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Tomato exports, which had been showing a downward 
trend during the whole of 1956, rose sharply in the first 
half o f 1957. The amount of 63,000 tons exported during 
the latter period represented an additional 41 per cent 
in foreign currency earnings, in spite of the lower prices 
for this crop. Cattle exports also soared, almost trebling 
their figure for the first half of 1956. Bananas, peanuts 
and sisal showed similar improvements, while sales of 
prawns, chickpeas and fodder were reduced. 
Total copper exports in the first half of 1957 declined 
42 and 56 per cent in volume and value respectively. 
While in 1955 and 1956 copper was the principal source 
of foreign exchange in the group of mineral products, 
during the first half of 1957 it was relegated to the 
fourth place after lead, petroleum and zinc. The volume 
of lead exports increased 19.7 per cent over the corre-
sponding figure for the first half of 1956, and its value 
rose 13.6 per cent. Zinc sales went up 14.2 per cent in 
volume in comparison with the period January-June 
1956, although their value increased only 13 per cent. 
During the first half of 1957, the volume of sulphur 
exports which had almost trebled from 1955 to 1956 
was 106.6 per cent greater than in the first half of 1956, 
and 97.2 per cent higher in value. This notable increment 
in the sales of Mexican sulphur abroad bears witness to 
Mexico's status as the world's second largest producer. 
It remains to add that all the minerals cited above showed 
a greater increase in volume than in value as a result of 
the drop in world prices. Petroleum exports decreased in 
value considerably in the first half of 1957, while that 
of silver exports rose 6.6 per cent. Increments in value 
were also recorded for manganese, calcium fluoride and 
barium sulphate. 
A comparison of exports of manufactured goods during 
the first six months of 1956 and 1957 shows a decline 
of 4.8 per cent in volume and 5.7 per cent in value, 
principally due to reductions in the volume and value 
of refined sugar and hemp yarns and textiles. 
The increment in total imports did not affect all the 
commodity groups and was accompanied by a change 
in the import pattern, consisting mainly in a sharp 
upward movement in both absolute and relative terms 
for non-durable consumer goods, fuels and lubricants 
and raw materials for capital goods. With regard to the 
first group mentioned, this upward movement was the 
result of increased maize imports. The other two groups, 
especially that of raw materials for capital goods, were 
equally noteworthy for a rise in prices and an increase 
in import volume. Furthermore, a significant increment 
in absolute terms was recorded for capital goods imported 
for industry and mining, and, on a lesser scale, for 
imports of durable consumer goods. The most important 
change of all was the increase in imports of non-durable 
consumer goods. 
The upward movement in imports of non-durable 
consumer goods which had been observed in 1956 
— following upon the declines recorded for 1954 and 
1955 — was much more pronounced in 1957, particu-
larly as a result of heavy purchases of maize. In 
fact, these imports, which had amounted to 400 and 
30,000 tons in the first halves of 1955 and 1956 respec-
tively, expanded to 206,000 tons in the first six months 
of 1957. This notable expansion may be attributed 
mainly to a falling-off in production, to the increasing 
use of this grain as raw material for the transforming 
industries and to the demand for it as a food for poultry 
and livestock, although some of the imports may have 
been intended to replace stocks which had diminished 
towards the end of 1956. 
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THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF BOLIVIA 
PRELIMINARY NOTE 
At the beginning of 1956 the Government of Bolivia 
requested the secretariat of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America to prepare a study on the economic 
development of Bolivia, on which a programme for the 
next few years could be based. In response to this request, 
the secretariat discussed the matter with the Bolivian 
authorities, and, early in February of the same year, 
it was arranged with the Deputy Executive Director of 
the National Commission for Co-ordination and Planning 
{Comisión Nacional de Coordinación y Planeamiento) that 
ECLA should undertake the study in question. At the 
same time, the Bolivian Government requested the 
United Nations Technical Assistance Administration 
to appoint experts to collaborate with the ECLA econo-
mists and, in particular, to analyse problems relating 
to foreign trade, industry, energy and transport, as 
well as to the social factors influencing economic develop-
ment. For the study of topics connected with agriculture, 
the co-operation of the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), through the ECLA/ 
FAO Joint Programme and the standing FAO mission 
in Bolivia, was sought and obtained. 
By agreement among these international agencies, a 
mission was constituted in mid-1956 composed of 
members of the ECLA secretariat staff and experts 
from TAA and FAO, under the direction of one of the 
economists from the secretariat. This mission worked 
at the ECLA headquarters, in Santiago, Chile, from 
July to September 1956, and, after spending October, 
November and December of the same year in Bolivia, 
returned there in February 1957 to gather the final 
data needed for the study. During their stay in Bolivia, 
the experts had the opportunity of visiting selected areas 
of the country and collecting opinions at first hand from 
high-ranking Government officials, representatives of 
private enterprise and many other persons in various 
walks of life who were cognizant of the facts and prob-
lems of Bolivia's present situation. 
The main diiSculty encountered in the execution of 
the study was the inadequacy of statistical sources and 
available data. The absence of any systematic arrange-
ments for the compilation and classification of statistics, 
the discrepancies between some of the series to hand, 
and the sporadic nature of such limited data as existed 
in almost all branches of economic and social activity, 
constituted obstacles familiar to everyone in the country 
concerned with such matters. Despite the invaluable 
co-operation of the Bolivian officials who assisted the 
* The following pages should be considered as an advance 
text and résuraé of a study which will be published shortly under 
the same title. 
mission in its endeavours to overcome such difficulties, 
part of the latter's time had to be devoted to the collec-
tion and elaboration of elementary background material 
and to searching for the necessary documents — not 
always successfully — in libraries and files. The lack 
of accurate data often compelled the experts to resort 
to estimates, which, however, were based, as far as 
circumstances permitted, on the maximum degree of 
observation and most careful appraisal possible of actual 
facts. If to these problems is added the shortness of the 
mission's stay in the country, the weak points in many 
aspects of the present study will be readily understood. 
The work of the Technical Assistance Administration 
and FAO experts who were appointed to collaborate 
with the mission provided the basis for the studies 
included here on the various sectors of the Bolivian 
economy, as well as for the analysis of its more general 
problems. The mission's work was at all times closely 
integrated, and the conclusions reached are the outcome 
of constant discussion and exchange of views among all 
its members. 
It must in justice be stressed that the present study 
could not have been carried out but for the invaluable 
co-operation of the Bolivian authorities, who unfailingly 
provided the material means and moral support in-
dispensable for its implementation. Of inestimable 
importance, from the purely technical standpoint, was 
the assistance rendered by the Ministries responsible 
for economic affairs, by the National Commission for 
Co-ordination and Planning, the Banco Central de 
Bolivia, the Statistics Department {Dirección Nacional 
de Estadística), the Mining Corporation of Bolivia 
{Corporación Minera de Bolivia), the Bolivian Develop-
ment Corporation {Corporación Boliviana de Fomento), 
the Bolivian State Petroleum Deposits {Yacimientos 
Petrolíjeros Fiscales Bolivianos) and other institutions 
of which the list is too long to be given here. Similarly 
valuable was the co-operation of the Chambers of 
Industry and Commerce, of the mining companies and 
of outstanding personalities in the fields of industry, 
trade, agriculture, mining and science. The mission was 
also able to take advantage of the wide knowledge and 
experience of the specialists attached to the United 
States co-operation programme and of the many experts 
from the United Nations and its specialized agencies 
who are permanently stationed in Bolivia ; in addition, 
it was in daily contact with the office of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, whose unflagging interest in the activities of 
the mission represented a vital contribution to the 
carrying-out of the study. 
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A . GENERAL PROBLEMS OF THE BOLIVIAN ECONOMY 
I . INTRODUCTION 
From the geographical, historical and economic points 
of view, Bolivia stands out among the Latin American 
countries as a special and highly interesting case. Broadly 
speaking, many of its characteristics are those common 
to the other countries of the region. Nevertheless, because 
of its geographical position, its physical environment, 
its population structure and the hierarchical composition 
of its society, Bolivia's history and economy display 
peculiar features of their own. It might even be asserted 
that many of the problems which have, in a less intensive 
degree, affected the economic and political evolution of 
the other countries of Latin America have assumed in 
Bolivia their most acute and dramatic form. 
The social and political development of Bolivia is 
partly explained by the country's economic and popula-
tion pattern since the time of the Incas. Bolivia can be 
divided into three clearly-distinct geographic zones. The 
first is the Altiplano or high plateau, which, bounded 
by the double chain of the Andes, has an average altitude 
of 4,000 metres, and covers 14 per cent of the territory. 
The second is formed by the low-lying plains to the east-
ward, with their tropical or sub-tropical vegetation, and 
comprises 70 per cent of the total area. And between 
these two stretches the jegion of the Valleys' which 
accounts for the remaining 16 per cent of the national 
territory. From time immemorial, the population of 
Bolivia has been concentrated on the high plateaux and 
in the valleys, especially the former, while the eastern 
lowlands are still to this day mainly virgin wilderness, 
practically marginal to the economy. In the first place 
it was the primitive community, collective farming and 
the actual origin of the race which peopled the land, 
that determined this singular distribution of the popula-
tion. Later, the mining economy was responsible. From 
the earliest years of the Conquest, the summits of the 
Andes and the Altiplano became the most famous mining 
site of the time. Potosí is the symbol of this economy 
centred upon the lodes of precious metals, where agri-
culture remained as primitive as in the past and cities 
sprang up at the pitheads or along the roads leading 
to the mines ; where fortunes lasted as long as the wealth 
of the deposits, or were spent abroad, and only poverty 
and deserted townships were left after the inevitable 
exhaustion of the veins of ore. 
Since colonial times, Bolivia has remained a mining 
country up to the present day. When there was no more 
silver, tin came to the fore and the boom in tin began 
at the close of the last century. The economy then 
continued to be as dependent on the product of the mines 
as during the colonial period. Some aspects of this new 
era bore the stamp of modern capitalism. The mita (or 
Incaic method of casting lots to determine the distribu-
tion of work) was replaced by the wage system ; modern 
plants superseded the primitive amalgamating-works ; 
and it was along metalled roads instead of the original 
bridle-paths that the ore was carried to the ports. Bolivia 
took its place as the world's second tin producer, and 
in addition possessed many other metals that enlarged 
the volume of its foreign trade. But apart from the mining 
economy, the outward aspect of the country hardly 
changed at all. In the rural areas, where the majority 
of the population dwells, the farming methods, social 
relationships and customs of the colonial and pre-
Columbian epochs still survived. As mining is carried 
on exclusively in the Altiplano, this was still the centre 
of Bolivian Ufe, while the lowlands remained neglected 
and cut off. The destination of the profits accruing from 
the mines and even the domicile of the enterprises them-
selves were outside the country, and the monetary 
economy barely embraced an incipient industry and an 
urban middle class in some few of the large towns. In 
the mid-twentieth century, Bolivia, with a per capita 
income equivalent to 82 dollars, was among the least 
developed countries in the region. 
A quarter of a century ago, two events, or rather two 
catastrophes, occurred in Bolivia which determined the 
course of its history up to the present time. The first 
was the tin crisis, which reduced the country's economy 
to incredibly low levels. Although in later years there 
were temporary booms on the tin market, since that 
time domestic factors, among them the depletion of the 
deposits, have prevented any real recovery. The second 
of these calamities was the Chaco war, which apart 
from the enormous cost to Bolivia in terms of human life 
and material expenditure and the loss of part of its 
territory, led to an internal political crisis which was 
both deep-rooted and prolonged. The rising generation 
of politicians, eager for economic and social reform, 
found itself confronted with the inescapable reality of 
an impoverished nation. From the mid-thirties onwards, 
necessity or impatience for some form of action led to 
ambitious economic measures, and almost all Govern-
ments indulged still more freely in the practice, already 
chronic in Bolivia, of adopting dangerous financial 
expedients. The result, from the economic standpoint, 
was the initiation of an inflationary process which, with 
the passage of time, has become the most serious ever 
experienced by any country in America. 
The economic, political and social crisis culminated 
in the revolution of April 1952, which was characterized 
by the application of measures that radically transformed 
the country's traditional economic structure. These 
included the nationalization of the large mining com-
panies, the land reform, active participation in trade 
union policy and programmes for the diversification of 
the economy. The changes that have taken place have 
had repercussions on all aspects of Bolivian life. On 
the one hand, the nation has assumed responsibility 
for its most important economic activity. On the other, 
the traditional patterns governing social relationships 
within the agrarian economy have been destroyed, with 
the intention, as yet unfulfilled, of replacing them by 
more modern systems of land tenure and farming based 
on the productive use of capital. Moreover, an organized 
working class prepared to fight for its rights has acquired 
a position of singular pre-eminence in mining and indus-
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try, where trade union interests frequently clash with the 
need for disciphne and material progress. Lastly, in a 
period when the resources of the State and of the economy 
as a whole are at a low ebb, ambitious projects for the 
economico-geographical integration of the eastern plains 
have been undertaken or tested. 
Since all these changes coincided with serious fluctua-
tions in the prices of Bolivia's exports, the country's 
economic situation rapidly deteriorated during the past 
four years. The inflationary process has become increas-
ingly acute and Bolivia, in order to survive, has had to 
use up its international reserves, its foreign credit and 
even its capital. The economic aid granted to the country 
by the United States Government since 1953, although 
reaching higher figures than anywhere else in the western 
hemisphere, has partially eased but not completely 
remedied the situation. Faced with the prospect of chaos, 
the BoUvian Government decided to take energetic 
action, and in December 1956 began to apply a stabiliza-
tion policy, the results of which are awaited with interest 
in the region. 
Stabilization is the immediate target of the Govern-
ment and the people of Bolivia, and rightly so. Unless 
inflation — daily more serious in the last few months — 
can be halted, the outlook is gloomy indeed. It is natural, 
therefore, that every effort should be made and every 
kind of sacrifice exacted to restore order in the country's 
economy. But at the same time, Bolivia will have to make 
sure that it does not neglect its economic development. 
The evils by which it has always been beset, especially 
in recent years, are due in the final analysis to the low 
productivity of its human resources, to the absence of 
capital formation, to the concentration of its activities 
on a single branch of production, to the lack of a spirit 
of enterprise ; in a word, to the under-developed state 
of its economy. However daring the social reforms of 
the last few years, they would have achieved greater 
success in a shorter time if the country had reached a 
more advanced stage of development and diversification. 
Moreover, before the revolutionary measures were 
adopted, the inflationary process had already begun, 
and was attributable in no small measure to Bolivia's 
economic and institutional backwardness. 
A short-term stabilization policy and a course of action 
designed to promote economic development are not 
necessarily incompatible. Although they may conflict in 
isolated cases, the future of stabilization is bound up 
with the effort to increase and diversify production which 
the Bolivian economy proves capable of putting forth. 
If the corrective measures do not strike at the root of 
the evils, the danger of further inflation will stiU exist. 
The very changes that have taken place in BoUvia during 
the last few years, despite the fact that their immediate 
results have been to some extent negative, open up 
possibilities for the acceleration of development once 
the country has emerged from the inevitable phase of 
disorganization. Mining is nowadays contributing most 
of its product to the internal economy, the archaic and 
pre-capitalist social relationships of the agricultural 
sector have been wiped out, and it is in the interest of 
the workers to raise their standards of productivity and 
efficiency in order to defend and consolidate the ground 
they have gained in the field of social welfare. Undoubted-
ly, many serious problems have still to be tackled. But 
the material conditions and human qualities required 
for their solution are also to be found in Bolivia, as has 
recently become apparent in the energy and good faith 
with which the task of curbing inflation has been shoul-
dered. 
I I . NATIONAL INCOME AND INVESTMENT 
1. Developments during the first half of the twentieth 
century 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to carry out a detailed 
study of the economic growth of Bolivia before the 
present decade. The almost total absence of all kinds 
of censuses and statistics and the tenuous and sporadic 
nature of existing information make it difficult to prepare 
representative series of the principal activities of the 
country. Only in 1950 was a demographic and agricultural 
census carried out, although a very deficient population 
census was made in 1900. Beginning in 1950 other series 
are also available which, even though they do not fulfil 
all statistical requirements, at least provide a basis for 
making estimates of the national income and product 
and for the preparation of other macro-economic series. 
Nevertheless, in order to understand the economic deve-
lopment of Bolivia during the last few years, it is necessary 
to have some idea of the evolution of the economy 
during the present century. This idea can only be very 
general, based as it is on incomplete and partial informa-
tion, but it will facihtate an appreciation of current 
events and situations which have their origin in previous 
periods. 
The backward state of agriculture has not undergone 
any modification during the first half of the twentieth 
century. The system of land tenure was characterized 
by large holdings farmed according to pre-capitalistic 
methods of " renta-trabajo". The agriculture worker 
received in return, for his labour, instead of wages, a 
plot of ground which served only for the subsistence 
of his family, so that he remained unincorporated in 
the market and unable to contribute to the demand 
for industrial products and personal services. The land-
owners, on the other hand, did not contribute on an 
important scale to the demand for domestic products 
because of their relatively small number and because 
their income levels permitted them to consume high 
quahty goods which were satisfied principally by imports. 
The mining industry, because of the very nature of 
its production and the relative insignificance of local 
sales, was an activity directed abroad. A part of the 
income from mineral exports necessarily had to remain 
in the country to pay for wages and salaries and the 
purchase of local materials. But existing circumstances 
in the Bolivian economy tended to maintain these pay-
ments at low levels. Mining employment represented a 
very small part of total active employment in the country ; 
according to the 1950 census total mining employment 
of aU kinds amounted to 43,441, or 3.2 per cent of the 
labour force and less than 2 per cent of the population. 
On the other hand, the earnings of Bolivian entrepreneurs 
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have always tended to emigrate, and there exist numerous 
cases of new industries which have been estabhshed in 
neighbouring countries with profits obtained in Bohvia. 
This situation has adversely influenced the level of saving 
and investment in the Bolivian economy and has created 
the paradox that Bolivia, even though insufficiently 
developed itself, has been an exporter of capital. 
The circumstances mentioned could have been offset 
at least in part by a vigorous fiscal policy which could 
have stimulated private savings and investment and 
captured income of the community for the purpose of 
increasing investment in basic development projects. But 
the Bolivian public administration was not able to solve 
this problem opportunely. The fiscal history of this 
period is characterized by a deficient structure of fiscal 
revenue, by a disorderly system of expenditures and 
by the absence of misdirection of public investment. 
During the period between the beginning of the century 
and the world crisis, one of the characteristics of the 
Bolivian public budget was a situation of almost per-
manent deficits. As internal resources were exhausted, 
it became necessary to recur to foreign loans, increasing 
in this manner the indebtedness of the nation and com-
promising future fiscal revenue in the service of these 
loans. These credits were contracted under rather burden-
some financial conditions so that in some years the 
Government had to postpone ordinary administrative 
payments and the service of the internal debt in order 
to comply with its external obligations, which absorbed 
about 50 per cent of its revenue. 
From 1930 most of the conditions which had favoured 
Bolivian development during previous decades disap-
peared. Already in 1927 the excess of world tin supplies 
had begun to reduce the price of this metal. The great 
crisis accentuated this downward tendency, and the 
prices and volume of Bolivian exports declined abruptly. 
No significant progress was made in agriculture either 
between 1930 and 1950. Complete figures are not available 
on production nor investment in this activity during 
this whole period, but existing information reveals that 
there have been no significant changes in the social 
relationships nor in production methods employed in 
the Altiplano and in the valleys. At most some agri-
cultural machinery was introduced in some isolated cases 
and certain permanent crops were extended, such as 
fruit trees and coffee. 
The most important change which occurred in the 
economic structure of the country during these years 
was the increase in industrial output. The reduction in 
the capacity to import stimulated import substitution, 
and the exchange system aided the import of machinery 
and raw materials through the application of favourable 
exchange rates. Already in 1920 to 1929 some important 
enterprises had appeared in the manufacture of certain 
consumer goods, such as beer and textiles, and in the 
production of cement. Nevertheless, industrial output 
apparently did not register a persistent increase until 
the following decade. 
In summary, between the decade of the 1930s and 
1950, the tendency to promote domestic economic deve-
lopment and obtain greater resources from the export 
sector to satisfy domestic consumption and investment 
was accentuated in Bolivia. This tendency was particu-
larly apparent in the new tax and exchange policy 
applied to the mining sector, in the increase and the 
nature of public investment, and in the growth of domestic 
manufacturing industry. However, new economic condi-
tions in more recent years have made it more difficult, 
compared with previous decades, to promote a develop-
ment policy. One of these is the less favourable position 
of Bolivian exports in international markets, and another 
is the fall in mining production and in the price of tin 
except for brief periods of recovery. It is also necessary 
to point out that the internal inflation, however much 
it favoured industrial investment at the beginning, has 
created problems which in time have become serious 
obstacles to balanced economic growth. 
2. Evolution of the gross product after 1950 
(a) The gross product in 1950 
In 1950 the gross product of Bohvia amounted to 
248 million dollars, that is, 82 dollars per capita, a 
figure which places Bolivia among the lowest income 
countries of Latin America (see table 1). 
Table 1 
BOLIVIA : GROSS PRODUCT PER CAPITA COMPARED 
WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1950 
(Dollars per capita) 
Argentina 575 Ecuador 124 
Bolivia 82 El Salvador 150 
Brazil 195 Honduras 160 
Chile 308 Mexico 210 
Colombia 215 Paraguay 96 
Costa Rica 290 Peru 125 
Dominican Republic . . . 164 Venezuela 641 
Apart from the level of total income, it is interesting 
to examine also the composition of income by economic 
activity sectors (see table 2). Almost one-third of the 
gross product in 1950 was provided by agriculture, cattle 
raising and forestry, to which must be added a small 
contribution by rural artisans. Extractive industries, 
traditionally considered as the principal source of 
income for the country, contributed only one-fourth of 
the gross product. It is interesting therefore to point 
out the disparity between the relative importance of 
mining as a source of external income on the one hand, 
and its contribution to the gross product on the other. 
The contribution of manufacturing is relatively small, 
a fact which reflects the incipient state of industrializa-
tion attained by the country. Furthermore, only a 
part of income from manufacturing is provided by 
the so-called " registered industry ", whereas an equal 
proportion is provided by small non-registered establish-
ments. The income generated by urban artisans, on the 
other hand, is relatively large compared with that o f 
industry itself. The small share of the gross product 
accounted for by transport is also notable, given the 
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fact that Bolivia is a country with very difficult geogra-
phic characteristics. Furthermore, about two-thirds of 
the income generated in this activity comes from road 
transport, which does not correspond to the relative 
volume of this kind of transport but instead to the 
nature of transport rates. 
Table 2 
B O L I V I A : P E R C E N T A G E B R E A K - D O W N 
O F T H E G R O S S P R O D U C T , 1950 
CPercentage of total) 
Agriculture" 32.8 
Extractive industries ' 24.4 
Manufacturing 8.9 
Urban artisans 4.3 
Transport 5.6 
Commerce and banks 10.3 
Government 4 .4 
Other services « 9.3 
TOTAL 1 0 0 . 0 
Total in millions of dollar-! 248.0 
» Includes rural artisans. 
" Mining and petroleum. 
° Includes construction and public works, rents and other 
services. 
The analysis of the relative importance of the different 
economic activity sectors in Bolivia must also take into 
account the amount of active population absorbed by 
them and the differences in productivity. According to 
the 1950 census, the total active population amounted 
to almost 1.5 million, which signifies a gross product 
per active person of a little more than 170 dollars. If, 
however, only the effective labour force in terms of adult 
men (amounting to only 1,043,000) is considered, the 
gross product per active person amounted to almost 
240 dollars. 
This figure is the result of very different levels of pro-
ductivity in the various sectors. The extractive industries, 
for example, show a gross product per active person 
almost 11 times as great as that in agriculture (taking 
into account in the latter only the effective labour force). 
The productivity of manufacturing was about one-third 
of that in the extractive industries and more than 3 times 
that of agriculture. The productivity of artisans, on the 
other hand, was less than that of the economy as a 
whole and not very different from agricultural pro-
ductivity. In general these differences reflect the various 
degrees of efficiency existing in the corresponding 
sectors, as well as substantial differences in the amount 
of capital employed per worker. 
(b) Changes in the gross product, 1950 to 1955 
As will be seen, the evolution of the gross product 
has not been favourable since 1950. After a moderate 
increase in 1951 and 1952, the gross product declined 
in the two following years, reaching in 1955 a figure 
barely 6 per cent above that five years before and 
practically equal to that already attained in 1951. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the figures 
mentioned reveal a situation much less unfavourable 
than that which has in general been estimated by those 
who have followed trends in the Bolivian economy 
during this period and who are aware of the serious 
obstacles which the country has had to face (see table 3). 
The differences between the growth of the various 
sectors during the last six years have not altered in any 
i nportant degree the composition of the gross product. 
Table 3 
B O L I V I A : E S T I M A T E S O F T R E N D S I N T H E L E V E L A N D B R E A K - D O W N 
O F T H E G R O S S P R O D U C T . 1950 -55 
(Millions of dollars at 1950 prices) 
19S0 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Agriculture 78.9 78.9 75.3 70.3 67.4 71.5 
Rural artisans 2 .4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2 .6 
Extractive industries 60.6 66.2 67.2 68.4 60.1 66.6 
Mining 58.5 64.4 65.4 66.3 54.2 57.3 
Petroleum 2.1 1.8 1.8 2.1 5.8 9.3 
Manufacturing 22.2 23.1 22.6 22.6 25.3 26.4 
Registered 11.8 12.3 12.1 12.1 13.5 14.1 
Non-registered 10.3 10.8 10.5 10.5 11.8 12.3 
Urban artisans 10.7 11.1 10.9 10.9 12.2 12.7 
Building and public works . 1.1 1.7 2 ,2 1.5 1.5 2 .0 
Rents 10.0 10.6 11.2 11.3 11.5 11.7 
Transport 13.5 13.8 16.4 16.2 18.1 20.2 
Commerce 23.0 27.3 TIA 24.5 25.2 27.9 
Banks 2 .6 2.8 3 .2 1.3 1.0 1.2 
Government 10.9 12.5 14.6 6 .6 7 .6 8.1 
Other services 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.0 12.5 
TOTAL 248.0 262.7 265.6 248.5 244.7 263.4 
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The relative importance of the agricultural sector fell 
from almost 32 per cent in 1950 to a little over 
27 per cent in 1955. Between these years the extractive 
industries as a whole increased their participation in 
the gross product from 24.4 to 25.3 per cent, manu-
facturing from 8.9 to 10 per cent, and transport from 
5.6 to 7.7 per cent, while in the case of the Government 
a decline from 4.4 to 3.1 per cent was registered. 
The influence of the eifect of the external terms of 
trade with respect to 1950 makes it necessary to analyse 
this point. The year 1950 was exceptionally unfavourable 
for foreign trade from the point of view of prices for 
the principal export product. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the high price for tin in 1951 brought about a 
substantia] increase in income, which in that year was 
greatly superior to that recorded in any other during 
the period 1950-55 : 265 milhon dollars compared with 
219 in 1950 and 234 in 1955. Although after 1951 the 
index of the terms of trade remained above the 1950 
level, its eifect on the gross product was much weaker. 
This is a point which has had an important bearing 
on trends in the Bolivian economy during these years, 
for if 1951 is taken as the base year for analysis, it must 
be concluded that the contraction in certain domestic 
activities was reinforced by external factors derived 
from the fall in the terms of trade (see table 4). If the 
increase in the population of the country by 10 per cent 
during this period is taken into account, then it can be 
concluded that there was a definite decline both in the 
gross product and net income per capita. 
Figures on the availability of goods and services 
constitute the best indication of the capacity of the 
Bolivian economy to satisfy consumption requirements 
of the population and investment needed for the main-
tenance and increase of productive capacity. The trend 
in available goods and services during the period 1950 
to 1955 was much more favourable than that shown 
by the product for several reasons. In the first place, 
the eifect of the terms of trade with respect to 1950 has 
been positive during the whole period, which signifies 
a greater purchasing power of the gross product generated 
in the internal economy. On the other hand, the country 
has received, particularly towards the end of this period, 
a net inflow of foreign capital — directly and by means 
of trade agreement credits — and a considerable amount 
of foreign aid. Finally, gold and foreign exchange 
reserves accumulated during previous periods were 
utilized to finance larger imports. 
Table 4 
BOLIVIA : ESTIMATES OF TRENDS IN THE GROSS PRODUCT 
A N D NET INCOME, 1950-55 
(Millions of 1950 dollars) 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Gross product at market prices 248.0 262.7 265.6 248.5 244.7 263.4 
Plus : subsidies 





Gross product at factor cost 243.3 257.5 260.1 240.1 237.1 247.7 
Depreciation and disinvestment in 
cattle stocks 24.5 24.5 30.2 30.3 30.2 25.9 
Net product at factor cost 218.8 233.0 229.9 209.8 206.9 221.8 
Effect of the terms of trade with 
respect to 1950 — 32.4 22.6 9.1 10.7 12.5 -
Net income 218.8 265.4 252.5 218.9 217.6 234.3 
3. Trends in investment and productive capacity 
According to the preliminary estimates specially 
prepared for this study, in 1950 total fixed investment 
in the Bolivian economy — replacement cost of depre-
ciated capital — amounted to approximately 870 million 
dollars. More interesting than absolute figures on the 
capital stock is its relation to the gross product, which 
indicates the degree of utilization of the productive 
capacity of the Bolivian economy. In general, the product/ 
capital ratio for the economy as a whole appears to be 
rather low — 0.29 in 1950 — which is the result of very 
marked differences between the main activities. The 
differences between the product/capital ratios of the 
principal economic sectors are much greater still if the 
amount of capital per employed preson is compared. 
In effect, the extractive industries have a ratio 15 times 
larger than that of agriculture and double the ratio 
corresponding to manufacturing. 
Now it is necessary to indicate the manner in which 
the total capital stock of the Bolivian economy changed 
between 1950 to 1955 and indicate the changes which 
have taken place in its sectorial distribution. Global 
estimates show that the increase in productive capacity 
during this period was very moderate (6 per cent), 
equivalent to a cumulative annual increase of I per cent. 
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One of the reasons which explains this slow rate of 
growth of productive capacity is related to the great 
effort which it has been necessary to make in order to 
take care of depreciation and the replacement and 
maintenance of this capacity. For this purpose alone the 
Bolivian economy has had to earmark approximately 
25 million dollars annually. 
Gross investment has shown very sharp fluctuations 
during the period under analysis. Whereas in 1951 and 
1952 total gross investment exceeded 40 million dollars, 
in 1953 investment fell by approximately 40 per cent. 
In 1955 on the other hand, the highest level was reached 
for the entire period and perhaps since 1930. In summary, 
during the period as a whole gross investment amounted 
to a little more than 220 million dollars, or about 15 
per cent of the gross product. On the other hand, total 
net investment was insignificant, barely 3.8 per cent of 
the gross product during these years. 
An interesting aspect in relation to investment trends 
during 1950 to 1955 is the substantial change in its 
composition as between public and private. Before the 
revolution, public investment represented about 15 per 
cent of total gross investment, but since then the share 
of the public sector has tended to increase, so that in 
1954 and 1955 this sector accounted for 33 and 50 per 
cent respectively. Among the factors which explain this 
substantial increase in pubUc investment are the nation-
ahzation of the large mines, the increase in petroleum 
investment, and the sizeable resources allocated to 
public works in transport and other projects of the 
Bolivian Development Corporation. Private investment, 
on the other hand, declined sharply after 1953 in rela-
tion to the levels attained in 1951 and 1952. Thus, the 
increase in public investment was responsible for the 
high level reached in 1955 and made possible the mode-
rate increase in the productive capacity of the Bolivian 
economy which was referred to above. 
Apart from the foregoing, it is also interesting to 
examine the composition of goods and services absorbed 
by investment. In the period 1950 to 1955 an average 
of about 50 per cent of gross investment was accounted 
for by the value of imported machinery, equipment and 
construction materials. The remainder is attributable 
principally to the value of transport, installation and 
construction required to put this machinery and equip-
ment in place. Domestic output of capital goods and 
construction materials, on the other hand, has been of 
relatively small importance during this period. 
Finally, it is necessary to make a short reference to 
the form in which gross investment has been financed. 
Available figures indicate that, in 1950-51, the country 
attained a rate of saving more than sufficient to satisfy 
investment requirements. Ah-eady by 1952 a notable 
change took place, internal saving being considerably 
inferior to gross investment. During the following years 
the contraction in national saving was accentuated, 
until in 1955 it did not even cover 50 per cent of total 
gross investment. 
Two principal factors compensated this reduction in 
domestic saving : United States aid and net foreign 
investment on the one hand, and the utilization of gold 
and foreign exchange reserves on the other. The main 
factor has without doubt been United States aid, which 
in 1954 and 1955 represented more than one-third of 
total gross investment. 
In spite of the importance of the decline in domestic 
saving, it is not easy to formulate precise conclusions 
as to its causes, because it is difficult to interpret this 
trend and undoubtedly it has been influenced by many 
diverse factors. Among them can be mentioned the 
significant improvement in the terms of trade in 1951, 
as well as their decline thereafter. In this regard, it 
could be considered that in reality the only year in which 
the coefficient of domestic saving was high, was in 1950. 
The 43 miUion dollars of saving recorded in 1951 must 
be interpreted by taking into account the fact that in 
this year the change in the terms of trade signified an 
increase in income of more than 32 million dollars. 
Similarly, the latter contraction in domestic savings up 
to 1953 is closely correlated with the reduction in the 
terms of trade effect, and the same can be said about 
the slight improvement shown in 1954 and 1955. 
In any event, it is evident that domestic saving has 
only covered a moderate share of gross investment during 
recent years. The influence of other compensatory 
factors, however, must be considered temporary, so 
that prospects for future gross investment must be based 
on a domestic savings coefficient considerably higher than 
that registered during these years. 
I I I . FOREIGN TRADE IN THE BOLIVIAN ECONOMY 
The evolution of foreign trade has been a key factor 
in the economic development of Bolivia. The importance 
of foreign trade can be appreciated from the fact that 
the value of exports, which in real terms has not grown 
except during short-period fluctuations since the end of 
the Second World War, is still equivalent to over one-
third of the gross product of the country. Imports also 
provide an important share of available goods and 
services ; imports of capital goods, for example, account 
for about 60 per cent of the total value of gross domestic 
investment. Therefore many of the difficulties impeding 
the achievement of monetary stability and more balanced 
economic growth centre around problems of restoring 
and diversifying production for export and assuring a 
more effective utilization of foreign exchange receipts. 
Although Bolivia is endowed with an abundance and 
variety of natural wealth, the capacity to import has been 
determined mainly by exports of a single mineral, for a 
long time silver and in more recent decades tin. Tin exports 
provided the basis for a significant expansion in foreign 
trade up to 1929, but thereafter the great dependence 
of the country on this metal, which up to very recent 
years accounted for over 70 per cent of total exports, 
has had adverse repercussions. On the supply side, 
Bolivian tin production was found to be at a com-
petitive disadvantage compared with most other produc-
ing countries when mine capacity greatly exceeded 
world market demand. In Bolivia tin is extracted from 
underground lode deposits which require rather heavy 
fixed investment and large-scale operation to be worked 
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efficiently, whereas in South East Asia and Africa — the 
other major producing regions — tin is found in placer 
deposits which can be mined on the surface, often with 
less expensive and smaller scale methods such as dredging. 
Thus, the sharp fluctuations in demand and output and 
the restrictions imposed by the International Tin Agree-
ment during the 1930s tended to improve the relative 
position of placer mines (in which output could vary 
considerably without seriously affecting unit costs) and 
smaller producers, at the expense of large lode mines, 
which received great stimulus when demand was rising 
rapidly and justified heavy fixed investment in large-
scale operations, but which were at a serious disadvantage 
when demand prospects were doubtful and conditions 
called for optimum flexibility. Consequently, very little 
new tin investment has been made in Bolivia during the 
last 25 years, new exploration has not been carried out, 
and many installations have been allowed to fall into 
disrepair, in contrast to the relatively large investments 
which were made in Africa during the Second World 
War and in South East Asia thereafter. 
Bolivian tin mining is also at a disadvantage because 
of the low tin content and greater complexity of the 
concentrates produced. Special smelting facilities are 
required to treat these minerals, or they must te mixed 
with cleaner and richer alluvial concentrates from other 
countries for smelting. The problem of marketing this 
ore was eased at the beginning of the Second World 
War with the opening of the Texas City smelter operated 
by the United States Government for the specific purpose 
of producing tin from Westérn Hemisphere supplies. 
Contracts for the purchase of Bohvian tin were succes-
sively renewed after the war, but the Texas City smelter 
has recently been sold by the United States Government 
and win gradually go out of production, so that Bolivia's 
low-grade concentrates will again have to be marketed 
in Europe. 
On the demand side, restrictions on the use of tin 
during the Second World War and resulting techno-
logical innovations have seriously limited and perhaps 
permanently eUminated the possibiHty for any further 
significant growth in world tin consumption. In spite 
of increased world income and industrial output, even 
as late as 1956 demand was still considerably inferior 
to the pre-war level. This is the result of the more efficient 
use of primary tin, mainly by means of electrolytic tin 
plating which is replacing older, more tin-consuming 
methods ; the increased utilization of secondary tin in 
bronze and brass and other products ; and the substitu-
tion of this metal by other materials in such things as 
solder, collapsible tubes and foil. These trends are almost 
completely beyond the control of producing countries 
bacause of the pronounced price inelasticity of demand 
for tin, which forms an insignificant part of the price 
of the final products in which it is employed. On the 
other hand, increasing costs of production in tin mining 
eliminate the possibility of a really important reduction 
in its price without making tin mining generally un-
profitable. 
Trends in the supply and demand for tin have been 
the principal determinant of Bolivia's capacity to import 
and general balance of payments situation, but two other 
factors have been of particular importance in recent 
years. The gross value of tin sales does not represent 
the foreign exchange income of the country from exports 
of this mineral, because included in this value are the 
cost of smelting abroad, international transport, and 
other foreign exchange expenditures such as salaries of 
foreign personnel and imports of materials and equip-
ment for the mines. When the mines were privately 
owned, a proportion of receipts was also retained by the 
companies as profits. Over the course of the last 15 years 
the share of the value of mineral exports returned to 
the Central Bank has tended to increase as a result of 
measures obliging the private companies to surrender 
larger amounts of exchange to the authorities, and later 
as a result of the nationafization of the large mines and 
stricter Government control over the operations of the 
smaller mines which remained under private ownership. 
In addition, the mining companies were obliged to 
surrender their exchange to the Central Bank at an 
official rate which became increasingly over-valued as 
adjustments lagged behind the rapid increase in domestic 
prices. This was in reality a kind of implicit taxation 
in so far as the Government benefited by selhng the 
exchange at higher rates to importers, or' an implicit 
transfer of income from the mining industry to the rest 
of the economy through the subsidizing of imports at 
an over-valued rate of exchange. Thus, the capacity to 
import of Bolivia has fared somewhat better than might 
be surmised from export statistics. 
The other important determinant of Bolivia's balance 
of payments position, besides tin supply and demand 
trends, has been United States procurement policy and 
more recently the foreign aid programme. The continuing 
operation of the Texas City smelter producing for the 
United States strategic materials stockpile was one of 
the main factors which enabled an orderly reduction of 
commercial stocks and a significant rise in tin prices 
after the war in spite of the reincorporation of South 
East Asian output in a depressed market. Later, when 
Bolivia's gold and foreign exchange reserves became 
virtually exhausted in the balance of payments crisis 
of 1952-53 following the short-lived Korean War boom. 
United States aid and the sale of surplus agricultural 
commodities were and continue to be of considerable 
assistance, particularly in view of the decline in the 
domestic commercial food supply which has resulted 
from successive droughts and problems arising from the 
land reform. Also, contracts for the purchase of Bolivian 
tungsten at prices twice those currently prevailing have 
helped to offset the continued decHne in the country's 
tin sales. Thus, by 1955 Bolivia's capacity to import 
in constant prices had risen to a level even higher than 
that of 1951 and twice the depressed level of 1950. 
The present artificial situation cannot be maintained 
indefinitely, so that it is urgently necessary for Bolivia 
to look for ways to restore and diversify production for 
export and the substitution of imports. The recent 
exchange reform has contributed in this direction by 
reducing incentives for contraband exports and re-
exports, which had reached such proportions that they 
were a serious drain on the national economy. Steps 
have also been taken to put the mining industry on a 
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more realistic footing. With regard to the large mines 
under the control of the Mining Corporation,^ the main 
problem concerns the deterioration in working condi-
tions, such as the dechning grade of ore, the narrowing 
or wedging out of veins, the excessive spread of under-
ground workings, the worn-out state of installations and 
equipment for treating and concentrating ore, and 
shortages of water and electric energy. In general, in 
existing mines more ore will have to be extracted under 
more difficult conditions and hauled over longer distances 
to get the same amount of metal. This situation can be 
eased only by renovating and modernizing equipment 
and methods in the older mines and by developing new 
deposits. However, so little is known about reserves that 
it would be inadvisable to begin any serious investment 
programme until intensive exploration reveals where 
commercial reserves are large enough to justify addi-
tional capital outlays. 
Labour and administrative problems have also con-
tributed to a fall in the productivity of Bohvian mining. 
Although a certain amount of administrative difficulty 
was inevitable with the nationalization of the large mines 
in 1952, because of the diversity of accounting and 
managerial procedures in the different mines and the 
loss of experienced foreign personnel, the most serious 
problem has been the confusion and conflict between the 
different bodies responsible for the operation of the 
mines, which has led to indiscipline, greater absenteeism, 
feather-bedding and other practices prejudicial to efficient 
operation. Although it was natural for the miners to 
expect an improvement in their status and some voice 
in management after the revolution, it is necessary to 
find some arrangement which reconciles the legitimate 
economic and social aims of the workers with more 
efficient organization and management. 
Analysis of the financial accounts of the Mining 
Corporation reveals that over-all operations were quite 
profitable at least until 1955. Short-run results were 
artificially favoured, however, by inadequate outlays on 
current supplies and the maintenance and replacement 
of equipment as well as by efforts to maximize current 
output at the sacrifice of preparing for future work. 
The sale of foreign exchange to the Central Bank at 
extremely overvalued rates also made it necessary to 
obtain credit in order to finance local currency expendi-
tures. But at a more reahstic rate of exchange, the 
Corporation would have been able to cover all local 
and foreign currency costs of production and still register 
a profit. Future prospects, however, are much less 
favourable than recent operations. In 1955, several of 
the most profitable mines of the Corporation benefited 
especially from the sale of tungsten at artificially high 
prices to the United States Government under contracts 
which are due to expire during 1957. Also, about 20 
per cent of the value of output in this year came from 
mines with such high costs of production that they 
must be considered sub-marginal producers. The spread 
between costs and prices has apparently decreased since 
1955, so that at the present time even the largest tin mine 
in Bolivia (Catavi) is probably near the break-even 
point and only three Corporation properties have 
sufficient proven reserves to justify continued large-
scale exploitation for a period of years. 
Thus, the Mining Corporation is faced with important 
decisions to make on investment priorities and the 
continued operation of sub-marginal mines. With regard 
to investment, present information on reserves must be 
supplemented by further exploration in order to for-
mulate an intelligent programme. Given the fact that 
it takes from three to five years to explore and develop 
a new deposit, and that under present conditions Bolivia 
can ill afford to reduce its foreign exchange income, it 
may be necessary for the Corporation to keep in pro-
duction all but the most unpromising mines for the time 
being, unless the factors of production engaged in them 
can be used more economically elsewhere. If sub-marginal 
or " social" mines are withdrawn from production so 
rapidly that serious unemployment results, then the drop 
in total output and foreign exchange income might 
create a greater burden for the Bolivian economy than 
the subsidization of these operations until alternative 
activities can be developed. 
With regard to the privately-owned mines, the output 
of which was severely curtailed after 1952, what is 
needed are greater incentives to increase production 
from existing properties and restore the output of mines 
which have been closed because of unfavourable condi-
tions. The first step is to permit private companies to 
retain a greater share of the value of exports in order 
to provide for the purchase of adequate suppUes of 
materials and equipment and a reasonable profit.^ 
Secondly, the functions of the Mining Bank, which has 
exercised a virtual monopoly over the operations of 
the private mines, should be restricted to those originally 
established by law, namely, the provision of services and 
credit to small miners who are handicapped because of 
their Umited financial resources. 
There exists another serious problem for which no 
short-run solution is apparently possible : heavy losses 
in the recovery of metal from ores and the inability 
to treat much commercially exploitable ore in small 
deposits, from which only the richest minerals are being 
extracted. The estabhshment of a local smelter designed 
to handle low-grade concentrates would enable many 
smaller mines to increase their recovery by 15 per cent 
or more, and exploitation could be carried out more 
rationally so as to increase mine yields and prolong their 
active life. Furthermore, since it is easier to market 
metal than concentrates, particularly of the type produced 
by Bolivia, a local smelter would help assure an outlet 
for the production of low-grade minerals as the Texas 
City smelter is withdrawn from production. Although 
there are no serious technical difficulties to smelting and 
refining low-grade concentrates in Bohvia, initial invest-
ment in fixed assets and inventories, together with start-
up and training costs, would amount to about 17.5 million 
dollars for a 10,000 ton smelter. Not only would such 
an investment require available reserves for 15 to 20 years' 
1 Most of the analysis of the mining industry is based on the 
study by the firm Ford, Bacon and Davis. 
^ In 1955 privately-owned mines were obliged to surrender 78 
per cent of the gross value of exports to the Central Bank. 
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operation to be justified (which are presently uncertain), 
but the high cost of operation in relation to existing 
foreign smelters, which employ richer and less complex 
alluvial concentrates, would reduce profits to a very 
moderate level even under favourable circumstances. 
Thus, the advisabiUty of making this investment at this 
time depends upon whether investment of a similar 
amount elsewhere would produce more immediate and 
surer benefits for the Bolivian economy than the estab-
lishment of a tin smelter. 
Prospects for the diversification of Bolivian exports 
are rather uncertain at the present time. Apart from the 
traditional mineral exports of secondary importance, 
some of which have a favourable growth potential 
— particularly gold, antimony, tungsten (in spite of the 
expiry of special purchase contracts) and to a lesser extent 
lead and zinc — the country possesses deposits of just 
about all other principal minerals of commercial value 
in the world. However, in spite of the fact that Bolivia 
is generally a low-cost producer of minerals other than 
tin, little can be said about future prospects because 
deposits are often situated in inaccessible areas, technical 
problems complicate their exploitation on a commercial 
scale, or not enough is known about the extent and 
nature of deposits. With respect to agricultural products, 
it appears that coffee offers the only important possibility 
for increasing the participation of the agricultural sector 
in Bolivia's exports over the course of the next few years. 
Although petroleum reserves are considered to be of 
great importance, present productive capacity is not 
capable of both satisfying increasing domestic demand 
and raising exports. Thus, future prospects will depend 
upon the results of exploration now going on, which if 
successful, should begin to bolster Bolivia's capacity to 
import in three to five years. 
Export prospects can be summarized in the following 
manner. Between 1955 and 1960, if the percentage increase 
in mineral exports considered feasible by the Ford-
Bacon experts under favourable conditions is accepted, 
and 1955 prices are maintained (except for tungsten, for 
which the present world market price is more appropriate), 
and it is assumed that agricultural exports can reach 
5 million dollars annually, then the gross value of exports 
could increase by 15 per cent, or to about 115 million 
dollars. This hypothesis excludes petroleum, since no 
basis exists at this time for making any projection. The 
proportion of the gross value of exports which can be 
expected to be returned to the country in payment of 
local costs of production, taxes, etc., will almost certainly 
be less than that in 1955 (about 58 per cent). Given 
the need for more adequate supplies and investment 
in the nationalized mines and the creation of incentives 
for the private mining companies, it would be unrealistic 
to expect that more than 50 per cent will be available for 
imports of goods and services for the rest of the economy, 
and the proportion might well be somewhat less. A 
reduction from 58 to 50 per cent, however, would entirely 
cancel out a 15 per cent increase in the value of exports ; 
so that unless the international situation changes markedly 
or there is a significant expansion in petroleum exports, 
it is not likely that Bolivia's net capacity to import 
will increase at least within the next five vears. It should 
be kept in mind, however, that there is ample room for 
a reduction in import demand, particularly through an 
increase in domestic output of agricultural products, 
which presently account for about 45 per cent of Bolivia's 
total imports. 
I V . INFLATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
I. Historical background 
Nothing has affected so profoundly the development 
of the Bolivian economy as the severe inflationary process 
through which the country has been passing, especially 
during the last four years. In order to understand the 
present situation, it is thus necessary to evaluate the 
possibilities and requirements of a development policy 
by studying the factors which have had a role in the origin 
and growth of inflation and the maladjustments which 
it has caused in the economic life of the country. 
The Bolivian inflation began in the first years of the 
1930s when the Government had to cover large deficit 
resulting from the Chaco war. Since then trends in the 
demand for export products have been a permanent 
disturbing factor contributing to the instability and the 
inflationary financing of the public sector. But even 
before this period and in spite of the fact that in some 
years Government budgets were balanced, there existed 
in Bolivia a particularly weak economic structure and 
a fiscal policy which contributed to the intensification 
of instability. 
Although from 1932 to 1952 the permanent inflation-
ary factor has been the fiscal deficit and public invest-
ment financed with bank credit, there exist various 
periods in which it is possible to distinguish between 
different causes : 
{a) During the Chaco war (1932-35), when the Govern-
ment incurred a heavy deficit to meet expenditures and 
money incomes grew considerably. Nevertheless, the 
rise in prices was relatively moderate owing to the decline 
in public and private investment, to the subsidies extended 
by means of the exchange system to essential goods, 
and finally to the belief that inflationary tendencies were 
of a temporary nature. 
{b) The period 1935 to 1939, during which money 
incomes increased at a slower rate than during the 
previous period, while prices experienced a considerable 
rise due principally to the increase in the velocity of 
circulation and to the devaluation of the currency. 
(c) During the Second World War (1939 to 1945), 
when the major cause of inflation was of external origin 
as a result of the favourable balance of payments which 
led to an increase in money income, thus reinforcing 
traditional inflationary factors. The most important event 
during this period was the stabilization policy applied 
from 1944 to 1945, which slowed down the increase in 
prices without diminishing internal production. 
{d) The post-war period (1945-51), when external 
inflationary pressure was eliminated and balance-of-
payments deficit and pressure on the exchange rate 
reappeared, reinforced by government budget deficit and 
an exoansion in bank credit. 
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The inflation after 1952 
(a) Introduction 
In 1952 and thereafter, as a result of the political 
revolution of 9 April, economic and social measures were 
carried out in Bolivia which signified in many respects 
a structural change in the country. Economic activity 
in general and the inflationary process in particular have 
been determined in succeeding years by the results of 
these measures, so that the analysis and appreciation 
of the Bolivian economy before this period loses a 
great deal of its validity because new factors began to 
play a preponderant role in economic events. The basic 
elements of the Bolivian economy, however, have not 
changed and their principal characteristics continue to 
be the dependence on exports of tin and a few other 
minerals, the low productivity of agriculture, the low 
level of industrial development and other traditional 
features. But in each one of these activities and in the 
directive spheres of the country changes have taken 
place which have altered the functioning of the economy 
as a whole. In addition to external factors which have 
influenced over-all trend and the traditional factors of 
disequilibrium and inflation during the last five years, 
there have appeared egalitarian social aspirations, a 
nationahstic mining policy, a marked increase in the 
importance of the labour unions, a radical redistribu-
tion of the land, and a programme of public investment 
which has required resources superior to the financial 
possibilities of the Government. The combined action 
of all of these forces in moments when external markets 
for the principal export products were not favourable 
resulted in a sharpening of internal disequilibrium and 
the inflationary process. 
The Bolivian revolution destroyed the traditional 
organization of mining and agriculture, the two funda-
mental activities of the country, and brought about a 
reduction in productivity, at least temporarily while new 
forms of organization could be created. In general, a 
redistribution of income was carried out which altered 
the previous play of social forces and created a climate 
for a sharpening of this type of conflict. On the other 
hand, in an eff"ort to transform the physical environ-
ment, or under the pressure of political necessities, a 
programme of Government expenditures was effected 
which was greater than could be handled by non-inflation-
ary resources available to the Government. All of this 
resulted in a reduction in the national product and 
conflict between diiferent social groups in an efl'ort to 
obtain a larger share of the gross product. Even if eco-
nomic conditions had been favourable, this complex 
of forces would surely have led to an inflationary situa-
tion. In Bolivia already the inflation was of long standing 
and had acquired greater momentum in the immediately 
preceding years. Moreover, simultaneously with these 
internal developments export prices and the terms of 
trade were faUing, thereby causing an even more pro-
nounced decline in the real product. Thus, the country 
found itself in a situation in which the national product 
was declining in real terms while nominal incomes were 
rising progressively under the pressure of labour union 
demands. Government expenditures and investment, and 
the policy of subsidizing essential articles. As in all 
inflationary environments, new factors such as specula-
tion, contraband and capital flights contributed to 
worsening the situation, along with the exchange system 
which did nothing to counteract the inflation. 
The case of Bohvia in the last five years is that of a 
country which has begun a social transformation and 
a pohcy of accelerated development under inflationary 
conditions and by resorting to inflationary measures to 
carry out this policy. Whereas on the one hand it was 
desired to increase the product and bring about a more 
just distribution of income, on the other hand unstable 
conditions were created or accentuated which exercised 
increasing pressure on the economy and fomented ten-
sions which could not continue without leading over 
the longer run to an untenable situation. The aspiration 
was that a rise in the real product from increased invest-
ment and the new social organization could produce 
results over a shorter period of time and that the infla-
tion would disappear with the progressive increase in 
the availability of goods. Recent events show that this 
objective was not attained. The inflationary process 
became cumulative and threatened to undermine the 
economy and the social and political organziation, while 
its effects impeded the increase of production and brought 
about a distribution of income very difl'erent from that 
which was initially desired. In this way, the fight against 
inflation even at the cost of temporarily suspending 
development investment and social conquests has become 
the urgent and all important problem of the Bolivian 
revolution. In the most optimistic of cases a solution 
requires a period of retrenchment before the conquest 
of the original objectives can be reinitiated under more 
favourable conditions. Recent experience has implied 
great economic sacrifice. The level of income, its equitable 
distribution, capital formation, and the creation of 
technical conditions appropriate for development have 
not improved in the inflationary climate. In the following 
pages the course of the Bolivian inflation in recent years 
and its effect upon economic development will be ana-
lysed in greater detail. 
(b) Indications of the rate of inflation 
In the period 1952 to 1956 the average annual increase 
in the cost-of-living index in the city of La Paz was 
147.6 per cent (see table 5). This rate of increase has 
been the highest in the history of the Bolivian inflation, 
since before 1952 the period of most intense inflation 
was 1936 to 1939, when the annual average increase 
was 50.7 per cent. 
The first great impulse to the inflationary process took 
place in 1953, in which year the cost of living rose 152 per 
cent. This was the year immediately after the revolution 
and the nationalization of the large mines. During this 
year the agrarian reform was also promulgated and the 
boliviano was devaluated. Thereafter in 1954 and 1955 
the price index continued to increase at a higher rate 
than before 1953 although inferior to the increase of 
this latter year. As a matter of fact, a market tendency 
towards a reduction in the rate of inflation was noted 
(99 per cent in 1954 and 69 per cent in 1955). Nevertheless, 
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Table S 
BOLIVIA ; COST-OF-LIVING INDEX IN LA PAZ 
(Base: 1931 = 100) 
Year General Foodstuff's Fuel Clothing Services Apartments 
1952 6,596 7,036 6,841 8,079 2,688 5,323 
1953 16,640 18,335 13,655 23,097 5,272 9,625 
1954 33,212 34,066 24,462 57,770 7,876 9,625 
1955 56,091 52,sn 75,509 103,675 16,251 9,625 
1956 March 85,042 97,010 107,331 132,214 28,062 9,625 
June 102,970 129,258 140,789 137,385 42,911 9,625 
October , 166,362 240,098 161,380 190,636 52,100 9,625 
Source: Statistics Department (Departamento Nacional de Estadística). 
in 1956 the rise in prices was renewed with greater force, 
between January and October the index rising by 196 per 
cent and increasing even more rapidly during the last 
four months of the year. 
The money supply in the hands of the public, including 
currency in circulation and bank deposits, increased 
20 times between the end of 1952 and October 1956. 
The increase during the course of 1956 was also much 
more intense, rising from 91,000 to 206,000 million 
bolivianos in ten months (see table 6). 
Table 6 
BOLIVL\ : MONETARY CIRCULATION (1952-56> 
(Millions of bolivianos) 
Year Total Currency Deposits 
1952 10,596.6 6,213.5 4,383.1 
1953 20,557.3 11,599.7 8,957.6 
1954 35,008.8 20,048.6 14,960.2 
1955 73,112.6 39,197.9 33,914.7 
1956 March 91,079.7 48,852.1 42,227.7 
June 124,800.4 70,639.2 54,161.1 
October 206,131.1 119,865.9 86,265.2 
Table 7 
BOLIVIA : QUOTATION OF THE BOLIVIANO 
IN THE FREE EXCHANGE MARKET 
(Units per dollar) 
Source: Banco Central de Bolivia. 
The ofiicial exchange rate, which was fixed at 60 boli-
vianos per dollar in 1950, was maintained at this level 
until May 1953, when a new rate of 190 was established. 
As will be seen, there existed exchange rates other than 
the official one, which were subject to frequent variations 
and which were applied to exports and to imports of 
necessary products. The free market was supplied with 
exchange from the tourist industry, from capital imports 
and from part of export receipts, and served to cover 
imports of non-essential articles, foreign travel and 
especially the outflow of capital and the hoarding of 
dollars. In the first months of 1952 the dollar was quoted 
in the free market at between 210 and 215 bolivianos. 
The rate reached 275 at the end of this year, depreciating 
rapidly thereafter until it reached 10,000 to 11,000 boli-
vianos per dollar between September and October 1956 
(see table 7). 
Month 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
January . 205 400 1,120 2,054 4,513 
February . 210 375 1,450 2,109 4,781 
. 210 410 1,400 2,500 5,670 
, 215 520 1,450 2,688 5,707 
. 225 650 1,525 2,554 6,330 
, 205 550 1,500 2,764 6,765 
July 210 575 1,450 2,898 8,310 
August 220 625 1,500 3,083 8,703 
September . 230 600 1,475 3,470 10,633 
. 255 650 1,465 3,876 11,604 
November . 265 675 1,810 4,000 
December . 275 950 1,820 4,018 
OFFICIAL RATE OF EXCHANGE 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
60 190 190 190 190 
Source: Pick's Currency Yearbook, 1955. 
(c) Principal factors aggravating the inflation 
(i) Influence of the external sector and of the conditions 
of mining production. At the time the large mines were 
nationalized, the favourable conditions of the inter-
national tin market occasioned by the Korean war had 
already begun to disappear. In 1951 the average quota-
tion for tin in New York was 1.27 dollars per pound 
of metal content. In the months immediately preceding 
the revolution the mining companies were discussing 
with purchasers agreements on the basis of 1.21 a pound, 
which the former did not consider sufficiently remunera-
tive. However, the price began to decline further and in 
1952 an average quotation of 1.20 was recorded, which 
later fell to 0.81 in the United States and 0.76 in London 
by September 1953, thereafter becoming stabilized 
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Table 10 
BOLIVIA : LOANS F R O M THE CENTRAL BANK TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR 




















































































TOTAL 82.6 112.3 255.9 379.5 413.3 
Advances to mining and petro-
leum concerns ° 2,164.0 13,482.2 6,223.2 33,413.2 128,101.3 
7,521.4 19,373.3 32,127.5 72,235.5 204,604.1 
Source: Banco Central de Bolivia. 
» Includes notes discounted in favour of the Mining Corporation and the Mining Bank in 1952, 
1953 and 1954. 
between 0.91 and 0.96 up to 1956, when an average price 
of 1.01 dollar per pound was quoted in the New York 
market. But the most serious aspect was that while 
external markets were weakening, problems of an internal 
character since the nationalization had produced a 
critical situation in the Bolivian mining industry. 
The Mining Corporation of Bolivia, which is in 
charge of the expropriated assets, was confronted with 
serious difficulties. Among them was the loss of numerous 
foreign technicians, the decline in the grade of mineral 
in the most important deposits, the lack of preparation 
of new work in the mines before and after nationaliza-
tion, the shortage of electric energy in some of the 
enterprises (aggravated by greater consumption of 
electricity to treat poorer minerals), the lack of working 
capital, the shortage of materials, etc. Other fundamental 
factors have also affected the Corporation : First, the 
rise in internal costs resulting above all from increases 
in salaries and social obhgations and increments in 
other expenditures due to the inflation ; second, the 
fall in production for technical reasons and because of 
the decline in labour productivity,^ and third, administra-
tive deficiencies of the Corporation itself. 
According to the Ford, Bacon and Davis study, in 
1955 the output of tin in the nationalized mines had 
fallen 17.3 per cent below 1951 ; silver had declined 
by 12 per cent ; lead 2.4 per cent ; zinc 21.2 per cent ; 
gold 51.9 ; and antimony 85.6 per cent. The only 
increases in production were recorded by wolfram 
(138.3 per cent) and bismuth (11.9 per cent). 
The unfavourable situation of the large nationalized 
mines, aggravated by other circumstances, was also found 
to exist in medium-sized and small mines. In addition 
to the increase in internal costs caused by the inflationary 
situation, the price policy of the Mining Bank provoked 
® The firm Ford, Bacon and Davis estimates that labour efficiency 
within the mines declined by 15 per cent between 1951 and 1956, 
although it is necessary to make clear that this reduction is not 
only due to the workers themselves. 
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a decline in the production of these mines greater than 
that experienced by the Mining Corporation. According 
to Ford, Bacon and Davis, between 1953 and 1954 
1,600 medium-sized and small mines were shut down 
and the value of output of these mines, which in 1950-
52 had reached an annual average of 43 million dollars, 
fell by 1955 to 25 miUion. 
In spite of the seriousness of these trends, perhaps 
the mining sector was affected even more by the exchange 
system. From 1934 exporters of minerals had been 
obliged to sell a part of the exchange earned on exports 
at a rate greatly inferior to the real parity rate of the 
boliviano. As far as the mining sector is concerned, this 
system signified a subsidy to the rest of the economy 
which increased in relation to the internal inflation and 
to the fall in the real exchange rate. As a consequence, 
while the local currency expenditures of the nationalized 
and private mining companies increased as internal 
prices and salaries rose, their income in national currency 
was frozen at the rate of exchange apphed to their sales 
of dollars to the Central Bank. In this way a heavy 
deficit was created in the mining sector which had to 
be covered with credit from the Central Bank and which 
made this sector appear as one of the principal factors 
contributing to the increase in the means of payment 
(see table 8). 
Thus the increase in the means of payment cannot 
be attributed entirely at least to losses suffered by the 
mining enterprises. If this sector had benefited from 
an exchange rate which corresponded to the real pur-
chasing power of the bohviano, its income in national 
currency would have been much greater and deficits 
would have been much less than those which the figures 
cited indicate, or they would disappear altogether. 
(ii) Financing of public expenditures and investment. 
The financing of the current expenditures of the public 
sector and government investments by means of Central 
Bank credit was accentuated during 1952-56, when the 
sharp increase in prices confronted the Government 
with voluminous fiscal deficit and when a large invest-
ment programme was being carried out. Central Bank 
loans to the national Government increased from 3,890 
to 20,337 million bolivianos between December 1952 
and October 1956, and credits extended to autonomous 
institutions rose from 1,225 to 55,517 milHon during the 
same period. 
Deficit financing contributed to the inflation both 
directly through an expansion in the means of payment 
and indirectly because the Government resorted in-
creasingly to expenditure and investment. In the second 
place, a structural change took indirect taxes to augment 
its revenue. Thus, added to the rise in prices originating 
from a reduction in the supply of goods and services, 
the devaluations, and the increase in the money supply, 
was the effect of these taxes on consumer goods' prices 
either directly or through tariff surcharges and exchange 
procedures. 
(iii) The role of bank credit in the private sector. 
During the period 1951-56 bank credit to the private 
sector contributed to the growth of inflation in a smaller 
degree than during previous years. In any event, its 
significance has been less than that corresponding to 
mining and the pubhc sector. 
If the rate of increase in bank credit to the private 
sector is compared with the annual rate of increase in 
prices during 1952 to 1956, it can be seen that except 
in 1955 the movement in bank loans has been parallel 
to the increase in prices. It thus appears that private 
banking has played a passive role in the inflation in the 
sense that the rise in credit has tended to follow the 
trend in prices, whereas the over-all amount of credit 
granted has diminished in relation to the nominal value 
of market transactions. On the other hand, since the 
supply of goods and services has not grown, the increase 
in bank credit has been an additional element in the 
creation of means of payment and in demand, although 
its role cannot be said to be autonomous but induced 
by other inflationary factors mentioned above. 
(iv) Fall in domestic output and in available goods and 
services. United States aid. In contrast with the dispropor-
tionate increase in the money supply to which reference has 
been made, beginning in 1952 domestic production and 
available goods and services in Bolivia suffered a con-
siderable reduction. The variations in the gross product 
during 1950-55 have already been examined. As was seen, 
in 1953 and 1954 a sharp decline was recorded, originating 
principally in the agricultural sector and in mining. In 
1955 there was some recovery, although the level of 1952 
was not regained. The per capita product, which 
amounted to 85 dollars in the latter year fell to 79 dollars 
in 1955. 
Imports also declined after 1952. From 113 million 
dollars (in 1950 prices) in 1952, imports fell to 88 miUion 
in 1953 and rose sUghtly to 93 million in 1954. In the 
following year there was some recovery, due principally 
to United States aid. 
As was seen in the analysis of the national income, 
available goods and services during the last five years 
have been superior to the gross product. This circum-
stance is explained in part by the improvement in the 
terms of trade with respect to 1950, but the main explana-
tion is the utilization of the country's international 
reserves, the receipt of credits from other countries and 
from some private firms, the postponement of the replace-
ment of capital equipment and the aid extended by the 
United States Government. All of these causes permitted 
the country to purchase a volume of imports greater 
than that which could be covered with current income, 
a situation which cannot be maintained indefinitely. At 
the end of 1956 the country found itself without inter-
national reserves and with an extraordinary external 
banking and commercial debt which made it difficult 
to continue recurring to external credit. In spite of the 
greater availabihty of goods and services than justified 
by the product, real per capita consumption decUned 
substantially after 1952 in relation to the immediately 
preceding years : from 73.2 and 76.5 dollars per person 
in 1951 and 1952 respectively, to 69.9 dollars in 1953, 
66.1 dollars in 1954 and 69.5 in 1955. 
The shortage of essential goods was counteracted in 
part by the aid provided by the United States Govern-
ment beginning in 1953. This aid consisted principally 
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of consumer goods and raw materials which brought 
about a considerable increase in the domestic supply 
of these goods. Between July 1953 and June 1954 the 
contribution of wheat, flour, lard, cotton and cotton 
seed amounted to 10.9 million dollars, or 17 per cent 
of Bolivia's imports in current prices ; from 1954 to 
1955 the contribution was 18.3 million dollars or 22 per 
cent of imports ; in 1955-56 it reached 17.5 million 
dollars. Another aspect of the United States aid was 
the provision of capital goods for economic develop-
ment, which rose from 1.2 to 5.7 and 5.3 million dollars 
in the three periods mentioned. 
(v) The influence of the exchange system. In recent 
years the exchange system, which can be classified as 
anarchical, has had serious consequences for the general 
economy of the country and has contributed on an 
appreciable scale to aggravating the inflation. One of 
its most characteristic effects was the maladjustment 
created in the price system. The subsidies extended to 
certain imports by means of the official exchange rate 
and the application of this rate to goods provided by 
United States aid signified that domestic prices for these 
products were very inferior to those prevailing in the 
world market. This was on the one hand a disincentive 
for domestic production and obliged the Government 
to provide subsidies by means of minimum prices, whereas 
on the other it encouraged the re-export of these goods, 
both those imported by the Government and by indivi-
duals and those received through the aid programme. 
The exchange system also tended to discourage exports 
of domestically produced goods. Thus, contraband trade 
to neighbouring countries absorbed an important share 
of Bolivia's supply of essential articles. This contraband 
has existed for many years as a result of the anomalous 
exchange system, but it was accentuated to an extraordi-
nary degree beginning in 1954. Although it is practically 
impossible to calculate the amount of this trade, autho-
rized sources in the country estimate that contraband 
exports of wheat, sugar, rice and cattle reached a value 
of approximately 5 million dollars per year.^ Income 
received from these illegal activities was converted into 
foreign exchange or returned to the country in the form 
of non-essential or luxury articles which were sold 
in the black market. 
The multiplicity of exchange rates was also a catalyst 
for internal speculation of vast proportions. Imports 
were carried out at different rates as a result of the 
shortage of official exchange, and the system permitted 
foreign purchases with dollars obtained at different 
quotations. As was logical, internal market prices were 
fixed in relation to the free exchange rate, so that extra-
ordinary profits were realized. Although as has been 
said the system of " revertibles " was intended to correct 
these anomalies, it was not capable of eliminating them 
altogether. Furthermore, the distribution of essential 
goods was deficient and resulted in a great deal of specula-
tion. The quotas for foodstuffs and other essential manu-
factured products assigned to the different productive 
sectors and urban centres did not always correspond 
* See C. H. Zondag, " Problems in the economic development 
of Bolivia ", 1956 (mimeographed document). 
to the population, thus contributing to shortages. The 
very distribution of exchange accounts and merchandise 
was also influenced by non-economic factors, as has 
been pointed out by high Government officials. In this 
way a black market developed in which prices were 
several times the official ones, especially in the larger 
cities. People who did not benefit from special quotas 
provided by the organizations to which they were 
attached ^—which included the bulk of the middle and 
upper classes and the independent workers — had to 
supply themselves in this black market, and even members 
of labour unions and co-operatives were obliged to 
purchase a substantial part of their supplies in this 
market because of the insufficient rations received at 
official prices. 
Re-exports and speculation — originating in the ex-
change system and stimulated, particularly in the case 
of the latter, by the distribution system — accentuated 
the inflation. These factors are at the same time one of 
the most unfortunate manifestations of inflation. Their 
immediate effects have been the loss of important 
quantities of essential products to the internal economy 
and the exorbitant increase in prices. They resulted in 
an even larger decline in the real income of the majority 
of the population and a distribution of income in favour 
or a restricted group ; and far from co-operating in 
solving the difficulties of the country, they have con-
tributed to worsening them. 
3. The stabilization measures of December 1956 
The worsening of the inflationary situation in the 
course of 1956, characterized by a runaway increase in 
prices and by the progressive decline in the free exchange 
rate, induced the Government to make a decisive effort 
to halt or attenuate this process. The decree of 4 August 
created the National Monetary Stabilization Council, 
presided over by the President of the Republic and 
composed of various ministers, the president of the 
Central Bank and other high officials. From the beginning 
the Council has had access to the advice of experts of 
the United States Government and the International 
Monetary Fund. On 21 November the Congress granted 
the President of the Republic special powers for a period 
of one year to enable him to take measures necessary 
for the attainment of economic stability, and on 15 De-
cember the basic decrees were promulgated, to be 
complemented thereafter by other measures. 
The fundamental characteristics of the new policy 
are the supression of the multiple exchange system, the 
devaluation of the boliviano, and the establishment of 
a single fluctuating exchange rate in accordance with 
market conditions ; the elimination of controls, of 
prohibitions affecting exports and imports, the adoption 
of a régime of free trade and exchange transactions, 
subject only to customs duties and the payment of 
export royalties ; the elimination of direct and indirect 
Government subsidies to essential articles and of internal 
price controls, except for rents ; the freezing of wages 
and salaries for one year after adjustments to com-
pensate for the increase in prices resulting from the 
devaluation and the elimination of the cheap company 
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store system ; the control of bank credit and the adoption 
of fiscal measures to balance the national budget and 
replace revenue obtained from the old exchange system 
with more normal tax revenues. 
At the time of preparation of this study (April 1957), 
only four months have elapsed since the application of 
these stabilization measures. It is thus premature to 
attempt to analyse the results, since several months must 
pass before it will be possible to appreciate how the 
country has been able to adapt itself to such a radical 
change and which have been the effects of the new 
situation both with regard to the economy as a whole 
and to its principal sectors. Nevertheless, immediately 
after the adoption of the anti-inflationary measures very 
significant changes took place which merit analysis, 
since they have a direct relation to the success of this 
policy. 
One consequence which can be classified as definitely 
favourable is the immediate disappearance of the vices 
which had their origin in the system of controls and 
multiple exchange rates. Speculative profits in the sale 
of essential articles and illegitimate gains from the 
distribution of exchange and quotas and from other 
similar abuses, have ceased to exist along with the factors 
upon which they were based. Even more important, 
the incentive for contraband trade with neighbouring 
countries has disappeared with the supression of exchange 
rates favouring the importation of consumer goods and 
some raw materials. This fact, together with the increase 
in the availability of essential goods provided by United 
States aid, has increased the supply of goods in the 
internal market and virtually eliminated the problem of 
shortages. It was possible to anticipate that during the 
period immediately following stabilization there would 
exist a heavy demand for exchange arising from uncer-
tainty over the new measures and from speculative 
transactions arising from the difference between the old 
free rate of exchange and the new parity rate, but available 
information indicates that this demand has been less 
than that anticipated, which has made it possible to 
maintain the position of the boliviano without recurring 
in an exaggerated degree to the stabilization fund. Not 
less important has been the psychological climate created 
by the disappearance of unjust privileges, by the honesty 
and energy with which the new policy has been applied, 
and by the willingness with which large sectors of the 
population have agreed to contribute their share of 
sacrifice in order to carry out stabilization. 
It is also possible to predict an increase in agricultural 
output as a result of the anti-inflationary policy, since 
the situation prevailing before December 1956 discouraged 
production in this sector. Small farmers enjoyed favour-
able relative prices in view of the fact that they sold 
their products in the cities and mining centres at free 
prices, whereas they were able to purchase goods provided 
by American aid and other products at controlled prices. 
Moreover, a considerable number of farmers came to 
the cities to form queues for the purchase of goods in 
ofScial sales or at controlled prices in order to resell 
them in the black market, thereby earning more than 
they could in their agricultural pursuits. In areas adjacent 
to the frontier, especially in the lake Titicaca region. 
contraband constituted a highly remunerative activity 
prejudicial to agricultural production. It might be con-
sidered that a worsening of relative agricultural prices 
would lead to a reduction in agricultural output, but 
in the case of Bolivia the situation is different. By elimi-
nating special privileges and windfall profits from small 
large-scale speculation and contraband, the stabilization 
measures have induced important groups of farmers to 
return to the country side because of a lack of other 
opportunities for employment, and it is hoped that 
farms will produce more so as to permit the rural popula-
tion to maintain its actual consumption level. It is 
possible that the full effect of this situation will not 
become immediately apparent because the sowing season 
has already passed, but it is almost certain that the 
next harvest will reflect the results of the return of labour 
to agriculture. 
In addition to these favourable effects of the stabiliza-
tion policy, some problems have arisen which require 
careful attention on the part of the economic authorities. 
The first of these — and without doubt the most impor-
tant in view of its possible consequences — is the drop 
in real income of the wage earning sector. It is not easy 
to calculate the exact level of remunerations before and 
after stabilization. Before December employees received, 
in addition to their monetary wages and salaries, indirect 
income through quotas of essential articles which they 
could purchase at official or fixed prices, although it is 
difficult to estimate the magnitude of these purchases 
in comparison with those made in the free market at 
much higher prices. A measure of the incidence of the 
stabilization decrees thus must not only take into account 
the increase in free market prices but also the effect of 
the elimination of this system of indirect benefits. 
The cost of living index for the city of La Paz prepared 
by the Dirección General de Estadística rose by 62 per 
cent between the end of November 1956 and the end of 
March 1957, although it should be noted that in the last 
two months there was a fall in prices in relation to 
December and January. This increase is undoubtedly 
quite exaggerated. In the foodstuffs group for the period 
prior to stabilization official prices were taken into account 
for various products which have a great weight in the 
index and which were purchased only to a limited extent 
at those prices even by labour union members, whereas 
prices for these products since December are those 
prevailing in the free market. The increase indicated in 
the price of housing is also doubtful. 
According to an index prepared by the Central Bank 
of Bolivia for a group of foodstuffs consumed by workers 
in the city of La Paz, prices rose by 22 per cent between 
3 December 1956 and immediately after the promulga-
tion of the stabilization decrees. Thereafter the index 
declined to 92 on 25 March (3 December = 100) and 
to 86 by 29 April 1957, although this index is also unre-
presentative of real trends. In the first place, in the calcula-
tion of the index only free agricultural prices were taken 
into account before and after 15 December, with the 
result that no consideration was given to that part of 
salaries spent on products at official prices. In the second 
place, the market in which the information was gathered 
is one with the lowest prices in which a large proportion 
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of consumers do not participate, and appreciable dif-
ferences exist between prices in the different markets 
of the city. Finally, the weights used in the index appear 
to be very different from the real composition of ex-
penditures. 
With regard to statistics on salaries, the problems are 
not less serious. According to data supplied by the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, average total 
wages for industrial workers in La Paz rose by 23 per 
cent between November 1956 and February 1957, 
including payment for overtime, special bonuses, etc. 
However, it should be pointed out that according to 
the information obtained by the Mission these figures 
have not taken into consideration some payments in 
money and in kind made by certain enterprises to their 
workers. 
Nevertheless, it would not appear venturesome to 
state that the real income of factory workers in La Paz 
has declined even though it is impossible to quantify 
the reduction at the present time. Aside from the ehmi-
nation of subsidies to articles of first necessity, prices 
of fuel and transport have increased, and overtime work 
in many industries has been reduced. It is not very pro-
bable that the compensatory increase in nominal salaries 
has been sufficient to neutralize the effect of these factors 
on real wages. Another sector which appears to have 
suffered from the contraction in real income is the 
public employees. The compensatory adjustment made 
in the wages of this sector— 1,450 bolivianos daily 
per person — probably does not represent more than 
a 30 per cent increase over average wages before stabiliza-
tion. In this group the most affected are the higher wage 
earners, whereas lower income employees may not have 
suffered any decline in their real income. 
Such a result was of course to be expected. The level 
of national income in the last few years has been main-
tained above that of the product, thanks to transitory 
factors such as the use of international reserves and 
external credits, which have tended to diminish. Eco-
nomic stabilization signifies basically that the country 
will have to live within its means and with the help of 
United States aid as long as it continues. Consequently, 
the inevitable reduction in real income is the prices 
which must be paid to restore a healthy economy. It 
is unnecessary to point out that a similar or even greater 
reduction would have come about in any event as 
extraordinary reserves became exhausted, which in fact 
had already been about to occur. 
On the other hand, the most delicate aspect of the 
situation is that a marked decline in the real income 
level of the wage earning sector must have repercussions 
on demand, which might reduce incentives for the main-
tenance of activity in certain sectors. It is not easy to 
resolve this problem, A disproportionate increase in 
wages could disturb the anti-inflationary policy by 
increasing the cost of production in mining and industry. 
If these activities were not in a position to absorb such 
increases, then they would have an immediate effect 
upon prices. Moreover, in the case of mining an increase 
in salaries could lead to a new devaluation of the boliviano 
in order to avoid deficits in the budgets of the enterprises, 
in which case immediate increases would take place in 
the prices of imported articles, particularly of essential 
goods and raw materials. In short, a pure and simple 
rise in remuneration could lead to a new wage/price 
spiral and worsen rather than improve the living condi-
tions of the workers. 
Without discarding the possibility of a revision in the 
level of wages which would take into account the dangers 
described, other ways should be mentioned which could 
lead to the improvement of real salaries by means of a 
reduction in prices. In the first place, many dispropor-
tionate price increases which took place immediately 
after stabilization have begun to fall back : the cost-of-
living index revealed a reduction of 8.8 per cent in 
February which was particularly noticeable in food-
stuffs and clothing, although a small increase took place 
in March. On the other hand, there appear to exist 
possibilities for revising railroad tariffs and truck rates 
without producing maladjustments in the economy of 
the enterprises. With regard to liquid fuels, which is 
another item with a great incidence on the price level, 
it may be possible to effect some reductions by lengthening 
the period in which Bolivian State Petroleum Deposits 
(Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos) has cal-
culated that it must wipe out the deficit accumulated 
before December 1956 and without disturbing its current 
budget. It is also possible to predict a reduction in the 
prices of some agricultural products after the next 
harvest (in May and June). 
The possibility should also be considered of avoiding 
a fall in demand and in the national product through 
new investment to create employment and income — 
which at the present time would require external financial 
resources — and through the application in the shortest 
possible period of measures to adapt domestic industry 
to the new structure of demand. 
Another question of upmost importance is the impact 
of stabilization on the financial capacity of the mining 
enterprises, both nationalized and under private owner-
ship. It has already been seen that the difficult situation 
of the Bolivian Mining Corporation and of the private 
mines originated principally in the application of an over-
valued exchange rate to their exports, which did not 
permit them to cover their current costs and take care 
of the replacement of equipment, the preparation of 
new work and new investment. At the time of stabiliza-
tion the exchange rate paid by the Central Bank for 
mineral exports was 3,500 bolivianos on the average. 
The new rate signifies a doubling of the income of the 
mining companies in domestic currency, but their costs 
of production have also risen due to the increase in 
wages and prices of fuel, domestic and imported 
materials.® 
This subject is presently being studied carefully by 
the economic authorities. The first results indicate that 
the Bolivian Mining Corporation will be able to finance 
its operations at the actual exchange rate, although with 
respect to the private mines it is not possible to anticipate 
any conclusion at the time of writing. 
® Before Dscember 1956, mining enterprises acquired dollars 
from tiie Central Bank for their foreign currency expenditures 
at a rate of 190. However, transport rates have diminished since 
stabilization, as can be seen in Part B, section III, of this study. 
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Another problem is the reduction which has occurred 
in the sales of Bolivian industry, particularly of textiles. 
It is not difficult to explain the origin of these difficulties. 
The frontier market of neighbouring countries, which 
before stabilization was artificially stimulated by dif-
ferences in prices arising from the exchange rates applied 
to imported raw materials and which absorbed an 
important share of Bolivian industrial output, has 
disappeared. Since 50 per cent or more of domestic 
output of certain textiles was sold in this market, a drop 
in sales of these goods was a logical consequence. It 
is furthermore possible that in anticipation of rising 
prices traders and consumers accumulated inventories 
of some manufactured products immediately before 
stabilization. It also appears that the direction of con-
traband has changed and that at present foreign articles 
are competing with domestic products.® 
All of these circumstances are to a certain extent 
temporary and relatively easy to correct by administra-
tive measures — with respect to contraband — or call 
for the adaptation of certain industrial sectors — the 
manufacture of textiles, for example — to the internal 
level of demand. More important is the problem arising 
from the reduction in consumption caused by the fall 
in real income, which has apparently taken place. There 
is no doubt that industry is presently confronted with 
serious difficulties. Labour unions and Government 
policy prevent the unemployment of workers, but if 
the present situation continues it is not improbable that 
some factories will have to shut down. Nevertheless, 
the problem has not yet reached this stage and only a 
limited number of enterprises has been seriously affected. 
As will be seen in the part of this study on industry,' 
there exist various possible solutions to this problem. 
One method which offers the best prospects of success 
consists of putting into practice an intensive campaign 
for the rationalization of Bolivian industry to adapt it 
to market conditions, accompanied by a policy of super-
vised credit to aid needy cases and to permit the invest-
ment (at present very limited) which rationalization 
requires.® In any event, the possibihty of a short-term 
reduction in industrial employment should not be under-
estimated, in which case it would be necessary to find 
new employment for the workers released. 
The fiscal situation is also a pressing problem, par-
ticularly for the immediate future. One of the principal 
bases of the stabiUzation policy is a balanced budget. 
To this end the Government has not hesitated to maintain 
the low level of wages of its employees, to reduce public 
' The deficient tariff reform, promulgated along with the measures 
of 15 December, has also contributed to increasing competition 
from some foreign products both of industrial and of agricultural 
origin. At the present time a new tariff system is being worked out. 
' See Part B, section I. 
® The rationalization mentioned here includes the diversifica-
tion of production to adapt it to demand and the substitution of 
some imports by domestic output, as well as improvements in 
administrative, production and organizational methods of enter-
prises. Such a process could lead in some cases to a reduction in 
the number of personnel employed, although this does not appear 
to be the case in many firms. It would also signify an improvement 
in workers' discipline and the selection of employees according 
to their efficiencv. 
investment and to limit expenditures to those which are 
strictly indispensable. But not even with these measures 
of extreme austerity is the Government's financial situa-
tion optimistic. In the 1957 budget, which amounts to 
292,000 milhon bohvianos, about 112,000 million or 
38 per cent is provided from the counterpart funds of 
United States aid. It is not possible to make any pro-
jection of the yield of current taxes, in view of the fact 
that the effects of stabilization measures on the economy 
remains to be seen ; but up to the present time tax 
collections appear to be inferior to the figures budgeted 
mainly due to the decline in economic activity. Thus, 
the Government is today faced with the problem of 
obtaining revenue during the current year sufficient to 
cover budgeted expenditures. In the immediate future 
the fiscal authorities must also seriously consider the 
need for increasing public investment in order to meet 
the development needs of the country. Soon, when the 
freeze on wages is lifted, it will also be necessary to 
increase the salaries of public employees. Although it 
is conceivable that further economies in expenditures 
can be made — particularly if organizational and work 
methods in Government offices are improved — this 
procedure does not offer great possibihties. A rise in 
fiscal revenue is thus a fundamental and urgent problem. 
The tax reform, the urgency of which cannot be over-
emphasized, may reveal new ways of obtaining resources 
for the public sector, but it is very probable that in order 
to take care of a minimum of its obligations and to 
begin a development policy, the Government will require 
in addition to United States aid other extraordinary 
funds, at least for a time. 
The picture which has been presented is far from being 
optimistic, but any other impression would not reflect 
the real situation. The job of restoring the economic 
health of the country is difficult and time-consuming. 
For many years Bolivia has been living beyond its means, 
spending more than it produces. Out of the inflation 
some sectors have enjoyed a favourable situation which 
cannot be maintained under normal circumstances since 
they were being paid out of the country's reserves, 
credit and capital. Today Bolivia must live out of its 
own resources, and this at the present time signifies a 
reduction in the standard of living. There are only two 
ways of overcoming the situation : one is transitory 
and limited, although perhaps necessary over the short 
run, namely, an increase in foreign aid and credit ; the 
other is fundamental and permanent and consists of an 
increase in output and productivity so that real income 
may be raised. In order to attain this last aim the country 
must inevitably pass through a difficult transition period. 
V . PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
1. The economic problem 
The economic future of Bolivia should be analysed 
from two points of view, which are closely connected 
but call for different methodologies. The first is an 
approach to the short-term problems to be solved, 
while the second consists in a fairly clear conception 
of BoHvia's long-term economic prosDects. 
With regard to the first aspect, Bolivia is in urgent 
need of various investment projects in order to avoid, 
inter alia, disemployment and an increased reduction of 
real income which might undermine the Government's 
plans for stabihzing and consolidating the economy. 
Moreover, such investment would constitute the basis 
— and possibly the starting-point — of future economic 
development. In the sections composing Part B of this 
study, the major sectors of the BoUvian economy are 
analysed, and the factors which may help to determine 
the nature of investment in each of these are described 
in more or less specific terms. It should nevertheless be 
emphasized that these chapters simply indicate general 
basic principles which may serve as a guide in planning 
the individual projects, but should not be considered 
as projects in themselves. The task before the Bolivian 
technical institutions consists in the preparation of such 
projects at the earliest possible opportunity. It will be 
clear from the sections on the different sectors that there 
are numerous fields in which a suitable investment 
policy for the country's development needs might be 
initiated without delay, and that it only remains for a 
precise statement to be made of the objectives and require-
ments embodied by the specific projects referred to. 
Although this method of approach to future invest-
ment pohcy can perhaps be justified by the imperative 
need to carry out specific plans for attaining the objectives 
mentioned, it is by no means the ideal formula for dealing 
with Bolivia's long-term development requirements. 
Despite the fact that the data given in the sector sections 
were based on as thorough a study as possible of pre-
vailing conditions, they should not be taken as the 
constituents for an economic development programme. 
The drawing-up of a scientific programme wilt not, in 
fact, represent merely the sectorial requirements, but the 
construction of over-all projections for the basic economic 
factors (demand, product, investment, savings, etc.), to 
which the specific plans for each of the main economic 
sectors should be adapted. 
The objective of this section is precisely to indicate 
some qualitative aspects of the long-term economic deve-
lopment problems confronting the country. As it is 
intended only to provide a methodological guide for the 
Bolivian technical institutions who will be responsible 
for programming, the tentative projections made should 
not be considered as the programme itself, or as predic-
tions and indications of what will occur if their premises 
are fulfilled. The value given in subsequent pages will 
undoubtedly be modified considerably when a detailed 
programme is prepared on the basis of more accurate 
information than that available up to the present. 
It should not be inferred from this that the figures 
arrived at by the analysis are divorced from reality. 
In spite of its predominantly methodological intention, 
its conclusions do not differ appreciably from the esti-
mates in the sectorial sections, although the methods by 
which these were calculated were entirely different. The 
figures should admittedly be corrected — as they inevi-
tably will be during the preparation of the programme 
— but they do provide some idea of the magnitude of 
the economic and financial problems that Bolivia will 
have to face during the next decade. The projections are 
also intended to draw the attention of the Government 
and people of Bolivia to the urgent need of devoting all 
their efforts to investing in scientifically-chosen strategic 
sectors in order to improve the standard of living and 
ensure the uninterrupted rise of a more balanced and 
steady rate of growth. 
(a) Statement of the problem 
Although there may be various methods of studying 
the long-term prospects of the Bolivian economy, the 
most appropriate would perhaps be to take as a starting 
point the basic problem of the growth of the labour 
force and the capacity of the principal economic sectors 
to absorb this increment. The heavy demographic pressure 
on the agricultural zones in the Altiplano is a well-known 
fact ; as the labour force is also being supplemented by 
several thousand persons annually, it is obvious that 
one of the nagging problems for the economy is how 
to find employment for the increasing population of 
working age without simultaneously reducing the exiguous 
average income of the agricultural worker. 
In the first place, an attempt should be made to assess 
the magnitude of the problem. The 1950 census recorded 
a total population of 3,018,000 inhabitants,® and, in 
comparison with the previous census of 1900, showed 
only a moderate rate of natural growth. A more extensive 
examination of possible demographic growth during 
the whole half-century will, however, lead to the con-
clusion that the real rate has accelerated in recent years 
and is likely to rise even more rapidly in future owing 
to improved sanitary conditions. If, therefore, a higher 
but still moderate rate of growth is assumed, the popula-
tion in 1957 will probably amount to approximately 
3,550,000 and, by 1967, may even have reached 4,300,000. 
To sum up, there is every likelihood that the Bolivian 
population will increase by some 750,000 persons during 
the next decade. 
The same census data indicated that, in 1950, the 
active population could be estimated at 1,043,289 per-
sons — approximately 34 per cent of total population — 
after the figures for employment in agriculture had been 
corrected so as to take into account the real labour 
force in terms of adult manpower equivalent. If the 
proportion is assumed to remain the same, the current 
real labour force can be estimated at 1,210,000 and may 
be expected to rise to 1,470,000 by 1967. It may thus be 
anticipated that the total active population in the country 
will increase by some 260,000 persons during the next 
ten years. 
To state the problem much more precisely, it may be 
asked how the Bolivian economy is to absorb an average 
yearly increment of 26,000 persons. The extent to which 
the various economic sectors are able to employ this 
increase in the active population will constitute a 
determining factor in the economic growth of the country 
and the improvement of its present standards of living. 
It is worth while to give some hypothetical estimates 
showing alternative possibilities in relation to the 
° This and subsequent population figures are based on estimates 
taken at mid-year. 
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distribution of the increase in the active population. 
When the corrections referred to had been made the 
labour force in the agricultural and livestock sector was 
estimated at 72.1 per cent of the total active population 
in 1950. If this proportion were maintained, agriculture 
would have to absorb almost 190.000 more persons 
during the next decade. The extremely unfavourable 
effect of such a large increase on productivity levels in 
the agricultural sector may easily be imagined, since 
the burden would fall mainly on areas where the density 
of employment is already very high. 
If it were desired to retain this additional labour force 
in the agricultural and livestock sector without a resultant 
deterioration in the income-level of that sector as a 
whole, it would be essential — as explained in greater 
detail in the relevant section — for the major part of 
the new active population to engage in production for 
export. In view of the territorial conditions in Bolivia, 
its distance from embarkation centres and the high cost 
of transport, it appears very unlikely that this country 
could become a large-scale exporter of agricultural and 
livestock commodities, since it would have to compete 
with neighbouring countries whose export possibilities 
are much more favourable. 
It is true that during the last few years other sectors 
have displayed a tendency to absorb almost 50 per cent 
of the increase in the active population, which has led 
to a proportional reduction of the agricultural labour 
force. (It is estimated that this will be only 61 per cent 
of the total labour force in 1957.) But it is equally 
certain that should this proportion be maintained during 
the following decade — even if other sectors continue 
to absorb half the increase in the labour force — the 
absolute figures for the active population that agriculture 
would still be obliged to employ would probably be 
incompatible with any real effort to improve the pro-
ductivity of that sector. 
The only remaining alternative, then, is to recognize 
that the essence of the problem lies in the agricultural 
and livestock sector, and to study over-all prospects on 
the basis of reasonable assumptions as to the greatest 
number of persons that can be absorbed by this sector 
in such a way as to enable them to contribute — on 
however small a scale — to the improvement of pro-
ductivity in the economy as a whole. The new areas 
appropriate for colonization are capable of absorbing 
approximately 4,000 active persons every year. If this 
is accepted, two alternative working hypotheses, of 
which the second is the more favourable, may be pos-
tulated as follows : (A) the labour force in agriculture 
will increase by the aforesaid 4,000 persons in the new 
settlements and by another 4,000 persons comprising 
the active population increment in the areas at present 
under cultivation ; or (B) there will only be an incre-
ment of 4,000 persons in the newly-colonized regions,^® 
unaccompanied by any increase in the active population 
on the land now under cultivation. 
It may be deduced from these two hypotheses that 
non-agricultural activities will have to absorb 18.000 
active persons every year in the one case and 22,000 
in the other. It would therefore be useful to study the 
probable distribution of these increments, on the basis 
of an estimated break-down by sectors, of the non-
agricultural active population in 1957, according to 
table 9. 
Table 9 
BOLIVIA : ESTIMATES OF NON-AGRICULTURAL ACTIVE 









Public administration and general services 
Trade, banking insurance 
Personal services 
Other services 
5 5 . 2 
5 6 . 5 
6 8 . 2 
3 2 . 2 
2 6 , 9 
5 2 . 3 
7 3 . 0 
8 9 . 2 
1 1 . 5 
TOTAL 4 6 5 . 0 
Source: ECLA estimates, based on the 1950 census. 
As regards 1967 an acceptable preliminary assumption 
would be that the distribution of the non-agricultural 
active population — 645,000 and 685,000 persons accord-
ing to hypotheses A and B respectively — would be 
proportionally the same for each sector as in 1957. The 
corresponding figures appear in table 10. But, as this 
mechanical projection would not be in line with real 
conditions and possibilities in the different sectors, 
corrected figures, which are more reasonable in the light 
of current knowledge of the Bolivian economy, are given 
in the two last colums of table lO.^i 
In future these will be designated as working hypotheses A 
and B resoectivelv. 
In the case of hypothesis A , these readjustments may be 
justified as follows. As it is well known that there is at present a 
surplus labour force in mining, it was not considered safe to assume 
additional absorption of more than 15,000 persons in the next 
ten years. With regard to manufacturing, the detailed considerations 
in Chapter I of Part Two were taken into account, and a lower 
annual increase of 2,500 persons was assumed. It seemed reasonable 
to suppose that urban artisan labour would grow proportionately 
less than industry, at an annual rate of 1,600 persons, whereas 
the building industry, in view of the need for more public works 
and buildings of all kinds, seemed likely to expand more rapidly, 
and a rate of 2,000 persons per year was postulated. The same figure 
was assumed for transport, which also implies a high rate of increase, 
with a view to the need to add some 700 units yearly to the lorry 
park to enable it to serve the newly-settled zones and cope with 
the increment in production. It was estimated that the trade, 
public administration and personal services sectors would maintain 
much the same relative importance as in 1957, while employment 
in other services and activities was calculated residually, a slight 
percentage decrease resulting. Hypothesis B envisages the absorp-
tion of an additional 40,000 persons during the decade. It was 
assumed that these would be mainly distributed among the high-
productivity sectors so as to ensure a greater increase in average 
national income. For this reason, a higher rate of employment was 
postulated for mining, manufacturing, building and urban artisan 
labour. It will be observed that hypothesis B is, in general, more 
optimistic, envisaging an expansion in the petroleum industry and, 
in particular, a higher rate of growth for industry than that forecast 
in the relevant chanter. 
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Table 10 
BOLIVIA : PROJECTIONS OF THE ACTIVE POPULATION 
IN 1967 
(Thousands of persons) 
Hypothesis A Hypothesis B 
According to According to 
percentage percentage 
distribution Readjusted distribution Readjusted 
Sector in 1950 distribution in 1950 distribution 
Extractive industries . . 75.9 70.0 80.5 80 0 
Manufacturing 83.3 82,0 89.3 97.0 
Urban handicrafts 93.7 84.5 99.4 94.5 
Building 44 2 52 0 46.9 57.0 
Transport 37.0 47.0 39.2 47.0 
Public administration 
and general services . 71.9 72.0 76.3 72.0 
Trade, banking insur-
ance 100.3 100.0 106.4 100.0 
Personal services 122 8 122.8 130.2 122 8 
Other services 15.8 14.7 16.8 14.7 
TOTAL 645.0 645.0 685.0 685.0 
This figure is lower than that of the last few years, 
since the basic projects already terminated will pre-
sumably be utilized in greater degree and no large-scale 
expansion is forecast for railroad construction, which 
has a high capital intensity. A final postulate will be 
that average capital per person employed in other 
activities (800 dollars) will show a slight increase over 
the 1950 figure, owing to the possibility of more invest-
ment in electricity. 
The conclusions to be drawn from these estimates 
are summarized in table II, which gives the average 
annual net investment during 1958-67 (according to 
hypotheses A and B respectively) that is compatible 
with the rate of growth and distribution of the active 
population cited in the previous section. 
Table I I 
B O L m A : ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL NET INVESTMENT 
REQUIRED, 1958-67 
Hypothesis A Hypothesis B 
(b) Investment requirements 
The foregoing figures and considerations constitute, 
in the final issue, ideal projections of how the increase 
in the active population would have to be distributed 
in order to solve one of the country's basic economic 
problems. They would, however, have no significance 
unless complemented by an examination of the real 
possibilities of achieving these objectives. In the last 
analysis, the icey factor is, of course, the volume of 
investment required by such growth and the sectorial 
redistribution of the labour force. An attempt will be 
made to deal with this aspect in the following paragraphs, 
although the figures employed are barely indicative of 
approximate magnitude. 
In the case of agriculture, the problem will be con-
sidered at much greater length in the corresponding 
section of the present study.^^ ^jn therefore be suf-
ficient at this juncture to note the conclusion that the 
annual net investment required by this sector, both for 
expansion of the area under cultivation and a moderate 
improvement in the techniques employed on existing 
farms, is likely to be approximately 5.5 million dollars. 
The section on manufacturing activities also estimates 
the average amount of capital required for providing 
employment for the increased labour force as approxi-
mately 3,000 dollars per active person. The possible net 
investment required in the mining sector will be calculated 
on similar lines, but the figures for investment per active 
person will be assumed to be considerably higher — 
as much as 10,000 dollars — in view of the high capital 
intensity required by the expansion of the petroleum 
industry and the fact that available 1950 data referred 
to depreciated capital. A capital of 6,000 dollars per 
person will be assumed necessary in the transport sector. 
See Part B, section IV. 
18 See Part B, section I. 
Annual net Annual net 
Annual investment Annual investment 
increase in ( Millions increase in ( Millions 
the active of 1950 the active of 1950 
Sector population dollars) population doUars) 
Agriculture and live-
stock 8,000 5.5 4,000 5,5 
Extractive industries . . 1,500 15.0 2,500 25.0 
Manufacturing 2,500 7.5 4,050 12,2 
Transport 2,000 12.0 2,000 12.0 
Services and others . . . 12,000 9.6 13,450 10.8 
TOTAL 26,000 49.6 26,000 65.5 
Source: ECLA. 
If such projections were to become reality, aggregate 
capital invested in the Bolivian economy in 1967 would 
be 1,420 or 1,580 million dollars (at 1950 prices) according 
to hypotheses A and B respectively. It will be recalled 
that the figure for 1955 was only a little over 920 million 
dollars. 
From the standpoint of the investment efforts required 
it will not be sufficient to consider net investment only, 
since some provision must be included each year for 
the depreciation of fixed capital. Assuming an average 
depreciation rate of 2.8 per cent, similar to that registered 
during 1950-55, and discounting the inevitable inñuence 
on such a rate of variations in the sectorial distribution 
of capital, total depreciation requirements may be 
estimated at an annual average of 32.8 million dollars 
on hypothesis A and 35.0 million dollars on hypothesis B 
for the whole period 1958-67. 
It will now be feasible to calculate total gross invest-
ment requirements, in accordance with the terms of 
both hypotheses. In the case of hypothesis A, to the 
net annual investment of 49.6 million dollars would be 
added 32.8 million for depreciation, giving a gross 
investment of 82.4 million, whereas for hypothesis B 
a similar calculation would place the gross investment 
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figure at 100.5 million dollars. These conclusions are 
admittedly striking. Gross investment requirements 
estimated in this way are far higher than those recorded 
for 1955, which year in turn witnessed a very favourable 
level in comparison with that of former periods.^* In 
any case, before it can be judged whether figures of this 
magnitude are attainable, they will have to be related 
to the expansion in the gross product determined by 
such investment, as well as to the financing possibilities 
at the country's disposal. This will be the topic dealt 
with in the final pages of the present section.^^ 
(c) Repercussions on the gross product and productivity 
Some consideration should now be given to the 
probable effect of the growth and redistribution of the 
labour force on the level of the gross product and over-
all productivity of the Bolivian economy. The corre-
sponding estimates are mainly based on the figures for 
the gross product per person employed in the principal 
sectors in 1955, and have been corrected to conform 
with more or less arbitrary hypotheses on possible 
increases in sectorial productivity. 
As regards agriculture, the gross product per active 
person was 125 dollars in 1950 and slightly lower in 
1955, It is estimated that cultivation of the new areas, 
and the improvement in the productivity of the labour 
force employed in the existing cultivated zones consequent 
upon improved techniques, will probably raise the 
aggregate gross product for this sector in 1967 to 35 mil-
lion dollars above its 1950 level, which would represent 
an increase of 13 or 18 per cent, according to the hypo-
thesis adopted, in the gross product per active person.'^ ® 
In the case of mining, the gross product per active person 
in 1950 amounted to 1,340 dollars. It will be assumed 
It will be recalled that average gross investment from 1950 
to 1955 was only 37 million dollars annually and 54.4 million dollars 
in 1955. 
w See point (d). 
1® It should be pointed out that a lower figure was given in 
Part B, section IV, which only comprised certain crops and covered 
a period of scarcely five years. Over a longer period, and including 
the anticipated increase in livestock and forestry production, the 
increment will be equivalent to that assumed in the hypothesis. 
here that productivity will rise by slightly more than 
10 per cent until, by 1967, the figure per active person 
will have reached 1,500 dollars. Calculations for manu-
facturing activities are based on the detailed informa-
tion given in the pertinent chapter, ^ ^ which postulated 
a 20-per cent increase in productivity. Urban artisan 
labour is assumed to show only a slight improvement 
on the figure for the gross product per person recorded 
in 1950 (192-200 dollars), whereas the services sector 
retains approximately the same level of productivity as 
in 1950. The figures for these estimates, adapted to the 
premises of the two working hypotheses utilized, are 
summarized in table 12. 
In short, it may be concluded that if the employment 
and productivity targets implicit in these assumptions 
are feasible, the total gross product in 1967 will amount 
to approximately 420 and 450 million dollars in hypo-
theses A and B respectively, i® This would imply a con-
siderable improvement in the figures for gross product 
per active person — from 238 dollars per person in 1950 
and 232 in 1955 to 286 in 1967, according to hypothesis A, 
and 304 according to hypothesis B. What is even more 
important is that the attainment of such targets would 
raise the gross product per capita from its current level 
of less than 80 dollars to 97 or 104 — according to which 
hypothesis is selected — by the end of the decade. It 
is surprising that such an intensive investment effort as 
that just assessed should prove indispensable for attaining 
what may be considered very moderate increases in per 
capita income. Nevertheless, it would result in the estab-
lishment of a much more favourable situation and pave 
the way for a subsequent acceleration of the rate of 
growth. 
See part B, section I. 
The total gross product would increase at a cumulative rate 
o f 4.7 per cent annually according to hypothesis A , and 5.5 per cent 
according to hypothesis B. 
' ' The wholly tentative nature of these computations should not 
be forgotten. In practice, there may be far greater increases in the 
gross product per active person, since a relatively small volume 
of investment in strategic points of the economy, where it is most 
useful in promoting the optimum utilization of existing capital and 
in eliminating bottlenecks, may result in a notable expansion of 
productivity. 
Table 12 
BOLIVIA : PROJECTIONS OF THE GROSS PRODUCT IN 1967 


























Agriculture and livestock . . . . 825.0 141 116.0 785.0 148 116.0 
Extractive industries 70.0 1,500 105.0 80.0 1,500 120.0 
Manufacturing 82.0 600 49.2 97.0 600 58.2 
Urban handicrafts 84.5 200 16.9 94.5 200 18.9 
Services and others 408.5 325 132.8 413.5 325 134.4 
TOTAL 1,470.0 419.9 1,470.0 447.5 
Source: ECLA. 
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Apart from an increase in the gross product, these 
hypotheses would also imply certain relatively important 
changes in its composition by sectors which are sum-
marized in table 13. The most outstanding would perhaps 
be the marked decline in the relative importance of the 
agricultural and livestock sector under hypothesis B, and 
the notable growth of manufacturing activities and, to 
a lesser degree, mining, which would, to a great extent, 
offset this deterioration. 
Table 13 
BOLIVIA : PROJECTIONS OF CHANGES IN THE 
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF THE GROSS P R O D U C T 
1967 






stock 32.8 28.1 27.6 25.9 
Extractive industries . . 24.4 25.2 25.0 26.8 
Manufacturing 8.9 10.0 11.7 13,0 
Urban handicrafts . . . . 4 .3 4 .8 4 .1 4 .3 
Services and others . . . 29.6 31.9 31.6 30.0 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ECLA. 
It should be pointed out that under these conditions 
there would be hardly any appreciable change in the 
product-capital ratio (0.29 in 1950 compared with 0.29 
and 0.28 in 1967 according to hypotheses A and B 
respectively). The foregoing considerations would, how-
ever, not be incompatible with a marked improvement 
in the product/capital ratio in specific sectors, since a 
substantial expansion is also assumed for certain basic 
high capital density industries such as petroleum, elec-
tricity and so forth. 
(d) Financing possibilities 
The crucial problem in relation to the aforementioned 
projections is, clearly, how to finance the large annual 
investment that will be required. It should be pointed 
out, in the first place, that a comparison of the aggregate 
volume of investment with the growth of the gross 
product will give average investment coeiiicients of 24.1 
and 28.3 for the whole period in hypotheses A and B 
respectively. These figures were also far from being 
reached during the last few years and their attainment 
would call for a much greater effort. 
The first aspect to be considered is whether it will 
be feasible to raise national savings to a point when 
they could finance such investment. It has already been 
stated that consumption of goods and services in 1955 
reached 233 million dollars (at 1950 prices), and it would 
patently be very unrealistic to put forward any hypo-
thesis which would imply a further reduction of this 
already very small amount. It was thus considered much 
See again footnote 19. 
more reasonable to assume that it will be necessary to 
set aside for this purpose a sufficient amount of consumer 
goods and services to meet the requirements of the popula-
tion increment and leave a margin for a small improve-
ment in per capita consumption (at an annual cumulative 
rate of 1 to 1.3 per cent per capita). From this, it may 
be concluded that the requisite annual average for the 
supply of consumer goods and services during 1958-67 
will be 290 and 300 million dollars according to hypo-
theses A and B respectively. 
When these figures are compared with the annual 
average gross product, it appears that national savings 
would have to reach 52 and 55 million dollars on the 
respective hypotheses. 
When the possible volume of national savings was 
thus quantified, no allowance was made for possible 
changes in the terms of trade. If these were to show an 
upward trend, the above figures might be substantially 
increased, and a slightly more ample expansion in per 
capita consumption might be anticipated, whereas if the 
terms-of-trade index were to fall below current levels, 
the possibility of maintaining the volume of savings 
would be considerably diminished, unless the modest 
improvements postulated for consumption levels were 
sacrificed in its favour. 
In any case, the preceding calculations indicate that 
the country will probably find it almost impossible to 
finance the investment targets, upon which the projec-
tions are based, by means of national savings alone. 
This emphasizes how serious would be the obstacles to 
a reasonable rate of development, unless the country 
can count upon substantial contributions from abroad. 
These calculations will also enable an evaluation to 
be made of the necessary volume of such assistance. 
Taking the same annual averages for 1958-67, gross 
investment in accordance with hypothesis A would 
amount to 82.4 million dollars, of which 52 million 
would be financed by national savings, and the remainder 
— slightly more than 30 million — would be obtained 
from external sources. Under the terms of hypothesis B, 
foreign contributions would amount to 45.5 million 
dollars. 
These estimates are by no means excessive, in view 
of the fact that, apart from external credit and assistance, 
they may also include direct foreign investment. Without 
the latter, it would be very difficult to raise the country's 
productive capacity to any appreciable extent, national 
savings would probably drop to such a point that they 
might be unable to cover depreciation requirements, 
and the possibility of a slow but steady improvement 
in the standard of living of the Bolivian people would 
have to be discounted. It seems unnecessary to reiterate 
how small are the practical possibilities off"ered by the 
alternative solution of an even more severe restriction 
of consumption of goods and services ; such a step 
would result in economic as well as social difficulties, 
as a result of the lack of production incentives attendant 
upon a drop in consumer demand. 
There are other relevant considerations to be taken 
into account. As gross investment implies, to a large 
extent, the importing of capital goods, it will be necessary 
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to ascertain whether the country's capacity to import 
will suffice to meet the maximum requirements estimated. 
Here no assessment was made, for want of the requisite 
data. It should nevertheless be mentioned that external 
contributions designed to supplement national savings 
would involve an increase in the capacity to import ; 
moreover, the industrial and agricultural development 
implicit in the projections would undoubtedly modify 
the structure of imports to a considerable extent, as a 
result of which capital goods would represent a much 
larger proportion of total imports than at present. 
Finally, the moderate consumption increase assumed, 
together with the more intensive growth of internal 
activities would, in fact, presuppose large-scale import 
substitution in the course of the decade. It is unlikely, 
therefore, that such problems would constitute the main 
obstacle to the attainment of the purely hypothetical 
targets postulated in this section. 
2. Economic development programming 
(a) Statement of the problem 
The question of whether a given country should base 
its economic policy on a development programme, and, 
if so, the nature and form of this programme, cannot 
be considered in the abstract without reference to the 
prevailing conditions in that country. It may well happen 
that the spontaneous behaviour of the economy has 
resulted in the satisfactory development of savings and 
investment as well as in an adequate rate of growth ; 
in such a case, it might be preferable to fix objectives 
or goals that could be reached without the aid of a 
programme. It may also be decided in certain circum-
stances that the need to establish an investment pro-
gramme refers to the pubhc sector only, since private 
enterprise has sufficient resources, initiative and com-
mercial knowledge to further economic development by 
its own spontaneous action. In addition to examples 
such as these, however, there is the more frequent case 
of under-developed countries where the magnitude of 
the problems arising and the limited nature or total 
lack of basic resources require a more resolute and 
systematic economic policy. In such cases there is also 
a very varied field from which to select the methods to 
be adopted, but there are undoubtedly advantages to 
be obtained from co-ordinating policy by means of a 
development programme which, on the basis of a sound 
and systematic study of the economy, would attempt 
to secure the best possible utiHzation of the limited 
resources and a minimum of conffict between its different 
aims.^^ 
For this purpose, the case of Bolivia must be considered 
from the point of view of both past experience and the 
nature of its current or anticipated problems. The 
inference to be drawn from the development of Bolivia's 
economy during the century is that a balanced and 
sustained development is contingent upon an active 
economic policy, and a greater rationalization of the 
aims to be pursued. It has been seen that the growth 
See Analysis and projections of economic development. 
J. Introduction to the technique of programming (E/CN.12/363). 
United Nations publication, Sales No . : 1955.II.G.2. 
of mining was not sufficient to produce a similar pheno-
menon in the remaining production sectors. While 
Bolivia's economy remains in its present under-deve-
loped state, experience does not warrant the belief that 
the spontaneous action of private interests will be suf-
ficient to achieve satisfactory development. At the same 
time, the lack of a more profound knowledge of the 
national economy, or at least the adoption of economic 
measures which did not take the prospects of the economy 
sufficiently into consideration, contributed to the creation 
of problems which in the course of time have become 
obstacles to development. A case in point was the large-
scale investment in projects that were not always well-
planned or executed and led first to heavy national 
debts and later to prolonged and increasing inflation. 
Further, fiscal resources ^^  were used to maintain con-
sumption subsidies, which hindered domestic production 
and diverted resources from high-priority undertakings. 
From a purely economic standpoint, and with no 
attempt to assess political needs, Bolivia's experience in 
certain periods has been that o f an economic policy 
without any definite guiding principles, characterized by 
adoption of unrelated measures to solve immediate 
problems, and at other times, that of public investment 
programmes and social changes which did not give 
sufficient consideration to the consequences of the 
methods of financing and the transformations effected 
in the country's economy as a whole. 
Current difficulties, and those which can be forecast 
for the near future, suggest that the country cannot 
afford an inadequate utilization of its limited financial 
resources. As may be appreciated from this study as a 
whole, Bolivia urgently requires investment in agriculture, 
industry, mining, petroleum, electricity, and transport in 
order to give employment to the active population without 
reducing labour productivity or per capita income. It 
also needs to improve health and education facilities, 
for which a considerable outlay in services and installa-
tions of various kinds is required. In the face of so many 
demands, domestic capital and the capacity to import 
are extremely limited. The country will need foreign 
capital, but must also raise national savings to the 
maximum and, above all, make the most rational use 
possible of its capacity for external payments. 
Thus, in the case of Bolivia, there are grounds for 
considering the advisability of preparing an economic 
development programme to guide Government policy 
and private interests. Such a programme would require 
careful consideration of certain points. It would not be 
exclusively a public investment programme, since Bolivia's 
economic problem cannot be confined to the systematiza-
tion and provision of sound financial bases for the execu-
tion of projects required by the economy. Nor should 
it be limited to the reform or improvement of public 
administration, although it is an accepted fact that this 
is of prime urgency if a sound economic policy is to 
be put into force. Under present conditions in Bolivia, 
what is required is a programme which, on the basis 
of a careful and far-reaching analysis of the economy 
Including differences arising from the multiple exchange 
rates. 
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and the probable future behaviour of its governing 
factors — especially that of exports — could establish 
immediate objectives for employment, investment and 
production, the country's available resources for attaining 
them, and the method of utilizing these resources so 
as to obtain the best possible yield from them. This 
would involve the fixing of priorities for targets, invest-
ment, and the use of the capacity to import ; the estimat-
ing of the levels which domestic consumption and savings 
should attain ; the calculation of the foreign capital 
that would be required within a given period ; and, in 
particular, the demarcation of the spheres of activity 
of the public and private sectors, and the estabUshment 
of the general lines of political and social pohcy which 
would facilitate co-operation between the two sectors 
and make the needs of the economy compatible with 
the encouragement of private investment. 
A programme which fulfils all these conditions cannot 
be quickly prepared in view of the diificulty of obtaining 
data in Bolivia as things are at present. This does not 
mean that the rationalization and improvement of eco-
nomic policy could not be embarked upon immediately, 
nor that action must be deferred until studies and analyses 
in every field of activity have been completed. On the 
contrary, in the course of this study it has been emphasized 
that immediate action is necessary in order to create 
favourable conditions for economic development ; in 
addition, what may be considered as the requirements 
and aims of a short-term programme have been outlined. 
Such a position, however, cannot be considered as 
satisfactory from the point of view of economic pro-
gramming ; it must only be regarded as a begirming. It 
will be necessary to improve methods of analysis and 
provide more scientific solutions in future. It therefore 
appears essential, if Bolivia's economic development 
programme is to progress, that an immediate start 
should be made on the creation of conditions which, 
within the shortest possible period, will conduce to an 
improvement in the techniques of programming and in 
development policy. These conditions comprise two 
closely related aspects : the first is the improvement of 
sources of data, and the second the nature and structure 
of the programming organizations. 
(b) Improvement of sources of data 
It has been mentioned repeatedly in this study that 
the sources of economic and technical data in Bolivia 
are decidedly inadequate. Statistics in particular — in 
spite of the efforts of certain individuals — have not 
yet reached the stage at which they may be considered 
satisfactory for every-day use of the series for purposes 
of economic policy. Furthermore, it is not unusual to 
find repeated gaps in the work undertaken, which signifies 
a waste of effort, and makes it impossible to use such 
data for chronological analysis. 
A sine qua non for analysing Bolivia's economy and 
preparing a satisfactory development programme is the 
immediate improvement of the statistical services. This 
would involve a number of tasks. 
Firstly, existing series and the information dispersed 
among the different public and private institutions and 
administrative departments must be examined and 
systematized. There is an appreciable number of old 
and current studies in Bolivia which has never been 
used, or whose employment has been limited to individual 
offices, apparently without any knowledge of their 
existence on the part of the central statistical organiza-
tions or others who might be interested. 
Although a laborious, it would not be a difficult task 
to examine and evaluate these data, and assemble them 
methodically in series which would provide information 
on the different economic activities. Unless this is done, 
it will be very difficult to improve the data available 
for the study of past phenomena which is essential to 
a diagnosis of the national economy. Another urgent 
necessity is an examination of the methods currently 
used to prepare the series published by private and 
official organizations. In the course of their work on 
the present study, the members of the mission noted 
serious deficiencies in methods and procedure, most of 
which could be corrected without any great difficulty. 
A further requirement in the statistical field is the 
preparation of series and studies which are not at present 
undertaken in the country but are essential to an analysis 
of the national economy. Under the first heading calcula-
tions of the national product and income should be 
mentioned. Some isolated estimates of these have been 
made by private individuals or international organiza-
tions for certain years, but there has been no systematic 
and effective work in this respect on the part of the official 
organizations.Some of the most important groups of 
data, such as fiscal and agricultural production statistics, 
are also too inadequate to be utilized. In general there 
is an immense field to cover with regard to accurate 
and useful statistics for economic programming, and 
specific projects have been presented by United Nations 
experts which may provide the basis for a radical improve-
ment of existing conditions.^^ 
The adequate organization of and close co-operation 
between the institutions or government or private depart-
ments concerned with statistics are equally necessary. 
Contact between these ofiices is not close enough at 
present, while there is an almost complete lack of satis-
factorily co-ordinated work programmes designed to 
prevent duplication and raise the standard of the methods 
used. 
The absence or inadequacy of data is not limited to 
the statistical field, but includes almost all economic 
and technical activities with very few exceptions. Agri-
cultural resources, sources of energy, industrial possibi-
Uties, labour, etc., all require both general and specific 
studies of diflFerent types which are indispensable for the 
preparation of programmes in these sectors and for 
the evaluation of specific projects. Various sections of 
the present article indicate the economic and technical 
' ' During recent months a national income unit has been created 
within the economic and statistical studies section of the Banco 
Central. The work of this section and of other Bolivian economists 
has been most useful to ECLA for its estimates of national accounts 
during the preparation of this study. 
^^  See report by Jacob Perl man, A new system for the organi-
zation of Bolivian statistics (TAA/BOL.9), 1956. 
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spheres where methodical studies should be undertaken 
at the first opportunity so as to obtain a better knowledge 
of the country's conditions and possibilities. 
(c) Programming organizations 
In Bolivia, as in various other Latin American coun-
tries, it has been found necessary to set up specialized 
organizations to prepare development programmes. The 
National Commission for Co-ordination and Pro-
gramming {Comisión Nacional de Coordinación y Plana-
miento), which has existed for some years, has been 
mainly responsible for the preparation of an economic 
development plan. However, as in other countries, no 
programme has yet been drawn up, or to be more precise, 
no systematic efforts have been made to do so. It is 
beyond the scope of this study to analyse the causes 
which have so far prevented the Commission from 
carrying out its principal task. Nevertheless, it would 
be well to make some comment on the essential requisites 
of this type of organization, as suggested by the experience 
of other countries. 
Exclusive or predominant dedication to true pro-
gramming appears to be an essential requisite — at least 
in the early stages — if this type of organization is to 
work effectively. It has often happened that where to 
this task the duties of supervision, departmental co-
ordination, and advising on economic problems have 
been added, these supplementary activities have absorbed 
the whole of the organization's efforts to the detriment 
of programming. This is undoubtedly true in the case 
of Bolivia, and has been aggravated by the fact that 
multiple controls and excessive administrative inter-
vention have laid a heavier burden on the Commission 
than its staff could hope to carry. Undoubtedly, at a 
certain stage of programming, especially when the coun-
try has already adopted specific objectives and a given 
line of economic policy, supervision of their execution, 
and of the co-ordination between the various depart-
ments involved, is essential. But the experience of a 
number of countries, both in and outside Latin America, 
seems to indicate that the premature use of the pro-
gramming organizations for administrative co-ordination 
or advisory duties may prejudice their basic activities. 
Perhaps where it is impossible or inadvisable to relieve 
the programming organizations of these functions, an 
intermediate solution might be sought be setting up, 
within the parent organization, other sections distinct 
from those responsible for the preparation of the pro-
gramme. 
The ability and zeal of the staff naturally form the 
keystone of the organization. Without adequately trained 
economists and engineers, experienced in this type of 
work and possessing a sound knowledge of local condi-
tions, the preparation of satisfactory programmes is 
inconceivable. Programming is not entirely the task of 
experts in the central organizations ; it also requires 
the collaboration of public and private technical and 
economic offices. Analysis of general economic con-
ditions, determination of the over-all aims of the 
programme, co-ordination of sectorial plans with the 
programme as a whole, appraisal of financing procedures 
and the possible instruments of economic policy are, 
inter alia, all matters which should be handled by the 
central programming authority. To this end, a sufficient 
number of properly qualified persons must be available 
who will work exclusively for the organization, in both 
the executive and technical spheres. 
Without the energetic support of the highest political 
circles and resolute collaboration from official economic 
organizations, it will be difficult for the programming 
authorities to carry out their task. It is not only a question 
of the status of this office within the administrative 
structure. In Bolivia, as well as in other countries, the 
National Commission for Co-ordination and Planning, 
or its equivalent, is placed at the highest level, but it 
still cannot be said to have received wholehearted ofiScial 
support. What is chiefly required is the " will to plan " 
on the part of the supreme political authorities, and the 
Ministers and other high officials in charge of the main 
organs of economic administration. In spite of the 
diversification plans commenced in Bolivia in recent 
years, certain factors appear to have militated against 
this spirit of enterprise, as is readily explicable. The 
serious inflationary situation, and the grave resulting 
problems, have been the main preoccupation of the 
Government, technical experts and public opinion, and 
at the same time have constituted a formidaWe obstacle 
to the preparation of an integral development pro-
gramme, which would naturally appear a leap in the 
dark without more normal economic conditions. 
The understanding and goodwill of the private sectors 
are fully as important as official assistance in program-
ming. As repeatedly stated in ECLA document,^® econo-
mic programming does not necessarily imply increased 
State intervention, but on the contrary it may mean that 
in some cases certain forms of intervention in private 
activities, prejudicial to economic progress, will disappear. 
Better knowledge of the economy and a more realistic 
approach to growth possibilities may be expected pre-
cisely in so far as private interests acknowledge the 
advantages of the development programme, and are 
prepared to collaborate with the programming organiza-
tions. 
As suggested eariier, the economic development of 
Bohvia could be strengthened by a well planned develop-
ment programme, which would form a basis for eco-
nomic policy and a guiding influence for private interests. 
If the Government so desired, the National Commission 
for Co-ordination and Programming would be the 
appropriate body to centralize and direct the prepara-
tion of such a programme, with the co-operation both 
of official departments and autonomous economic 
entities, and of the private sectors. Under the current 
organization and staffing conditions of the Commission, 
it is improbable that this task could be efficiently under-
taken. Alongside the other requisites mentioned, priority 
would undoubtedly have to be given to the reorganizing 
of the Commission so as to enable it to discharge its 
appointed duties. 
See especially Introduction to the Technique of Programming, 
chapter I. 
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B. SECTORS OF THE BOLIVIAN ECONOMY 
I . INDUSTRY 
1. General considerations 
Bolivia is at present undergoing great changes in 
regard to the method of operating its economic system. 
Numerous measures of control, rationing and interven-
tion of various kinds have been abandoned in an attempt 
to recover greater stability through simpler and more 
autonomous systems. Industry has naturally shared in 
these changes, so that many of the problems have 
disappeared which until a few months ago could have 
been considered characteristic o f this sector, while others 
of a different kind have arisen. That is why it is par-
ticularly interesting, and at the same time extremely 
difficult, to study the industrial sector in this period of 
transition. Some problems already belong to the past 
and are therefore of purely historical interest ; others 
cannot yet be fully appreciated in all their magnitude, 
because the stabiUzing measures have been in force such 
a short time. 
It would of course be erroneous to try to examine 
the prospects of the country's industry solely in the light 
of modifications of the type just indicated. During recent 
years structural changes have taken place in Bolivia's 
economy which are bound to have a profound effect on its 
industrial development. A market which is in itself a 
limited one, because of the size of the population and its 
level of income, was until quite recently still restricted to 
a great extent by the existence of large sectors which 
were virtually marginal to the monetary economy, being 
based on a self-suflBiciency. The reforms introduced, 
mainly in the institutional regime that existed in the 
countryside, are now opening up possibilities for the 
gradual incorporation of these sectors in a trading 
system and thereby facilitating their access to new forms 
of consumption. It therefore does not seem unduly 
ambitious to try to analyse the prospects of Bolivia's 
industry in relation to one fundamental problem : that 
of the need to change from an industry designed to supply 
part of the requirements of a relatively small nucleus 
of the country's population to a manufacturing output 
sufficient to meet the growing requirements of the entire 
population. This naturally involves a great effort. As 
long as the market for manufactured goods was small, 
part o f its requirements could be met by imports, so 
that industry could restrict its activities to the supply 
of a few main commodities ; nevertheless, as this market 
expands, a domestic industry supplying a relatively 
small percentage of requirements for manufactures will 
no longer be sufficient, since the country's capacity to 
import would in all probabiUty be insufficient to sup-
plement this supply with foreign manufactures. 
Even the measurement of the rate of industrial growth 
consistent with the raising of the standard of hving of 
the Bolivian population to a given level would involve 
an unknown factor difficult to estimate. To this would 
have to be added other numerous factors essential in 
order to assist in guiding government activity and 
private enterprise itself in terms of industrial develop-
ment. Such factors include the main lines within which 
growth should develop, the methods to be followed, the 
incentives and protection required, etc. Briefly, an 
industrial policy would have to be defined for the country 
under which to unite the efforts of the different sectors. 
It is naturally beyond the scope of a study of this 
kind to define in precise terms the outline of this in-
dustrialization policy. All that is attempted here is to 
provide some informative background data, some 
objective guiding principles and some over-all indications 
which might possibly serve as a starting point for sub-
sequent research by official agencies or private institu-
tions within the country. Even this preliminary stage 
offers considerable difficulties, mainly because of the 
inadequacy of the statistical material available ; to date 
no complete industrial census has been taken and con-
tinuous statistics are not always sufficiently broad and 
reliable.^® Hence the work has necessarily been focused 
largely on the gathering and revision of basic statistics, 
supplemented by direct observation in some of the 
enterprises and with the valuable opinions of various 
entrepreneurs and Government officials. 
2. Present situation and future prospects 
The industrial nucleus of Bolivia is relatively small. 
The contribution by this sector to national income (less 
than 9 per cent) is not only low in absolute terms, but 
also in relation to the country's level of income, com-
pared with other Latin American countries. In this sense 
the desire to achieve substantial industrial expansion 
cannot be considered over-ambitious, since to a large 
extent it would do httle more than offset great relative 
backwardness. 
The contribution of national industry to the total 
supply of manufactured goods is very restricted, so that 
the country has to depend to a very high degree on 
imports ; this is true even of the relatively " easy" 
branches of manufacturing activity, such as the pro-
duction of non-durable consumer goods, in which 
national industry began to participate quite a long time 
ago. By way of contrast, the profound changes that 
have taken place in the country in recent years have 
opened up prospects for great expansion in the domestic 
demand for some manufactures, since large sectors of 
the Bolivian population can now be incorporated into 
this kind of consumption. In view of the limited prospects 
of the country's capacity to import, the foregoing makes 
it urgently necessary to progress rapidly from the stage 
of an industry designed to supply some of the needs of 
The Statistics Department {Dirección Nacional de Estadística) 
periodically sifts the main information relating to a sample o f 
industry, which covers from 1,300 to 1,400 o f the largest establish-
ments in the country. In the absence of a census, it is difficult to 
estimate how representative this sample is in terms of manufacturing 
output as a whole, particularly when it is remembered that in 
some branches o f industry handicraft production predominates. 
The sample itself tends to show variations in the number of estab-
lishments included, which makes the interpretation of the corre-
sponding tabulations a very complex process. 
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a very small nucleus to a manufacturing output sufficient 
to supply the growing needs of the entire national 
population. 
Bolivia's industry absorbs a very small proportion of 
the country's active population, less than 2 per cent 
in registered industry and slightly over 4 per cent in the 
small unregistered industry which is also included in 
the estimate. Nevertheless, this sector has an immense 
responsibility to absorb a growing proportion of the 
increase in the labour force, in view of the limited 
immediate prospects of mining and the excess of active 
population in the existing agricultural areas. Moreover, 
any transfer of manpower from other activities — except 
the extractive ones — to the industrial sector will be of 
considerable assistance in raising the country's average 
income level, since the gross product per person employed 
in manufacturing activities, including the small unregis-
tered industry, is more than double the figures for the 
over-all economy. 
This is largely the result of the low productivity of 
agriculture, involving a very high proportion of activities 
which are almost at the bare subsistence level. It cannot 
therefore be interpreted to mean that the productivity 
of the industrial sector would be very favourable ; on 
the contrary, even if only the registered industry were 
considered, the value added per person employed is less 
than one-third of that for the extractive activities. 
Bolivia's manufacturing sector is characterized by a 
marked predominance of industries operating on a very 
small scale, as well as by high production of the artisan 
type. Registered industry, which might be considered as 
industry properly speaking, employs less than one-fifth 
of the total population employed in manufacturing 
activities ; about 40 per cent of it corresponds to small 
unregistered industries and almost half to handicrafts. 
The difference in the productivity of these three activities 
is very marked, the figure for registered industry being 
almost double that for unregistered industry and nearly 
three times higher than handicrafts. Therefore the expan-
sion and modernization of activities which have until 
now operated practically without any machinery or 
equipment would be a factor of considerable influence 
in improving the productivity of the sector as a whole. 
In registered industry, productivity is very low in 
relation to the machinery and equipment which it has 
at its disposal. This is mainly the result of factors of 
four different kinds : 
(a) Social factors. Lack of discipline, the virtual 
immovabiUty of personnel as a whole and demands and 
pressures of every kind have prevented the adjustment 
of employment to the levels of production and of technical 
improvements, encouraged absenteeism, considerably 
reduced the number of days worked each year, and have 
led to activities which are scarcely conducive to the 
improvement or even the maintenance of the productive 
levels. 
(b) Inadequate maintenance of equipment. The dif-
ficulties of importing spares and accessories and of 
replacing obsolete equipment have been progressively 
worsening maintenance conditions and affecting pro-
ductive capacity ; in fact, this has led to a reduction in 
the real capital of several industries and to a drop in 
productive capacity that can scarcely be afforded. 
(c) Insufficient raw material supplies. The shortage 
of foreign exchange has seriously restricted the possi-
bilities of importing the raw materials which industry 
simply must have in order to maintain or to increase 
its levels of production ; in most cases, these levels have 
been determined more by the availability of raw materials 
than by productive capacity or the possibilities of placing 
goods on the market. Supplies of domestic raw materials, 
particularly those of agricultural origin, have been like-
wise limited. 
(d) Shortage of technical personnel. Bolivia has a 
relatively scarce supply of technical personnel at the 
various levels ; even though industrial education is being 
encouraged, a great deal has still to be done in regard 
to training. Industry in turn has not had the necessary 
facilities for the greater temporary utilization of foreign 
personnel which, together with an improvement in present 
technical conditions, could facihtate the more rapid 
training of national personnel. 
Although the demand for manufactured goods has 
expanded considerably during recent years, Bolivian 
industry, largely because of the factors just mentioned, 
has been unable to expand its supply of national manu-
factures at the same rate. This was undoubtedly one of 
the factors which contributed to the acute inflation of 
recent years. After growing very rapidly from the time 
of the crisis at the beginning of the thirties' until just 
before the war, and then again during the war, the volume 
of industrial output has remained practically stationary 
for the last 5 or 6 years. Moreover, it can be proved 
in several cases that production reached higher levels 
than the existing ones as long as 5, 10 or 15 years ago. 
These facts suggest that the immediate problem of 
Bolivian industry does not lie so much in an expansion 
of its productive capacity as in reviving a capacity 
already existing and in ehminating the factors which 
impede its proper utihzation. If each branch of industry 
recovered the maximum levels already recorded in some 
past years, that by itself would increase the country's 
manufacturing output to a large extent. 
This cannot eliminate the permanent need to maintain 
an adequate rate of investment in the industrial sector, 
a rate which in recent years has declined to an alarming 
extent. The average amount of industrial machinery 
and equipment imported annually in the years 1954-55 
has fallen very far below that recorded over the five-
year period from 1925 to 1929, and is not half as much 
as during 1936-40 or 1947-50. Apart from general factors 
such as import difficulties and social factors, this decline 
in industrial investment is partly attributable to the 
discouragement implicit in the introduction of various 
controls and Government measures : The fixing of official 
prices, lengthy processes for the prior approval of costs, 
countless regulations for authorizing the installations of 
new industries or the expansion of existing ones, diffi-
culties (deriving from a very high tax on revaluation) 
in revaluing assets in relation to currency devaluation, 
etc. Some of these factors have been eliminated through 
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the recent stabilization measures, and this will probably 
have a favourable effect on the rate of investment in 
industry. Nevertheless, the problem is so important that 
it merits careful and detailed subsequent consideration 
in order to examine, for instance, the measures that 
might possibly encourage a greater reinvestment of 
profits, through a broader policy relating to amortiza-
tion and depreciation, special taxation treatment for 
undistributed profits, etc. Foreign capital could also 
contribute considerably towards raising the volume of 
investment in industry ; until now, foreign investment 
in this sector has been relatively small, although Bolivia 
has offered several interesting opportunities which 
naturally have to be supplemented by adequate legisla-
tion. Apart from the intrinsic importance of such oppor-
tunities because of the increase they would entail in the 
supply of machinery and equipment operating in the 
country, these investments could also represent a technical 
contribution of great interest. 
As might be expected, the results of the present stage 
of industrial growth in Bolivia, characterized by a greater 
development of activities producing consumer goods and 
by the scanty participation of those designed to process 
intermediate products, is largely that industry has to 
depend to a marked degree on imports of raw materials 
and intermediate products. This fact in turn makes 
domestic manufacturing output highly dependent on 
variations in the capacity to import. To lessen this 
dependence to any large extent is obviously a long-term 
undertaking and will depend not only on the expansion 
of industry itself — to provide numerous intermediate 
manufactured products — but on that of the agricultural 
sector. In respect to the first, the present phase of Boli-
via's industrial development suggests that there are still 
many possibilities of growth in the branches of non-
durable consumer goods, before the stage of import 
substitution of intermediate goods is entered upon, since 
the latter usually require greater investments and repre-
sent more advanced technology. Naturally this does not 
mean that their production should not be encouraged 
in certain specific cases, in view of the fact that activities 
of this kind might constitute a field in which the participa-
tion of foreign capital could be particularly advantageous. 
On the other hand, since the objective is to alleviate 
Bolivia's balance of payments situation so as to ensure 
the availability o f the foreign exchange needed for 
importing raw materials, industrial expansion which 
replaces a growing proportion of final consumer goods 
at present imported would, although indirectly, have a 
similar effect ; this also means that at the present stage 
some manufacturing activities which have to operate 
with imported raw materials and intermediate products 
should not be overlooked. Such activities always imply 
some foreign exchange saving because of import substitu-
tion in respect of the final product and they lead to 
greater employment opportunities for national labour 
and a growth in income, as well as the gradual assimila-
tion of new manufacturing techniques and training of 
skilled technical personnel on an increasing scale. 
As for imports of agricultural raw materials, produc-
tion of several such raw materials — cotton, sugar cane, 
tobacco — is just beginning to be encouraged and if 
their cultivation is given the necessary incentives they 
can yield results in a relatively short time and thus help 
to alleviate this situation of dependence on imported 
raw materials. In some cases it is more a question of 
correcting a relative backwardness in agricultural deve-
lopment, since the supply of some national raw materials 
has even declined in relation to corresponding imports. 
Bolivia also has a potential output of several raw materials 
(oilseeds, cacao, rubber, leather of different kinds, etc.) 
which up till now have been used to a very slight extent 
by national industry and could be utilized to a much 
greater degree within the country. 
The recent stabilization measures have created the 
necessary conditions for overcoming several of the 
obstacles which up to a few months ago hampered 
Bolivia's industrial growth (abolition of controls and 
limitations on imports of spare parts, equipment and 
raw materials ; reduction in the tax on the revaluation 
of assets, etc.), but at the same time they have created 
new problems. The most serious of these is perhaps 
the marked contraction of demand, which has led to a 
reduction of sales to levels which are a matter of grave 
concern. This seems to be the result of a coincidence 
of several factors. On the one hand, a considerable 
proportion of the country's industrial production, and 
of the textile industry in particular, was exported clan-
destinely, advantage being taken of the low import 
prices of some raw materials enjoying an exceptionally 
low preferential exchange rate ; under the new condi-
tions such exports are no longer so profitable. On the 
other hand, it is natural that, in a period of uncertainty 
as to what will really happen to price levels, the con-
sumers should wait until the situation shows a more 
definite trend, particularly in the case of consumption 
which, as happens in the case of many manufactured 
products, can be delayed for a certain period. The most 
important factor seems, however, to reside in the decline 
in real wages, which has meant a contraction in effective 
demand which the reduction in the relative prices of 
manufactured products had not been sufficient to 
stimulate. This problem has been causing serious concern, 
justified by the fact that, with the per capita level of 
income in Bolivia, a moderate decline in real income 
— determined by unemployment or a decrease in pro-
ductivity as the levels of production fall — accompanied 
by a marked increase in the prices of foodstuffs, may be 
sufficient to cause the demand for other manufactures 
to drop to minimum levels, even if their prices fall 
considerably. This then is a basic problem requiring 
serious study to prevent the stabilization measures from 
reaching the point where they jeopardize the recovery 
of the manufacturing industry and the prospects of any 
future industrial development. 
The above has not been the only unfavourable effect 
of the stabilization measures on the industrial sector. 
The increase in monetary wages and the rise in raw 
material prices have also accentuated the problem of 
supplies of working capital for the enterprises. In fact, 
to have to make these larger disbursements at a time 
when there is a marked drop in sales raises a serious 
cash problem for industry, further aggravated by the 
restrictions imposed on credit facilities. In contrast to 
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the preceding problem, it is probable that this one has 
not yet made itself felt to its full extent because of the 
initial possibilities of liquidating stocks of finished pro-
ducts or raw materials. Nevertheless, close attention 
will have to be paid to the course taken by new applica-
tions for imports of raw materials and intermediate 
products, in order to anticipate a situation that might 
lead to a virtual stoppage of industrial activities through 
lack of financial resources for the supply of these pro-
ducts. At the same time, attention must be paid to the 
possibility of pursuing a flexible credit policy in this 
connexion naturally adjusted not to conflict with the 
over-all stabilization measures. 
The foreign trade system which has accompanied the 
stabilization measures has also created new problems 
for industry. According to the new regulations, the 
competitive position of national manufacturing vis-a-vis 
imports is determined exclusively by customs duties, 
modified recently. Hence it is essential to follow closely 
the effect of this tariff and the extent to which it aff"ords 
sufficient protection for the maintenance and promo-
tion of the production of those goods for which the 
country has the necessary capacity and the financial and 
technical resources. 
Leaving aside the immediate problems just indicated 
— among which the importance of the social and political 
ones should not be overlooked — it may be stated that, 
from the long-term point of view, rapid industrial 
development is indispensable to the favourable evolu-
tion of Bolivia's national income. This is so not only 
because of the foreseeable disparity between a reason-
able growth of rate of income and the Umitations of 
the capacity to import, which wiU render the need to 
replace imports and to change their pattern ever more 
acute ; the principal reason is the part that will have 
to be played by industry in absorbing a growing pro-
portion of manpower resources. It has already been 
said that, even if the country did not propose to lessen 
the present population pressure in the currently inhabited 
agricultural areas but only to prevent it from mounting 
further, an annual increase in the labour force of nearly 
25,000 persons would still have to be considered, and 
these people would have to be provided with opportuni-
ties for employment in other activities. Allowing for a 
possible expansion in the mining and petroleum industries, 
and taking into account the present surplus population 
in mining activities, a good part of this increase will 
have to be absorbed by industries and services. The 
magnitude of the problem can be better grasped if it 
is remembered that such an annual increase in the 
labour force represents more than a quarter of the total 
population currently employed in all manufacturing 
activities, including handicrafts, and one and a half 
times the present employment in registered industry. 
Similar conclusions are reached if thought is given to 
the prospects of demand for manufactured goods. The 
present levels of consumption are as a rule very low, 
and in some cases the per capita consumption figures 
recorded are barely a fraction of those for countries with 
a slight higher level of per capita income. Therefore the 
growth and diversification in the demand for manu-
factured products will be one of the more important 
dynamic factors in the future development of Bolivia's 
economy. Industry will not only have to increase its 
share in the total supply of manufactures, which is 
very small in comparison with imports, but will also 
have to take measures to meet the increased demand 
which it is logical to anticipate. In addition to estimating 
the magnitude of the problem in over-all terms, it will 
also be important to proceed with the detailed studies 
of the possible increase in demand for each of the more 
important types of manufactured goods. Such studies 
will serve as a guide and help to determine the necessary 
policy of incentives for private investment as well as the 
policy of investment by the public sector. 
Bolivia's small population and its low level of income 
are obstacles which, from the market point of view, 
limit the development prospects of numerous industries 
where a minimum scale of economic production is 
required which is probably above the present consump-
tion figures. Nevertheless, the importance of this factor 
ought not to be exaggerated when considering the 
short and medium-term development prospects. For the 
time being there are great possibihties for expanding 
the levels of production in existing industries. This is 
possibly the most urgent task, but in addition there is 
room for diversification along present lines. At the 
present time these industries do not meet Bolivia's 
present requirements so that the output has to be supple-
mented with imports. In general, industry is far from 
covering several items that do not seem to require too 
high a degree of capital intensity or any great techno-
logical resources and for which the present size of the 
market would not impede economic production. This is 
true not only of the industries making consumer goods, 
but also of some industries making intermediate pro-
ducts and some categories of tools and simple equip-
ment. Meanwhile, the growth of over-all income and 
industrial development itself will create the conditions 
for an expansion of the internal market which will 
justify future industrial growth along lines which would 
include certain more complex intermediate products and 
capital goods. This might even happen relatively quickly, 
in view of the high income-elasticity usually shown by 
the demand for manufactured consumer goods and the 
great potential need to improve the supply of tools and 
equipment, even of the simplest types, for agriculture 
and other activities. 
Apart from domestic demand, industry could also 
count on an export market. Although in general terms 
the costs of Bolivian industry are too high to facilitate 
any considerable exports, Bolivia does have numerous 
natural resources that could provide a margin for manu-
factures intended for export. (Purely for purposes of 
illustration, the following might be mentioned : pro-
cessed timber, cacao products, tinned fruit, skins of 
" wild " animals, etc.) Although the total amount of 
such exports might appear small, its importance should 
be judged in relation to the size of existing industry 
and the relatively low value of the country's total exports, 
amounting to only about 100 million dollars per year. 
With the statistical reservations indicated earlier, it 
may be pointed out that an examination of the present 
composition of industrial production shows a high 
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degree of concentration on foods, beverages and tobacco, 
and on the textile and garment industries : the remaining 
manufacturing activities cover a great variety of pro-
duction lines, but all of very slight importance, and at 
times only at an incipient stage of development. Even 
in the traditional branches of the food and textile 
industries, imports are still very substantial and the 
development prospects even over the short term are 
therefore very high : imports of wheat ñour could easily 
be replaced if necessary by using imported wheat ; 
preserves and tinned foods could be expanded ; the dairy 
products industry ought to be expanded, since it is only 
in its initial phase ; the capacity has already been created 
for a growing production of sugar ; the preparation of 
cacao products could be expanded, even with a view 
to small-scale exports ; various imports of cotton manu-
factures could be replaced ; there appear to be good 
prospects for establishing a textile industry based on 
hard fibres, etc. As for the industrial branches which 
are so far less developed, it seems likely that even over 
the short-term there could be an improvement and an 
expansion of the timber industry ; further development 
of the rubber industry, in regard to which efforts were 
made earlier to set up a tyre-making plant ; expansion 
to overcome the constant cement shortage ; expansion 
in the range of production of the glass industry, etc. 
Two industrial branches merit special mention, since 
they seem to be even more backward, namely those 
covering the broad range of chemical and pharmaceutical 
products and the great variety of products made by the 
mechanical and metallurgical industry. Leaving aside 
the production of more elaborate goods, the above 
include many specific industries for which the small 
size of the market and the amount of investment needed 
would not constitute very great obstacles. In brief, 
even taking into account the present size of the Bolivian 
market, there are many industries where expansion or 
installation would be fully justified from an economic 
point of view. A better knowledge of existing industry, 
is needed, together with a more careful study of future 
prospects and the laying-down of certain general lines 
of industrial policy for the establishment of priority 
criteria. The latter would ensure industrial growth, as 
balanced as possible, and would facilitate the better 
utilization of Bolivia's resources of all kinds, as well 
as the introduction of adequate credit, fiscal and tariff 
incentive. From the preceding remarks it might be 
deduced that as a first step, efforts should be directed 
toward restoring the productive capacity of existing 
industry and the elimination of obstacles preventing 
the full utilization of that capacity. At the second stage 
it would be necessary to encourage investment in new 
manufacturing activities. This could be done through 
a system of priorities in which account would be taken 
of the need to obtain a maximum yield from the scanty 
capital resources available, of the effect of this produc-
tion on the country's balance of payments and of the 
extent to which the development of such production 
would help to absorb real or virtual manpower surpluses 
from other sectors of the economy. It is probable that 
a good part of this stage would still consist in the expan-
sion of industries producing consumer goods and that 
the encouragement of industries producing intermediate 
goods and some capital goods, which as a rule require 
greater capital resources, demand greater technological 
skills and a higher minimum scale of economic produc-
tion, would take place at successive stages of later 
development. 
Many of the current problems affecting the manu-
facturing sector might be considered more adequately 
if they were judged in the light of the possible industrial 
development requirements over the next ten years. If 
during this period industry is to account for a moderately 
larger relative proportion of Bolivia's total active popula-
tion (from 4.1 to 5 per cent), it would have to absorb 
some 2,500 persons each year, which would thus be 
added to the present employment figure of some 
50,000 persons. Such growth would at the same time be 
essential to meet the increased demand for manufactured 
products and to offset possible insufficient expansion in 
the capacity to import. Adding the investment require-
ments needed to maintain present productive capacity 
to those required to provide this extra labour force with 
reasonable capital intensity, an annual gross investment in 
the order of 9.5 million dollars would be called for ; this 
figure is much higher than that recorded in recent times 
and would require in addition a substantially higher 
investment coefficient. It is probable that to achieve it 
numerous favourable factors would have to play this 
part (credits, taxation incentives for the reinvestment of 
profits, etc.) and the contribution of foreign capital in 
this sector would have to be much greater than has 
been recorded in the past. Despite difficulties of this kind, 
this would be the only way to bring about a positive 
participation by industry in the future development of 
Bolivia's economy, as well as to prevent it from hampering 
a reasonable growth in national income during the next 
few years. 
11. ENERGY 
Energy is one of the basic elements of economic develop-
ment, not only because its increasing use is essential for 
raising productivity, but also because of the welfare of 
the population, for whom a part of the supply constitutes 
a consumer item. Per capita energy consumption — 
especially commercially — is a clear index of economic 
development, and its increased availability is a prior, 
indispensable condition if a country is to achieve greater 
development, characterized by greater mechanization in 
industry, transport, agriculture and mining. 
An adequate supply of energy therefore plays a pri-
mary role in the development of productive activities, 
and must be given high priority in economic plans. 
This becomes even more important when it is remembered 
that the installation and plants required for its produc-
tion, transformation and distribution normally take 
longer to construct and require greater capital than 
most sectors of the economy. 
An increased supply of energy, in the quantities and 
localities indicated by the demand, is essential to econo-
mic development, and every possible effort should there-
fore be directed towards its attainment. 
Although this problem is common to almost all the 
Latin American countries, none presents the same 
49 
degree of contrast as Bolivia as regards the abundant 
natural energy resources available in the country and the 
low level of consumption, nor the same difficulties in 
increasing the utilization of these resources. 
Bolivia does not lack the natural resources required 
to increase production. Hydraulic energy and petroleum, 
the two main types of commercial energy most needed 
in modern technique, are abundant. The problem lies 
in the shortage of financial resources to make use of them, 
and since this is a problem affecting the remaining sectors, 
a decision must be reached from the point of view of 
the needs of the economy as a whole. 
Although all types of energy have common basic 
aspects, each has its own peculiar characteristics, both 
present and future. These should be distinguished, in 
order to appreciate better the Bolivian energy problem. 
1. Development and future prospects of energy 
consumption 
As regards the present energy consumption situation 
and its recent development, the characteristics — which 
should be analysed before the future prospects are 
examined — would be the following : 
(a) Both total per capita energy consumption — fuel 
and electricity — (235 kilogrammes of petroleum equi-
^ valent) and that of electricity above (60 kWh),^' are the 
lowest in Latin America. At the same time, if this is 
compared with the gross product, it is seen that Bolivian 
consumption is higher than the average of the remaining 
Latin American countries. This is explained by the 
relative preponderance of mining activity, which is a 
, large consumer of electricity, using almost half the total 
production. 
{b) The low electricity consumption is aggravated 
by several factors. The annual increase of installed 
capacity and production — less than 5 per cent 
annually —are the lowest registered in Latin America 
in recent years, and much lower than what may be 
considered normal in countries in a similar stage of 
economic development. 
Generally speaking, the electric supply does not meet 
the demand, an acute problem in some cities in the 
interior, and the situation will deteriorate in years when 
limited water supply reduces the generating possibilities 
of the hydraulic power stations. This occurred in 1956, 
when the supply was heavily rationed in some cities, 
and mining needs could not be met. 
The lack of systematic studies of resources, and of 
opportune investments, has necessitated excessive recourse 
to the installation of thermal plants in recent years — 
generally an uneconomic step when hydraulic resources 
are available. 
Except for the La Paz and Oruro systems of the Boli-
vian Power Company Ltd. and certain of the plants of 
the large mining industry, it may be stated that almost 
all the electric systems in Bolivia are seriously deficient, 
both in generation and in transmission and distribution. 
^ Further, Bolivia has no water or electric energy legisla-
Excluding mining consumption. 
tion, nor is there a suitable national organization to 
deal with the electrical problem efficiently. There is no 
uniformity in distribution frequencies and voltages. No 
Government department carries out hydrological studies, 
nor are there any integrated electrification plans. 
At the same time, electricity consumption is strongly 
concentrated in the main cities, and the mining establish-
ments on the high plateau. Per capita production varies \ 
considerably between cities ; in 1954 it was 307 kWh in 
La Paz, and 17 kWh in Santa Cruz. It may be estimated 
that some 2.2 million people (nearly 70 per cent of the 
population) have no electricity supply. 
(c) The petroleum derivative supply situation in 
recent years differs from that of electricity. The praise-
worthy efforts made by Bolivia, through the action of 
Bolivian State Petroleum Deposits (Yacimientos Petrolí-
feros Fiscales Bolivianos) (YPFB), together with the 
discovery of the Saracenda oil-bearing sands in the 
Camiri deposit in 1953 have led to a substantial increase 
in production reaching 504,000 cubic metres in 1956 
(6 times more than in 1952). The total consumption of 
derivatives also rose considerably (more than 20 per cent 
in the past three years) to 331,000 cubic metres in 1956. 
Imports, which reached a maximum of 133,000 cubic 
metres in 1952, almost ceased by 1954 ; exports of crude 
oil increased, and derivatives began to be exported to 
neighbouring countries, attaining a total of 67,000 cubic 
metres in 1956. 
The Cochabamba and Sucre plants, together with those 
in the deposits, cater for all of Bolivia's petroleum 
refining needs, except for aviation petrol. Existing 
pipeline systems have provided a satisfactory solution 
to internal transport problems, and also that of deriva-
tives exported to Argentina. In addition to the increased 
production, refining and transport within the country, 
YPFB has improved its organization and its technical 
personnel. 
Although domestically it has contributed to inñation, 
the incentive provided to the petroleum industry has 
not caused any expenditure of foreign exchange, since 
what was saved through prohibition of imports, in 
transport, and by the increased exports, was slightly 
more than the foreign exchange expenditure of YFPB 
(38 millions dollars) from 1953 to 1956. 
(d) Finally, an analysis of the composition of total 
fuel consumption shows that in Bolivia, as in other 
Latin American countries, petroleum derivatives are 
gaining an ascendency over the use of coal, the consump-
tion of which is small and entirely met by imports, and 
more especially vegetable and similar fuels. These latter, 
however, still account for 60 per cent of the total, since 
a large proportion of the population has not yet been 
absorbed into the commercial economy. 
The first step towards the adoption of plans and 
measures for dealing with the energy problem is to 
estimate future consumption. Insufficient data are 
available for an exact calculation to be made, but in 
order to make some estimate — using comparative data 
from other contries — possible consumption in Bolivia 
in 1965 can be obtained from the hypothesis of 20 per 
cent growth of the gross product over the 1955 level. 
50 
These calculations show that the gross consumption 
of all types of energy (770,000 tons of petroleum equiva-
lent in 1955) should reach 1,047,000 tons in 1965. Total 
electricity production should increase from 375 to 
900 million kWh (9 per cent annual increase), with hydro-
electric power maintaining its share of approximately 
80 per cent. The very small consumption of coal would 
remain almost unchanged, while vegetable and similar 
fuels should decline from 400,000 to 320,000 tons of 
petroleum equivalent. Petroleum derivatives would 
increase from 240,000 to 490,000 tons (7.3 per cent 
annual increase), not only absorbing all fuel consump-
tion increases, but also replacing the reductions in 
vegetable fuels.^s Available information is insufficient 
to permit a separate calculation of the growth of each 
of the derivatives, but it had been estimated that petrol 
consumption, both standard and aviation, could reach 
200,000 cubic metres in 1956, which would mean a 
cumulative annual increase of 5.7 per cent. 
2. Prospects of electricity production 
Bolivia has excellent hydro-electric resources, estimated 
at a total of some 7 million kW. Furthermore, as in few 
other countries, the Bolivian resources are close to 
consumer and distribution centres, so that low power, 
approximating to the requirements, can be generated, 
in many cases using the available flow in a succession 
of falls, which permits scaled utilization. The resources 
are much greater than even the long-term needs which 
may arise in Bolivia, and a small part of the known 
possible utiUzation would satisfy short- and medium-
term requirements. 
A satisfactory solution of the Bolivian electricity 
problem would demand that the installed capacity should 
be increased by at least 68,000 kW in the next five years ; 
70 per cent of this could probably be hydraulic. These 
figures show the appreciable difference between resources 
and utilization needs. Although in the majority of cases 
the resources have been insufficiently studied, there are 
several projects, some well advanced, whose execution 
could satisfy much of the future demand. Certain factors 
will necessitate immediate needs being met by thermal 
plants — lack of hydraulic resources in certain regions, 
lack of hydrological data, the long period required to 
build hydroelectric plants — but it must be emphasized 
that maximum use of hydroelectricity would bring 
notable economic advantages to Bolivia. 
The investment needed for an increase of 68,000 kW 
generating capacity would be around 33 million dollars.^® 
The limited capacity of the country to make all the 
investments required in the various economic sectors 
makes it doubtful if those of the hydroelectric sector 
could be met, but it must not be forgotten that energy 
is a basic requirement for production and economic 
development. To help solve the investment problem, it 
A greater or lesser substitution of vegetable fuels by petroleum 
derivatives vfould give rise to a similar variation in the latter. 
Specific studies of the different projects might cause this 
figure to vary, since it is only an indication. It must also be remem-
bered that some hydroelectric plants are built with greater capacity 
than that immediately required. 
may be considered that a part could be made by private 
enterprises. For example, Bolivian Power is building 
a 6,000 kW plant in its Oruro and La Paz systems, 
and projects other construction up to 1961, totalling 
19,500 kW.®" It seems also that there are financing 
offers from certain enterprises interested in the construc-
tion of the Corani project which, according to the com-
parative study of the various hydroelectric projects and 
consumption requirements, should be started as soon 
as possible. 
Although investment problems prohibit Bolivia from 
undertaking works which would in 5 years produce the 
capacity required to meet the needs of economic develop-
ment and improvement of the standard of living, the 
creation of an institutional structure would undoubtedly 
contribute towards an improvement of the present 
situation. Such an organization, co-ordinating the work 
of all branches at present interested in the problem, 
could study and formulate complete water and electricity 
legislation, prepare a national electrification plan, and 
commence methodical hydrological studies of all resources 
which could possibly be utilized in the future. 
3. Prospects of petroleum production 
The supply of domestic needs for petroleum products 
is not a major problem for Bolivia, since ample oil 
resources are confirmed by satisfactory preliminary 
studies of the country's geological structure. On the 
other hand, to obtain large exportable surpluses, which 
would diversify Bolivian exports and improve the 
capacity to import, does constitute a problem. 
To maintain its reputation as a country of contrasts, 
two contradictory aspects again appear. On one hand, 
it is difficult for YPFB to increase its production with the 
financial means at its disposal, while the door opened 
to foreign capital by the Código del Petróleo and the 
considerable interest of private enterprises lead to the 
belief that output could be greatly increased. 
YPFB's present situation is difficult. Known reserves, 
the extent of which is not precisely determined, seem 
too small to provide the increased output needed to 
leave any large exportable surplus. Also, the fall in the 
output of wells means that the 1957 drilling programme 
will only maintain output — or possibly show a slight 
increase — over 1956 production, making the opening 
of new deposits essential. At the same time, the foreign 
exchange budget for the enterprise under the stabiliza-
tion plan will not permit YPFB to acquire the essential 
drilling equipment, nor to carry out sufficient prospecting. 
It is therefore probable that production will decrease in 
1957, except under unusually favourable circumstances. 
If the Bolivian State enterprise is to achieve a satis-
factory situation which will permit consofidation of its 
operations and competition with private enterprises in 
exports, investments would have to be made to give a 
The execution of the company's plans are subject to the 
approval of new rates, since the present ones are not considered 
to be sufficiently remunerative. 
12.6 million dollars, including 1.8 for imports o f aviation 
petrol. 
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daily output of approximately 25,000 barrels. As in all 
cases of petroleum production calculations, that of these 
investments is dubious. To give some idea of the magni-
tude of the figures, it is estimated, according to inter-
national data and the opinion of Bolivian technicians, 
that the total investment required to achieve such produc-
tion, the reserves which justify it, the means of transport 
etc., must be around 60 milhon dollars over the normal 
budget of the enterprise, to be applied during three or 
four years. 
The difficulties in making the investments, and the 
poor results of leasing to the firm of Glenn McCarthy, 
led YPFB to grant a concession in 1956 to the Bolivian 
Gulf Oil Co., covering a large area in the region reserved 
by the Código del Petróleo, The approval of the Código 
by Congress at the end of 1956 has awakened great 
interest among foreign capital enterprises, and many have 
obtained concessions for direct working or for pro-
specting and subsequent working.®^ In addition, six 
enterprises, including YPFB itself and the others men-
tioned, have received permission for primary prospecting, 
and further requests from large enterprises are expected. 
From the activities of the private enterprises which 
have obtained concessions for prospecting and working, 
subject to the liberal conditions of the Código, export 
prospects on the world market may be considered to 
be promising. Apart from the increase of available 
foreign exchange which would be obtained,®^ Bolivia 
would benefit from the economic activity resulting from 
the essential works. In spite of this, it is estimated that 
the obtaining of an output which would allow sizable 
export surpluses would require at least 3 to 5 years. 
Because of the peculiar geographical situation of 
Bolivia, transport to any foreign port which could export 
the product to the world markets presents a problem. 
To meet this difficulty, YPFB has already projected an 
oil pipeline to the Chilean port of Arica on the Pacific 
coast, and there are also plans to make an outlet through 
the Peruvian port of Ilo, and to the Atlantic through 
Paraguay.®^ 
It does not seem that Bohvia will have a market 
problem in placing its petroleum, since current data 
show that the neighbouring countries, Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile, will continue to be heavy importers of this 
product ; there are also the Californian markets. 
4. Price problems 
A further aspect of the energy problem, partly con-
nected with investments, is the question of the prices 
at which energy is sold on the domestic market. The 
Bolivian Gulf Oil Co. , Shell Prospecting Co. Ltd., Andes 
Oil Co. Inc. 
®® According to the contract between YPFB and Bolivian Gulf, 
a daily production of 20,000 barrels would give Bolivia an income 
o f some 7 million dollars, o f which 2.5 would be for YPFB. T o this 
must be added the f o r e i ^ exchange returns arising from the 
expenditure o f the enterprise in Bolivian currency. 
The construction o f the pipelines is subject to international 
agreements at present being discussed with the neighbouring 
countries concerned. T o help the financing of the pipeline to the 
Pacific, Bolivian Gulf has offered to provide part of the investment 
by means o f an interest-bearing loan. 
stabiUzation measures of December 1956 have caused 
considerable increases ; those for electricity in La Paz 
have risen between 185 per cent for low-quantity 
household consumption to 665 per cent for industry. 
Liquid fuel prices have risen between 220 per cent for 
standard petrol to 800 for paraffin. As may be expected, 
these increases have given rise to much adverse comment ~ 
by the consumers. 
The problem is difficult. In the case of electricity, 
Bolivian Power maintains that the increases still do not 
cover expenses or leave a sufficient margin of profit to 
allow investment plans to proceed. Thus on the one 
hand there is the desire of the population to enjoy 
relatively low prices, which could be obtained if the 
advantageous characteristics of Bolivian hydroelectric 
production were utilized, and, on the other hand, it 
would be most advisable for Bolivia to receive new 
capita] contributions to meet the essential future increase 
of installed capacity. 
The income which YPFB obtains from petroleum 
derivatives with the new prices and from exports, accord-
ing to sales forecasts at the beginning of the year®® 
(171,212 million bolivianos) will enable it to finance the 
expenses and investments of 1957, reduce the pending 
debt by 13,000 milhon bolivianos, and amortize 3,171,000 
dollars of the debt for previous credit purchases. It has 
been estimated in some circles that the new prices are 
too high, and should be reduced. This would favour the 
economy in general by increasing the purchasing power 
of the people, but it would also reduce YPFB's possi-
bilities of paying off matured commitments within a 
short period, and of making new investments in a few 
years' time. 
Finally, it must be emphasized once more that to solve 
adequately all aspects of the energy problem, it is essential 
that the country should have an institutional authority 
to deal with programming, execution and control. 
I I I . TRANSPORT 
1. Means of transport 
There are few parts of the world where transport 
presents so many problems as in Bolivia, partly because 
of its geographical situation and its configuration, but 
especially because of the uneven distribution of its 
population, which is concentrated in the mountainous 
part of the country and supplied from very distant 
centres. Almost the whole of the mining output comes 
from the Altiplano (High Plateau), one of the most 
uninviting regions of the world. There are workings at 
5,000 metres above sea level, where the cold, the wind, 
the desolation and the rarified air make living conditions 
barely endurable. To export ore from Chilean or Peruvian 
Pacific ports, it must be transported hundreds of kilo-
metres — more than 1,000 in some cases — over difficult 
mountainous country. 
Up to the end of the last century, the llama was the 
only means of long-distance transport available to the 
" Subsequently a drop in sales and a reduction in prices pro-
duced a substantial deficit. 
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inhabitants of the Altiplano. Silver and tin were carried 
by thousands of these animals, whose load was not 
more than about twenty-five pounds each and which 
brought consumer goods to the population and the 
mining centres on the return journey. Indian labour 
also helped, each man being capable of carrying 50 or 
more pounds on his back. Even today, llamas, donkeys 
and men in the Altiplano still carry a considerable part 
o f the loads, although they are now limited to food-
stuffs, vegetable fuels and similar articles. 
The railway joining the central region of the Altiplano, 
the most important from the mining point of view, to 
the Chilean port of Antofagasta was only completed 
at the end of the last century. During the present century 
the line has been extended from Uyuni to Oruro, Cocha-
bamba, La Paz, Potosi and Sucre, to the Argentine border, 
and the shores of Lake Titicaca, thus connecting with 
Peru. 
At the same time, the narrow roads of the Altiplano 
were widened to allow the passage of lorries, and work 
was begun on the expansion of Bolivia's road network, 
joining the largest cities to each other and to the valleys, 
from which most of their supplies came. Until the end 
of 1955, when the new Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway 
was opened to traffic, the journey between these two cities 
was by an extremely bad road, impassable for a large 
part of the year ; today it takes ten hours by car, or one 
hour by plane. The provinces of Beni and Pando still 
have no surface communication with the capital. Rail 
traffic between the Altiplano and Chaco must pass 
through Argentina, which involves a 600 kilometre jour-
ney outside the country. 
Bolivia was one of the first Latin American countries 
to organize air services, which solved the problem of 
communication to the vast regions of Beni, Santa Cruz, 
Tarija and Chuquisaca, formerly without any form of 
transport. The air services began on a modest scale in 
1925 and developed rapidly, covering today almost the 
whole country and carrying not only passengers but also 
a considerable volume of freight, consisting of fresh 
and dried meat, timber, raw rubber, Brazil nuts, cocoa, 
hides, etc., produced in the tropical regions, and delivering 
to these regions all types of materials, vehicles and 
machinery. 
Excluding Lake Titicaca, there are no organized com-
mercial transport systems on Bolivia's inland waterways. 
Only recently has an attempt been made to reach the 
navigable parts o f the rivers Beni and Ichilo by roads 
from the Yungas and Cochabamba. The River Paraguay 
is also not used for international traffic. Unfortunately 
Bolivia has no suitable coast for utilizing this mangificent 
tributary of the Plata. To arrive at the port of Corumba 
on the River Paraguay, only a few kilometres from 
Bolivian territory, cargo to and from Bolivia must pass 
through BraziUan territory. This would be the only 
possible route for exporting to Argentina the iron from 
the rich Mutum deposits, near Port Suarez, a short 
distance from Corumba. At present, utilization of the 
inland waterways is less important than the improve-
ment of the road and rail systems, on which greater 
efforts should be concentrated in order to reduce 
transport costs. 
The railway is the most important means of transport-
ing passengers and freight in Bolivia. All ore to the 
Pacific ports and all imports from those ports travel 
by rail. Railways within Bolivia carry a total of 2.5 million 
tons of freight and 3.5 million passengers. 
Next in order of importance come the roads, for 
which there are no statistics except a count of the number 
of vehicles traveUing on some major roads. With few 
exceptions, there are no private enterprises carrying 
passengers or freight on scheduled services, but there 
are three passenger and freight road services operated 
by State railway enterprises. Most of the drivers carrying 
passengers and goods own their vehicles and are at the 
same time transporters and traders, since they buy agri-
cultural products and sell them in the city markets. 
There are no drivers, co-operatives to operate services, 
but all belong to various trade unions which exercise a 
virtual monopoly over passenger and freight traffic. 
The figures for the air services give an excellent picture 
of the importance of this means of transport in Bolivia : 
184,000 passengers and 40,000 tons of freight and parcels 
were carried in 1956 by Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano, Trans-
portes Aéreos Militares and other domestic airlines. 
The rail and road freight rates are extremely high, 
because of the very difficult terrain and the consequent 
high fuel consumption and heavy wear. The altitude 
also has an adverse effect on the efficiency of internal 
combustion engines. It is natural that these high costs 
should be reflected in the road and rail service rates. 
Air services are also expensive, since the petrol must be 
imported and transported at high cost to inland centres. 
Furthermore, the greater part of the traffic is in the 
most unfavourable direction. All these disadvantages 
combine to raise the prices of articles of prime necessity, 
raw materials and construction materials. 
The above comments show the basic importance of 
transport in Bolivia's economy. Serious problems thus 
exist which should be solved as soon as possible to 
prevent transport and communications from becoming 
an excessive price-burden on goods, or an obstacle to 
the general development of the country. 
2. The main problems 
(a) Current freight rates 
Transport operating conditions in Bolivia produce an 
increase in costs which is naturally reflected in the high 
passenger and freight rates. Nevertheless, apart from 
unavoidable geographical reasons, there are other 
circumstances which bear on the excessively high level 
of these rates. It is therefore urgent to examine current 
transport rates in order to reduce them to the lowest 
possible level while still allowing the enterprises to cover 
costs and show a reasonable profit. Railway and road 
transport rates could possibly be modified ; they are 
greatly influenced today by transport monopolies. There 
This figure is obtained by adding the total carried by each 
railway, which means that eacli passenger or ton of freight carried 
from La Paz to the Argentine frontier, for example, is counted 
three times, since three different railways are involved. 
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also seems to be a possibility, subject to certain measures 
in regard to organization and costs, of reducing air 
traffic rates. 
(b) Internal reorganization of some transport enterprises 
A reduction of the rates must be accompanied by an 
improvement in the administrative and operating methods 
of the enterprises, so as to reduce costs. This is especially 
necessary in the State railways, where the multiplicity 
o f accounting systems and the number of workshops 
artificially increase operating costs. 
(c) Modernization of railway equipment 
The soundest way to improve railway operation and 
consequently to lower costs and prices is to replace the 
old, costly traction equipment of all the rail enterprises 
by modern diesel engines. This appHes to both State and 
private enterprises. 
(d) Investments in roads and railways 
A careful study shows that Bolivian investments in 
surface transport are open to considerable adverse 
criticism. The way in which railways and certain roads 
have been constructed has undoubtedly cost the country 
much more than would have been the case under a 
rational plan, and this is not entirely a question of the 
past. Even today, the justification for some of the invest-
ments made is highly questionable ; the gravity of this 
is increased when Bolivia's few resources for economic 
development are taken into account. There have been, 
and still are, many motivating circumstances. The 
transport policy must be formulated from the point of 
view of the general economic interest rater than of local 
considerations, and not under the pressure which has 
often led to the execution of activities in which con-
siderable capital has been and is being invested, without 
producing the improvements which might have been 
expected in the country's transport system. Other railway 
operations should be examined, in which large sums 
continue to be invested, which appear to be quite un-
justified under present or immediate future circumstances. 
An analysis of the road situation leads to the con-
clusion that, apart from a few cases, the improvement 
and repair of existing roads, together with the building 
of local roads to connect the present system to the pro-
duction centres are more essential than the construction 
of new highways. 
(e) Administrative organization 
Obviously the major transport problems must be 
studied together and in relation to the economy as a 
whole ; this is the only way to avoid waste of eifort 
and capital and to obtain the greatest possible use from 
each system, according to its capacity and special 
characteristics. For instance, the building of a railway 
parallel to an existing road could only be justified if 
it could be proved that there is, or will shortly be, sufficient 
trafile for both systems. That is to say, heavy car, bus 
and lorry traffic for small loads which must be moved 
rapidly from door to door on the road, and a volume 
of long-distance rail traffic sufficient to ensure profitable 
railway operation ; such loads might include grain, sugar, 
timber, cement, industrial raw materials, etc. It is not 
in the national interest to continue investing in railway 
construction which duplicates road facilities. 
In addition to investment problems, there are also 
questions connected with the co-ordination of existing 
means of transport, rates, concessions and monopohes, 
all of which should be in the hands of a specialized 
organization. The formation of a transport board is 
proposed, to include representatives of the Government 
in each of the country's transport systems, and sub-
divided in the most effective manner consistent with 
private interests and the technical requirements of each 
case. 
I V . AGRICULTURE 
1. The importance of agriculture 
Despite the fact that the major part of Bolivia is 
potential agricultural land and that agriculture supplies 
more than 60 per cent of the population with work and 
a means of livelihood, as well as substantially contributing 
to the formation of national income, this branch of the 
economy has long been stagnant and has lagged behind 
the other sectors which have meanwhile continued to 
progress. The boom in mining production and the con-
sequent increase in exports and foreign exchange availa-
bilities have, in the past, enabled Bolivia to import 
vital foodstuffs and raw materials, without giving serious 
thought to their domestic production. While internal 
demand was still small, owing to the low standard of 
living of the indigenous population and their virtual 
isolation from the outside world, and foreign exchange 
availabilities were adequate, the static situation of agri-
culture had no very appreciable effect on the country's 
development. During the last few years, however, urban 
growth, together with other social and economic factors 
which will be considered later, have raised import require-
ments for foodstuffs and raw materials derived from 
agriculture and animal husbandry. This has come to 
represent an ever-growing burden on the Bolivian eco-
nomy, which in 1955 amounted to 38.5 per cent of total 
imports, thus absorbing a major part of the foreign 
exchange needed for importing the capital goods in-
dispensable for a more rapid development of the economy. 
Although Bolivian agriculture is capable of supplying 
nearly all the items required by the domestic market and 
of undertaking import substitution and improving the 
current meagre diet of the population, as well as con-
siderably expanding Bolivian sales abroad, there are 
many reasons why it is actually unable to do so. 
The primary cause of the retarded state of agriculture 
in Bolivia was the system of land tenure in force up to 
August 1953, when the Land Reform Decree {Decreto 
de Reforma Agraria) was enacted. The system of large 
semi-feudal estates was almost totally impervious to 
progressive agricultural techniques ; the farms mainly 
used antiquated methods of cultivation while the farm-
hands continued to live in wretched conditions. The 
owners, who were for the most part absentee landlords. 
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left all responsibility in the hands of a bailiff who was 
no more knowledgeable than they were, and who per-
sisted in growing crops on land that was becoming in-
creasingly exhausted without troubling to revive its 
vanishing fertility. The application of minimum standards 
of animal health and plant genetics, and the use of 
fertilizers and soil-conservation methods were almost 
unknown, while tools were generally very primitive and 
resembled those in use in colonial times. The agricultural 
worker, who was obliged to devote two to four days 
of the week to working on the owner's land as payment 
for the right to cultivate a small holding or " sayaña " 
for his own use, usually imitated the methods of pro-
duction on the main farm. The result of all this was 
very low unit yields, which restricted agriculture to the 
mere production of subsistence crops with no particular 
commercial end in view. The majority of agricultural 
workers sold in the towns only the smallest possible 
fraction of their produce in order to obtain the money 
needed to buy whatever they could not raise on their 
own land. For the same reason, they scarcely ever 
charged adequate prices, which frequently prevented the 
more commercialized farms from competing with them. 
The revolutionary movement of 1952, and the sub-
sequent Land Reform Decree of 1953, were intended 
to end this state of affairs by redistributing land and 
incorporating the indigenous population into the eco-
nomic life of the nation. Although the land reform has 
succeeded in justifying its introduction by breaking up 
the system in force until then, and giving the agricultural 
worker a new sense of his own worth which will enable 
him to become of greater social and economic significance 
to the country, it had no positive effect on production 
for the first few years. The natural confusion resulting 
from such a radical change has already lasted too long. 
The complexity and slowness of the distribution methods 
were combined with the lack of an effective development 
policy and of a spirit of change as regards the technical 
aspect. The far-reaching transformation which was 
attempted has so far had repercussions of a purely 
political and social nature. In contrast, production has 
dropped even lower, as a considerable number of agri-
cultural workers deserted the land, probably because of 
the uncertain and even insecure atmosphere prevailing 
in the Bolivian countryside. There has been no appreciable 
advance in methods of cultivation either, although 
serious efforts have been made in this respect during 
the last few years, especially since the formation of the 
Inter-American Agricultural Service {Servicio Agrícola 
Interamericano). 
At all events, it would be premature to try to evaluate 
the different aspects of such an important reform in 
the short space of time that it has been in force although 
this has already been long enough to reveal the existence 
of weak points and the need to modify its organization 
to enable it to be carried out more coherently and 
effectively. 
The natural confusion created by land reform which 
lacks the material means to carry it through expeditiously 
was heightened by the effects of the economic crisis in 
Bolivia during the last five years arising from, among 
other factors, acute inflation and an inadequate exchange 
régime. The complete disruption in the country's current 
agricultural and livestock production may be partially 
explained by this. 
Another delaying factor of considerable importance 
was the imbalance between the population and the 
supply of cultivated land. The Bolivian population is 
predominantly concentrated in the Altiplano and certain 
valleys where suitable agricultural land — especially in the 
Valleys — is limited, erosion far-advanced and fertility 
low, and which have a particularly rigorous climate. 
The eastern plains, on the other hand, which have the 
largest stretches of potential agricultural land, are almost 
uninhabited and have no adequate means of communica-
tion with the rest of the country or abroad. For these 
reasons, the proportion of cultivated land per capita is 
extremely low and has, moreover, been impoverished 
by centuries of inefficient cultivation without any effort 
having been made to restore its fertility. 
As a result of the Chaco war, the belief that Bolivia 
possessed fertile territory in the east, which was under-
populated and almost entirely virgin land, spread and 
from that time onwards, the idea of breaking the " Andean 
curtain " enclosing the Bolivian population, and removing 
the population surplus to the plains, has been constantly 
gairung ground. The efforts made in 1945 to settle colonists 
in Santa Cruz, the opening of a road between that town 
and Cochabamba, the formation of the " Batallones 
Coloniales ", the concentration of controlled credit and 
the work of the Inter-American Agricultural Service in 
that region may all be ascribed to it, and it has ultimately 
become so popular that many are convinced that it 
represents the whole solution to Bolivia's agricultural 
problem. The matter is so important that it warrants 
further examination, however cursory. 
It does not seem likely that the eastern region will 
be able to absorb the surplus population from other 
areas at the rate of more than 3,000 or 4,000 persons a 
year, which would require the annual reclaiming of some 
5,000-6,000 hectares. As the natural growth of the 
population in the Altiplano and Valleys is approximately 
25,000 annually, it is clear that the east can only provide 
a solution for less than a sixth of the annual surplus 
population from that region, which would leave the 
problem of where to settle and find work for some 
20,000-22,000 persons still pending. A similar number 
to that estimated for Santa Cruz might be placed in 
other areas, such as Caranavi, Chapare and some of 
the southern valleys. But, in any case, more than 15,000 
rural inhabitants will have to search for work in other 
sectors of the economy, if the present low income-level 
of the population in the Altiplano and Valleys is not 
to be further diminished. 
In fact, one of the principal problems of Bolivia's 
over-aU economic development is how to find work for 
its increasing population and simultaneously raise rather 
than reduce their average income-level. Without entering 
upon a detailed analysis which would exceed the scope 
of an agricultural study, it may be said that any solution 
This figure may be lower still if commercial and industrial 
activities which will complement agriculture, are initiated in those 
areas. 
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envisaged for the agricultural sector must be conducive 
to the balanced development of each region so that "the 
easing of population pressure in the Altiplano and Valleys, 
and the higher income-level enjoyed by that part of 
the population that migrates to the new settlement 
areas, may be combined with an improved income-level 
for the agricultural workers obliged to stay in the Alti-
plano. 
Yet another factor which has been active in slowing 
down agricultural development and which is closely 
linked with the former is the relative isolation of large 
areas of the country owing to the lack of satisfactory 
means of communication. The rugged topography of 
Bolivia hampers and raises the costs o f road and rail-
way construction, and this has meant that important 
potential production sectors have remained with rudi-
mentary or no contact at all with the large consumer 
centres. The majority of the existing communications 
were built to facilitate access to the mines and did not 
consider agricultural development. For instance, only a 
hundred kilometres from La Paz, in the Upper Beni 
region, there is sufficient land, at present uncultivated, 
to supply the capital with the major part of its foodstuffs 
without difficulty. 
During the last decade, some attempt has been made 
to counteract the desertion of the land by forming 
numerous public services to deal with agricultural prob-
lems. The Ministry of Agriculture has thus been supple-
mented by the Inter-American Agricultural Service, a 
subsidiary of the United States Government International 
Co-operation Administration ; the Ministry of Farm 
Affairs {Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos) ; the Land 
Reform Service {Servicio de la Reforma Agraria) ; the 
Bolivian Development Corporation {Corporación Boli-
viana de Fomento) and other less important institutions. 
In order to co-ordinate and plan the work of all the organi-
zations promoting Bolivia's economic development, the 
National Council for Co-ordination and Programming 
{Consejo Nacional de Coordinación y Planeamiento), 
whose Department of Agriculture will integrate the 
activities of the aforenamed organizations into a coherent 
plan for the harmonious development of the agricultural 
sector. The lack of effective co-operation between the 
various bodies is, however, one of the fundamental 
defects in their administration ; each one prepares its 
work programme independently, which has resulted in 
unnecessary duplication, competition between the dif-
ferent sectors and, most important of all, the inability 
to formulate a definite agrarian, policy or any joint 
plan for tackling the problems of Bolivian agriculture 
that would be both radical and comprehensive. 
Bolivia's most pressing current problem in agriculture 
is how to supply its urban and mining centres satis-
factorily, and reduce its agricultural and livestock imports 
so as to free the foreign exchange urgently required in 
other sectors, as well as in agriculture itself, for the 
import of capital goods. At the same time, there is a 
need for greater homogeneity in Bolivia by means of 
the migration of some of the surplus population from 
the Altiplano and Valleys to the hitherto uncultivated 
regions. 
The incorporation of new and more fertile land and, 
above all, the adoption of improved production techniques 
will promote a large-scale expansion in the supply of 
foodstuffs and raw materials, thereby improving the 
average diet, which is at present very deficient, and 
helping to raise the low income-level, of the agricultural 
workers. In turn, this will stimulate demand for non-
agricultural commodities, which will then facilitate the 
absorption into other activities of the surplus rural 
population that could not be settled in the new agricultural 
zones. 
2. A programme outline 
The following suggestions for an agricultural develop-
ment programme are only intended to provide a rough 
outhne, since their final execution will be the responsibi-
lity of Bolivian experts, with the co-operation of foreign 
technical assistance consultants. 
(a) Objectives of the programme 
The objectives of a programme to develop agricultural 
and livestock production in Bolivia may be summarized 
as follows : 
(i) Increased production in agriculture, the fishing 
industry and forestry, in order to effect maximum 
import substitution in these branches, which absorb 
almost 40 per cent of the country's foreign exchange 
supply ; to expand agricultural and forestry exports so 
as to increase total capacity to import and reduce the 
extent of national dependence on mineral exports ; to 
raise the dietary level of the population, especially of the 
indigenous inhabitants and urban low-income brackets, 
which is at present far below the standard nutritional 
requirements. 
(ii) Improvement of yields and labout productivity, 
in order to contribute to the expansion of production 
referred to in (i) ; to raise the average income of the 
agricultural worker ; to lower production costs ; to 
preserve natural resources more satisfactorily. 
(iii) More efficient distribution systems, in order to 
diminish transport and marketing costs ; to reduce the 
distribution margins, and, consequently, lower retail sales 
prices ; as a result of this, to extend the present limits 
of consumption and enlarge the domestic market for 
the sale of country produce ; to improve the quality of 
the goods and reduce losses during marketing. 
(iv) Equilibrium between the rural population and 
suitable agricultural land in order to alleviate, or avoid 
intensifying, the population pressure in some zones of 
the Altiplano and in the Valleys ; to raise the average 
income of these communities ; to integrate national 
territory more thoroughly. 
(v) Consolidation of the land reform, in order to 
restore security and confidence to agriculture ; to reculti-
vate land deserted because of the reform, and thus 
contribute to population growth ; to establish a definite 
system of land tenure. 
(vi) A rise in the cultural level of the agricultural 
worker and in his average standard of living, in order 
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to integrate the agricultural workers more completely 
with the remainder of the population ; to incorporate 
them into the monetary economy of the country, as a 
preliminary step to the development of other sectors ; 
to rescue them from the cultural isolation in which they 
have been living. 
In the course of preparing the development programme, 
these objectives should be converted into specific targets 
to be attained within a given time. This measure, which 
is characteristic of any well-planned programme, is 
essential for determining the degree of utihzation and 
combination of resources to be employed in its execution. 
(b) Available means and resources 
Once the programme's objectives have been defined 
and its targets laid down, an analysis should be made 
of the measures to be applied and the resources required 
for attaining such objectives. 
The requisite measures for carrying out the programme 
fall into four main groups : (i) physical and technical ; 
(ii) financial; (iii) economic ; and (iv) administrative. 
(i) Technical measures. Among these, the following 
should be singled out : the selection of new areas to 
be reclaimed in the Santa Cruz, Upper Beni and Chapare 
regions and in other valleys, which, according to esti-
mates, should amount to 8,000 to 10,000 hectares 
annually ; the land reclaimed should be settled by the 
indigenous inhabitants, especially from the overpopulated 
regions of the Altiplano and Valleys ; the new colonies 
should have every technical and financial assistance to 
enable them to apply the most up-to-date production 
techniques to their respective holdings ; the irrigation 
works being carried out in Angostura, Tacagua and 
Villamontes should be finished as soon as possible, 
and those projected for the Altiplano and Cochabamba 
Valley begin immediately ; in addition, areas should be 
chosen in which to concentrate the efforts of agricultural 
extension and controlled credit services with a view to 
improving techniques,®® the agricultural extension ser-
vices of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Inter-
American Agricultural Service should be reinforced, 
so as to enable them to deal more effectively with the 
regions where advanced techniques are to be introduced ; 
the import and internal distribution of the necessary 
elements to improve production techniques, such as 
fertilizers, improved seeds, insecticides, machinery, spare 
parts, wire for enclosures, etc., should be facilitated ; 
research on early varieties o f wheat, hard fibres, oil-
seeds, dry-farm fodder crops, beetroot and so forth 
should be expedited ; the establishment of seed-beds of 
Vicia villosa to propagate cultivation of this leguminous 
plant throughout the Altiplano should be encouraged ; 
the enclosure of grazing land should be promoted, the 
quality of fodder crops should be impoved and the 
building of forage silos accelerated ; the efficiency of 
the marketing system should be increased through the 
It has been estimated that large-scale technical improvements 
will be introduced in some 20,000 hectares annually, including land 
for crops and grazing, apart from the newly-colonized zones 
referred to above. 
establishment of central markets, refrigerator plants and 
modern slaughter-houses as well as the grading of crops 
and livestock according to quality. 
(ii) Financial measures. The execution of the pro-
gramme will require a substantial increase of investment 
in agriculture. It has been calculated that, in order to 
reach the minimum targets set, an average of no less 
than 5.5 million dollars will have to be invested annually 
during the next few years in the following items : heavy 
machinery for reclaiming land—1.2 million; irriga-
t ion—1.3 million; crops — 2 million; livestock — 
0.6 miUion ; miscellaneous items — 0.4 million. As the 
farmers' own investment will have to be financed by 
the expansion of supervised credit, the capital held by 
the Banco Agrícola will have to Ije approximately six 
times as great. The Bolivian Development Corporation 
{Corporación Boliviana de Fomento) and the Irrigation 
Department {Dirección General de Riegos) will also have 
to be granted funds for terminating the irrigation works 
already under way, and for putitng the new projects 
approved into effect. At the same time, the Ministry 
of Agriculture's budget will have to be considerably 
expanded, especially that part of it earmarked for the 
Departments of Agriculture and Livestock {Direcciones 
de Agricultura y Ganadería). Moreover, the Extension 
Division of the Inter-American Agricultural Service will 
need to increase its budget about 200 per cent before it 
can employ more assistant representatives and agrono-
mists and effectively cover the region where it is proposed 
to introduce improved techniques. 
(iii) Economic measures. The price policy to be pur-
sued in future should be studied carefully with a view 
to providing the appropriate incentives for attracting 
investment to agriculture and implementing the technical 
measure recommended. In order to avoid any extreme 
fall in prices which might hamper the future develop-
ment of agriculture, some consideration should be given 
to the fixing of minimum prices, and to Government 
purchases for stock-piling, which may later be used for 
the completely different purpose of stabilizing prices 
during periods of shortage and preventing an uncontrolled 
price-rise. At the same time, the application of new 
customs tariffs should be envisaged to protect agricultural 
development, in view of the slow rate of growth to be 
expected in the capacity to import, and Bolivia's impera-
tive need for import substitution. All these measures 
should be closely linked with the country's general 
economic development policy. 
(iv) Administrative measures. The execution of a 
development programme will require readjustments in 
the organization of the public services connected with 
agriculture, as regards both their internal structure and 
their inter-relationships. On the first aspect there is little 
to be said at the present time. Nevertheless, as a general 
principle, attention may be called to the need to increase 
the technical staff in most of the institutions, and to raise 
their salaries in order not to lose trained personnel who 
would often be extremely difficult to replace. 
Within the Ministry of Agriculture itself, a Department 
of Agriculture {Secretaría General de Agricultura) might 
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be created which would take precedence over the different 
Departments and would serve as a liaison between them. 
As a Minister's duties are political rather than technical, 
it would be indispensable for a permanent technical 
expert of high rank to be included on the staff, who 
would be unaffected by purely political changes and whose 
presence would give the development programme greater 
stability. It is also of primary importance to reorganize 
and strengthen the Department of Agricultural Economy 
{Dirección de Economía Agraria) in order to make a start 
on the basic economic and statistical studies required 
for planning and carrying-out an agricultural and 
livestock development programme. 
Of just as great or even greater urgency than the 
internal reorganization of the institutions connected, in 
one form or another, with agriculture, is the need to 
co-ordinate their activities and thereby eliminate useless 
duphcation, which is often costly and hinders the enforce-
ment of a consistent and cohesive policy. 
The organization to which the role of co-ordinator 
should be assigned is undoubtedly the National Com-
mission for Programming and Co-ordination, through 
its Agricultural Department {Departamento Agrícola). It 
should bear the main responsibiUty for the preparation 
of the agricultm-al development programme and to this 
end should be able to count upon the close collabora-
tion of the technical institutions which will supply the 
background data and information relating to its respec-
tive fields of action. It would consequently be preferable 
for the Commission to Umit its own technical studies 
for the time being, and give greater emphasis to the 
analysis and evaluation of reports prepared by other 
organizations. On the other hand, the preparation of 
research and reports on general economic topics should 
be undertaken by the Commission itself, in close co-
operation with the Department of Agricultural Economy 
of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
The Programming Commission should be the highest 
authority in so far as both the planning and execution 
of the programme are concerned. For this reason, it 
would be essential for the Agricultural Committee 
{Comité Agrícola) of the Commission to include repre-
sentatives of each organization actively connected with 
the programme. For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture 
should be represented (if possible by the Director of the 
Secretariat referred to previously), as well as the Ministry 
of Rural Affairs, the Land Reform Service, the Inter-
American Agricultural Service, the Bolivian Develop-
.ment Corporation, the Banco Agrícola and the Com-
mission itself. In this way, the decisions taken by the 
Agricultural Committee, and subsequently ratified by 
The Executive Council of the Commission {Consejo 
Superior), will reflect those aspects of the over-all policy 
to be applied by each of the institutions. Their respective 
fields of action will thus be defined more clearly, thereby 
avoiding the waste of resources and other defects referred 
to above. 
The possibility of creating a Settlement Board {Junta 
de Colonización) has been considered. This would be a 
branch of the Committee, in common with other similar 
entities, such as an agricultural extension service, a 
sub-committee on machinery, another on irrigation, and 
so forth. These sub-committees will usually be responsible 
for partial aspects of the programme, so that the Com-
mittee's decisions may be based on material that has 
been well prepared and analysed. They should also 
include representatives of private organizations directly 
concerned with crop and livestock production, such as 
the Cámara Nacional de Ganadería, the Asociaciones 
de Agricultores, co-operatives, etc. If the programme is 
under the auspices and direction of the Programming 
Commission, it will be easier to integrate it with the over-
all economic policy of the country and see that it is 
consonant with development projects in other sectors. 
In this sense, it is obvious that transport policy should 
be closely linked to that adopted for the agriculture and 
livestock sector. 
(v) Other measures. There are other highly necessary 
measures that do not fall definitely into any of the fore-
going categories, and which will therefore be dealt with 
separately. 
Among these, the improvement of agricultural and 
livestock statistics is of primary importance, and is 
fundamental to the preparation of the programme. 
Without such statistics, the task of programming would 
be transformed into a mere game of chance, with an 
equal possibility of success or failure. An attempt 
should therefore be made to build up a permanent system 
for gathering, tabulation and analysing data in this sector 
of the kind that already exists in many other countries. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization is currently 
examining the problem and its regional statistics expert 
recently went to La Paz to study it in the field. The co-
operation of the international organizations in this, as 
in many other fields, may be of immeasurable assistance 
to Bolivia in attaining its development objectives. 
A complementary system of periodic surveys should 
also be initiated, which would deal with consumption 
of foodstuffs and raw materials produced by the agri-
cultm-al and livestock sector and give an accurate idea 
of the evolution of real demand among the population. 
Moreover, the inclusion in these surveys of other elements, 
such as consumer income and expenditure distribution, 
is essential for an analysis and better understanding of 
the dynamic factors in Bolivia's economy, which is a 
fundamental requisite for the programming of its 
economic development. 
Mention has already been made of the need for more 
foreign technical assistance experts to strengthen the 
basic categories of public administration in Bolivia, but 
there are other aspects, in connexion with which the need 
for technical collaboration is even more imperative. This 
might be provided by international organizations such as 
FAO or UNESCO. It is obvious that, in so far as the 
agricultural and livestock sector is concerned, technical 
assistance projects must be closely linked to the require-
ments arising from the sector's development programme. 
However, technical assistance will probably be required 
very shortly for tropical crops, which have been studied 
very little in Bolivia ; the marketing of agricultural and 
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livestock production, on which a more detailed study is 
required to complement the preliminary reports by a 
FAO expert ; stockbreeding and management; the 
conservation of natural resources and water utilization ; 
technical agricultural education at the three levels of 
primary, secondary and University studies ; and the 
agricultural statistics and consumption surveys men-
tioned previously. 
The possibilities that agriculture in Bolivia will emerge 
from its present retarded state are clearly so favourable 
that the combined eiforts of the responsible officials 
and agricultural leaders, together with foreign technical 
and financial assistance will, without the slightest shadow 
of doubt, enable agriculture to develop more rapidly 
and thus contribute more effectively to the general 
well-being of the BoUvian people. 
C . THE SOCIAL PROBLEM 
I. THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF BOLIVIA IN NOVEMBER 1956 
Under an over-troubled surface, the crowded history 
of Bolivia flows by in the three well-known stages of its 
course — the rule of the Incas, the dominion of Spain 
and finally, the independent Republic, which now, in 
the flood-tide of liberalism, is broadening out in an 
effort to merge into the modern world. Yet such an 
image is far from accurate, for although these phases 
can be enumerated in chronological order it would seem 
that they represent, rather than a gi'adual onward 
movement, a succession of historical strata, super-
imposed one upon another, but not yet welded together, 
and still divided by innumerable breaches and cleavages. 
And while the chronicle of the past is essential to an 
understanding of the finer shades and complexities of 
the country's present-day life, its study is so remote from 
the task in hand that there is no need here to do more 
than touch upon two aspects which are very much to 
the purpose. One is apparent in the ideologies prevaihng 
today, and another, as a result of these, has become 
part and parcel of the characteristics of contemporary 
Bolivia's real social situation. 
Those who take history as what actually did happen 
and could have happened in no other way, may feel 
that each of the phases of Bolivia's history fulfilled its 
own mission, even if after the defective, incomplete and 
fragmentary fashion of all the works of man. The present 
state of affairs in Bolivia is their outcome, and no other 
point of departure exists ; it is — if these same phases 
may now be envisaged in terms of the nucleus of their 
respective economic structures — as much the product 
of the " ayllu " as of the hacienda and the mine, and 
the achievements of each stage will, under other guises, 
be prolonged into the future. But so total an acceptance 
of history is not the most common attitude ; it is more 
usual to indulge in speculation as to what might have 
been, or to analyse yesterday from the standpoint of to-
day, in the hght of tomorrows possibihties. Then it 
comes about that events are distorted from one angle 
or another, that the shadows of this or that period are 
more darkly pencilled in, that there is a quickening of 
nostalgia for the successful endeavours of times gone 
by, or that in the desire to escape into the past, its facts 
are made to fit into the unyielding grooves of a sequence 
of occurrences that can be seen to lead up logically to 
a predictable future. In Bolivia, as in other Latin American 
countries, there has existed and still does exist a lively 
interest in the interpretation of its history, and this has 
been the source of a hterature which includes some 
undeniably brilliant books. The interest of such hterature 
on this occasion, however, lies not in its intrinsic value 
but in the sociological effects o f its repercussions on the 
ideologies of the man in the street. For all those of its 
elements that represent contradiction and controversy 
in an intellectual field where there is still room for shades 
of opinion, are transmuted in the day-to-day struggle 
into a turmoil of sweeping and exclusive assertions which 
in no way help to create that awareness of historical 
continuity without which a deep-seated sense of nation-
ality cannot take shape. 
Nevertheless, on the formation of such a sense of 
nationality the survival of Bolivia depends. For the 
series of accretions and superstructures already referred 
to, by boxing up, as it were, one within another, systems 
that differ in social organization and belong to different 
epochs, has brought the history of Bolivia to a point 
at which the foremost of its social problems is that of 
its failure to become a fully integrated nation. Up to 
now there have still been geographical regions almost 
entirely cut off from one another, where it was easy 
for the traditional seed of Spanish individualism to take 
root and flourish, and contacts between the various 
ethnical and social strata and their ways of life have 
been so slight as to preserve these as closed cultural 
systems. Moreover, the minority responsible for govern-
ment has constituted too small a proportion of the total 
population. These shortcomings have inevitable repercus-
sions on each and all of the country's social problems, 
and not least on its economic development possibihties. 
In this sense, national integration and economic develop-
ment are permanently associated in mutual inter-action. 
The former process will prove easier, and is bound to 
be consolidated, by virtue of an economic development 
which opens up new means of communication, streng-
thens the interdependence of production and markets 
and in general raises the standard of living of the whole 
population. But economic development in its turn, at 
the world's present pass, calls for a national conscious-
ness to combine discipline with responsibility and to 
provide a major share of the incentives and stimuli that 
are essential if the necessary effort is to be kept up. 
It is in no way surprising that this problem, whether 
clearly stated or dimly divined, was one of the main-
springs of the revolution in Bolivia. 
Every revolution, once a fait accompli, seems the work 
of destiny. Idle then to speculate on the clearsighted 
action by which it might have been prevented. The 
historian has only to trace objectively the chain of causes 
that led to such an effect. Nothing of the kind, of course. 
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will be attempted here in the case of Bolivia ; but equally 
of course an endeavour will be made to single out 
certain vital moments. Two aspects seem inseparable 
from each other. One of these is the internal exhaustion 
of the possibilities of a socio-economic system, and the 
other the ossification of an élite that failed to adapt itself 
to new demands, for want of the ability or the will to 
infuse fresh blood into its veins. The unilateral structure 
of an economic system based almost entirely on the 
export of tin ore necessarily ceased to fulfil the function 
that it had discharged for many decades, because of the 
changes in prevailing conditions that inevitably took 
place, externally in the market and internally in produc-
tion. And the traditional ruling minority, caught up 
in the inertia of the system, was unwilling or unable to 
introduce new stamina into its ranks, despite the efforts 
made under the Governments of Saavedra and Siles. 
Like all its kind, the revolution in Bolivia was not a 
sudden outbreak ; it was a long time brewing. And the 
whole of this period of ferment dated from the decisive 
episode of the Chaco War and its unhappy consequences. 
It is impossible here to trace them step by step. Rather 
should it be recalled that this event not only drew atten-
tion for the first time to the symptoms of exhaustion 
manifested by the system out of which modern Bolivia 
had grown, but also united its social classes and ethnical 
strata in common experiences and on the equal footing 
of danger shared, kindling in the country's disillusioned 
youth an ardent desire to see their nation self-renewed. 
The subsequent years, coinciding with one of the most 
troubled moments in the world's history, are of supreme 
interest to any who wish to determine the exact origin 
of the prevailing ideologies and to account for their 
undoubted confusion and heterogeneity. For in this 
welter of conflicting ideas and aspirations lies the second 
most serious problem confronting the Bolivia of today. 
The task of passing judgment upon a revolution is 
usually shelved until posterity's more impartial outlook 
enables history to be " contemplated in tranquillity ". 
This is not, of course, the place to attempt any such 
thing. But two facts can safely be acknowledged. A 
régime could not long survive that allowed a major 
part of its population to continue living in obsolete 
conditions. And a Government came into being which, 
desirous of redressing ancient wrongs — though perhaps 
it was Utopian to hope to do so at a single blow — had 
the supreme courage to take that leap into the dark 
every historic decision must represent, and opened up 
for its country a prospect full of promise, it is true, but 
also of grave risks. 
The radical changes brought about by the Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario shook the foundations of 
each and all of Bolivia's hereditary institutions, political, 
economic, and cultural, with the exception of the Catholic 
Church. Obviously, however, immediate and final shape 
could not be given to those which were to replace them. 
The agrarian reform, the nationalization of the mines 
or the disbanding of the army, were at the outset vigorous 
measures of demolition, practicable only if succeeded 
by the patient labour of reconstruction. The magnitude 
of the task may, for the time being, be considered an 
excuse for delay. But this latter must also have been 
largely due, as is commonly recognized, not so much 
to the differences existing within the party, as to the 
variety of ideological banners — already referred to — 
under which its members march. The passion inherent 
in every young nationalist movement, vestiges of certain 
Germanic influences, Marxist doctrines of every sort 
and shade, together with hberal elements and techno-
logical targets common to all the peoples of our time, 
were woven into a mental web difficult to unravel into 
clear, firm and feasible decisions. Sociologically speaking, 
the disparity between ideology and practice is unimpor-
tant, since the former can fulfil special functions on its 
own account, as is abundantly proved by contemporary 
experience. But what is, on the other hand, of vital 
significance is the tendency of the unrelated and con-
flicting elements in an ideology to find expression in 
incompatible forms of action, or in the paralysis of any 
form of activity whatsoever. Political decisions imply 
ultimate appraisals which transcend the scope of rational 
analysis. But, conversely, such analysis — social science, 
if the reader will — can declare, with the strictest im-
partiaHty, what may be the immediate and secondary 
consequences of these decisions, and demonstrate that 
they cannot serve to bring about the simultaneous fulfil-
ment of aspirations which by their very nature are ' 
mutually irreconcilable. Without rational analysis to 
serve as a guide, only painful collisions with reality can 
teach exactly what is wanted, as well as what it is 
reasonable to want. During the past few years, it was 
impossible for the Bolivian revolutionary movement to 
embark upon the methodical work of reconstruction 
without first sorting out its doctrinal confusions, or, in 
other words, clearly defining not only the content but 
the real limitations and practical scope of its hopes and 
aims. In these circumstances, the third factor making 
for delay was to be found in all the various repercussions 
of uncontrolled inflation. 
As a society cannot survive without disgregating in an 
institutional vacuum, its tendency is temporarily to fill 
up the void with pseudo-structures, non-functional over 
the long term, but for the moment enabling it to keep 
its feet. This is what has happened in Bolivia during 
recent years. With its foundations embedded in the 
rubble of traditional institutions, a structure has gradu-
ally arisen which has served to buttress up the every-
day concerns of a large number of individuals. The 
speed of events may shortly convert into a historical 
curiosity a phenomenon which, to the loss of social 
science, has not been made the subject of a satisfactory 
monograph. And this is the more regrettable inasmuch 
as, while the general outlines of this phenomenon are 
well known, they are here to be seen for the first time in 
the setting of a primitive environment and attended by 
singular and paradoxical effects. 
Bolivia, apart from its positive achievements, has for 
some years been dependent on a structure composed of 
the following elements : contraband, a black market 
and trade-union sinecurism. It must be understood 
that such terms are used only in their strictly structural 
connotation, and that no judgment of any kind is implied. 
Among these elements, contraband is the only one of 
which a careful description exists, in one of the chapters 
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of the study made by C. H. Zondag ; ^^  as regards the 
other two and their inter-connexion, the want of the 
monograph mentioned, which might have been extremely 
important, makes itself felt. How was this structure able 
to function ? What efforts did it stimulate ? What were 
its repercussions on the standard of living of the workers, 
and on the strafication of society ? What were its positive 
and negative effects in the sphere of both moral conduct 
and economic behaviour ? These are some of the questions 
to which at present only conjectural replies could be 
offered. Not even an attempt will be made to do so here. 
However, some apparently paradoxical consequences 
may be pointed out, and a modest prophecy tentatively 
ventured. 
It was not, of course, to be expected that such a 
structure (smuggling, black marketeering, trade-union 
feather-bedding) could constitute a sound basis for 
economic development. Neither savings nor investment 
can become a firmly-established part of so hand-to-
mouth a way of life. According to strictly Hegelian 
theory, the " cunning devices " of Reason might be held 
to account for the unexpected fact that the great mass 
of the Bolivian people — the rural population especially 
— should have set foot upon the road to rationaliza-
tion thanks to the incentives provided by such a structure. 
Speculation is, after all, a form of calculation, and the 
rejection of established usage for reasons of necessity 
constitutes a final break with long-standing tradition. 
It is incredible how quickly the agricultural worker 
traverses the lengthy stages of the process of transition 
from the hoarding of coins to fixing the price of his 
produce in dollars. And there can be no better index 
of some human beings' adaptability and their latent 
possibilities of metamorphosis when conditions become 
more favourable. Much the same is true of the expansion 
of demand. The growth of aspirations and needs is 
largely bound up — if the stimuli offered by the new 
political atmosphere are set aside — with the hazards and 
the peculiar features of this pseudo-structure. And if 
such growth is therefore far from logical and organic, 
it is, even so, a form of initiation into ambitions which 
perhaps may later be satisfied by efforts of another kind. 
Thus, although in quantitative terms there can be no 
compensation for the number of hours wasted in unpro-
ductive work, on a balance-sheet of over-all human 
losses and gains, among the latter must be reckoned, 
perhaps for all time, the abnormally intensive process 
of rationalization to which the Bolivian people has been 
subjected. 
How long this structure might have lasted, left to itself, 
is now a pointless question. If the stabilization measures 
announced and already under way are successful, they 
are bound to cause its downfall in a relatively short 
space of time. For with the abolition of the complicated 
exchange system at present in force, the incentives to 
smuggling disappear, as well as the raison d'etre of the 
quota mechanism, prop of trade-union and bureau-
cratic sinecurism, and, with these two, the network of 
the black market with all its varying range of interme-
diaries and retailers. But with them will also vanish the 
numerous forms of disguised unemployment, and the 
sources of income — compensatory or lucrative, moder-
ate or high — of a considerable sector of the popula-
tion. In this sense, stabilization is not merely an economic 
operation, but something broader, with social repercus-
sions whose immediate and secondary effects far transcend 
what can be calculated and readjusted with the help 
of known statistics. Monetary stabilization will constitute 
a little revolution within the pseudo-structure that for 
some years has been the basis of Bolivian life. Con-
sequently, apart from the major and minor resistances 
that are sure to be set up, two prophecies can be made. 
First, the changes that have taken place in the interim 
— especially in the stratification of society — will have 
to be accepted, since any return to the statu quo is 
impossible. Secondly, the work of demolition will be a 
barren task unless it is simultaneously accompanied by 
that of building up Bolivian society on a system of 
" eufunctional", or in other words, practical institu-
tions. Economic stability and social stability — each 
needs, as it conditions, the other. 
II . THE SOCIAL PREMISES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Any attempt to outhne the social premises of a country's 
economic development must be based on a clearly-
defined framework of concepts in which a theory is 
imphcit. Both exist at the present time, and undoubtedly 
as the expression of a consensus of opinion much greater 
than is usually recognized. For this reason it will perhaps 
be as well here not to pursue the first-hand preparation 
of the theoretical background,^" but to use a set of 
concepts presented elsewhere. Acceptance of the sys-
tematic classification drawn up by W. E. Moore at the 
request of UNESCO not only invokes the support 
of an acknowledged authority, but at the same time 
offers evidence of the concordance referred to, which 
is patent despite terminological differences or discre-
pancies of detail. In this connexion, needless as it may 
seem, attention should nevertheless be called to two 
points. The fact that Mr. Moore's scheme has been 
adopted in the present analysis does not imply a com-
mitment to reproduce it hterally —and this not only 
with respect to the Spanish rendering — provided that 
the liberties taken are not too great. Secondly, all the 
theoretical groundwork that can only be alluded to in 
passing must be taken for granted. 
The analysis of the social premises of Bolivia's eco-
nomic development will therefore be based on the three 
planes or levels suggested by Moore, namely, institutions, 
organization and the psycho-social plane of motives or 
incentives. 
Every society, of course, is nothing but a system of 
institutions, and, for better or for worse, exists only 
as long as this system, whatever it may be, continues 
See Problems in the economic development of Bolivia, op. cit. 
See ECLA, Progress report on the study on social conditions 
of economic development (E/CN.12/374), and " Three sociological 
aspects o f economic development". Economic Review of Latin 
America, special issue, Bogotá, August 1955, pp. 56 et seq. 
" The social framework of economic development" (unpu-
blished) ; see also the index to W. Arthur Lewis' Theory of Economic 
Growth, London, George, Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1955. 
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The unequal distribution of the population throughout 
the national territory has repercussions on the labour 
market. While some parts of the Altiplano and the 
valleys are over-crowded with people engaged in marginal 
work, in Santa Cruz there are not enough hands for the 
sugarcane and rice harvests. Clearly, the predictable 
social effects of any development include, over the long 
term, a more balanced geographical distribution of the 
population. But the question is so urgent, especially in 
its agrarian aspects, that for some time the possibility 
of directed population shifts has been arousing interest 
in Bolivia. The problem lay in the doubt as to whether 
the inhabitants of the plateau would be able to acclimatize 
themselves to the tropical and sub-tropical zones. In 
effect this problem has been convincingly solved, thanks 
to a few well-planned settlements established by private 
enterprise or by the Development Corporation and 
through the unquestionably admirable experiments of 
the " Regimientos Coloniales ". But it is doubtful whether 
these small-scale achievements could be repeated on a 
larger scale. The undertakings mentioned undoubtedly 
are of value as spurs to further effort. But in all likelihood 
future population shifts will have to be spontaneous 
rather than directed, when the economic magnets created 
by a development programme are allied to the effects 
of better education, which invariably generates new 
incentives and desires. 
What is the situation of the agricultural worker since 
the decisive episode of the Agrarian Reform ? Unfor-
tunately, scarcely any of the problems which this question 
raises can be discussed on a basis of objective research ^ ^ 
and conclusive evidence. If all controversial elements 
are eliminated, only the consensus of a few reliable 
opinions remains. 
It is an undisputed fact that the standard of living 
of the indigenous agricultural worker has perceptibly 
risen. In what degree and through what combination 
of different elements it has done so, and how far the 
improvement implies the beginning of a metamorphosis 
of his way of life, are questions to which no precise reply 
can be given. What is important — from the sociological 
standpoint, of course — is not so much the extent of 
the improvement as the fact that it is not strictly confined 
within the inherited system of a closed economy at 
subsistence levels. 
But these questions imply another of prior and therefore 
fundamental significance. How has the Aymará and 
Quechua agricultural worker reacted to that restoration 
of his dignity as a human being which was the under-
lying motive of the reform ? What has really gone on 
in his mind in face of his sudden endowment with both 
moral and material possibilities ? 
Another undeniable fact is the enthusiasm with which 
the agricultural worker has co-operated in the defence 
and maintenance of his new rights, which, if not actually 
conquered by him, are undoubtedly consonant with his 
age-old aspirations. Equally incontrovertible is the gent-
Up to now it has not been possible to make use of a piece 
o f research which apparently meets this need, namely, R . W. Patch's 
Social Implications of the Bolivian Agricultural Reform, Doctoral 
Thesis, Cornell University, June 1956. 
leness of his nature, which has kept violence within 
relatively moderate limits. For, while violence there has 
been everywhere — in Cochabamba especially, although 
the Quechua is supposed to be of a more open and 
malleable temper — together with " reinstatement feasts " 
comprising numerous head of prize cattle, it has been 
very slight in comparison with what might have been 
indulged in by armed masses in whom red-hot ancestral 
passions had been aroused. But an understanding of 
these facts does not constitute a sufficient reply to the 
question posed. Once the enthusiasm — always transi-
tory— is over, what attitude, is taken to the sober 
demands of every day ? Once the rights have been 
assumed, how are they reflected in the duties that are 
their reverse side ? Once the tumult has been stilled, 
how will the tasks of the new community life be shoul-
dered ? 
Hence the question : What has really gone on in the 
agricultural worker's mind ? Ignorance on this point 
precludes even a vague forecast of the future of the 
agrarian reform, and therefore, because of the latter's 
basic importance, of the country's economic development 
prospects themselves. 
The Indian's time-honoured method of defence, as 
those who know him well are constantly repeating, has 
always been a barricaded withdrawal into himself and 
his own group. Perpetually on the defensive, his existence 
was necessarily founded on suspicion and mistrust, hide 
bound by custom and resistant to innovation as it was. 
While nothing has hitherto had the power to bing him 
out of his shell, one of the greatest of the hopes pinned 
to the agrarian reform is that it will do so for the first 
time. Success depends upon some means of breaking 
down the attitudes behind this aloofness. Mistrust must 
be replaced by confidence in dealings with strangers, and 
the all-absorbing desire for security, rooted in tradition, 
must be ousted by eagerness for progress. None of this, 
of course, can be achieved in a day ; and only the estab-
lishment of a more favourable institutional environment 
will at some future time reveal the meaninglessness of 
the heated arguments between those who systematically 
disparage the Indian and those who romantically exalt 
his virtues. So much the more important is it, therefore, 
to examine certain symptoms and forecast certain dangers, 
for the greatest risk that can be incurred is that clumsiness 
and want of tact, or a slavish subjection to preconceived 
and doctrinary ideas, may once again set in motion the 
machinery of the age-old impulse towards security. 
The indigenous rural population has been subjected 
to an intensive process of syndicalization. Agrarian 
inspectors, rural schoolmasters and joint commissions 
of officials and from among the agricultural workers 
themselves, devoted their energies to the speedy per-
formance of this task. Apparently some of these com-
missions managed to organize as many as three trade 
unions in a single day. The inevitable defects consequent 
upon so much haste, and various others that might be 
cited, do not affect the present issue, since in order to 
state it clearly, the process might even be assumed to 
have followed ideal lines. The essence of the problem 
lies in discovering how the agricultural worker was 
able to effect the transition from the primary community 
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in which he lived to the secondary organization repre-
sented by the trade union, and what were his animic 
reactions in face of the relative but obvious abstraction 
which the latter implies. It cannot be supposed that so 
abrupt a step could be taken with ease, or without being 
attended by a few negative consequences. The imper-
sonal and objective nature of the relationships thus 
suddenly embarked upon was to stretch as far as the 
official routine of the Ministry, through the series of 
claims and formalities relating to the allocation and 
concession of the worker's land. The leap from the 
personal relationship with the " compadre " (the patron 
who stood godfather to his tenants' sons) to the functional 
relationship with the secretary of the trade union sym-
bolizes an altered situation in which some sense of bewil-
derment and defencelessness must presumably exist. 
And this is precisely the feeling which must at all 
costs be avoided, as two facts seem to suggest. One of 
these is the readiness with which the agricultural worker, 
despite his traditional attachment to the soil, has some-
times broken away from his farming to engage in petty 
trading and smuggling ; although allowance must ob-
viously be made for the general effect of the insecurity 
of tenure previously mentioned, which was bound to 
influence old and new landowners alike. The second is 
the apparent existence, in certain rural groups, of a 
fairly definite and even more or less conscious nostalgia 
for the old order of things. If such a sentiment exists, 
it is called forth not by the previous system in itself, 
but rather by the " security " which it afforded, mediocre 
as was the level attained. This is understandable. But 
those who reject the black-and-white portrayal of reality 
that is inevitable in political contests, are bound to 
suppose that not all the former landowners were incom-
petent and ruthless exploiters, and that there must have 
been some among them who were not only capable 
farmers, but human beings able to feel concern and 
affection for their servants and employees. In this sense 
the landowner of the past, with all his shortcomings, 
perhaps fulfilled a twofold function vis-a-vis the indi-
genous agricultural worker. On the one hand, he could 
provide technical advice and economic assistance, when 
occasion arose, in a professional capacity, that is, with 
respect to the farming of the land belonging to both. 
On the other hand, he could also give personal support 
and friendly aid, which in its different degrees might 
extend as far as the family tie represented by the " com-
padrazgo " (position of godfather to the tenant's sons). 
Both these functions were of course discharged within 
a relationship typical of paternalism but afforded a 
security which complemented that of the blood-com-
munity. 
The disappearance of the old type of landowner 
leaves a gap that is psychologically dangerous for those 
accustomed to living under his authority. And upon 
whether this gap can be satisfactorily filled will depend 
the success of the agrarian reform from the social stand-
point. When a contemporary sociologist (Gehlen) 
attributes all the problems of power in the modern world 
to the irreparable loss o f its patriarchal sources, there 
is nothing to wonder at in the suggestion that for an 
almost primitive world some risk is entailed by the 
sudden disappearance of its traditional paternalism. 
How, and by what substitutes, can the two functions 
indicated be replaced ? 
The only safe prescription is to grapple with the 
problem in all its aspects and using all the instruments 
that come to hand ; and, moreover, without too much 
impatience. The rational association of the trade union 
is not enough, not is the official action of a far-away 
Ministry. The effects of extension courses on agricultural 
techniques must be combined with the warmer and 
more human results of basic education. And even so, 
the pervading influence and the example of the person 
close at hand remains a lack which by one means or 
another would have to be supplied. 
All these problems, and others of a technical or 
juridical nature, derive from the way in which the agrarian 
reform was carried out ; or rather, from the way in which 
all agrarian reforms are habitually effected, with identical 
results. For, while theory is rich in suggestions for the 
concrete action that should accompany it, the inertia 
characteristic of the world's history has usually pre-
vented its being put into practice from above, with all 
the precautions and complementary measures recom-
mended, and its implementation has been imposed from 
below as a revolutionary expedient. This was what 
occurred in Bohvia's case. It seems, therefore, unneces-
sary to seek for possible justifications or to imagine how 
things might have happened otherwise. As it was, the 
decisive move seems to have been based upon the de 
facto appropriation of the land, or, in other words, to 
have been a political rather than an economic step. 
Or again, to use the Marxist terminology of some Bolivian 
intellectuals, the reform is typically " plebeian " ; which 
means that if it has satisfied the claims of material 
justice, it has paid no heed to the formal principles of 
productivity. It has thus been possible to contend that 
while the reform is a success in the social field, it con-
stitutes a failure — like many others — from the eco-
nomic point of view. But how long this dichotomy can 
last — if at a given moment it actually exists — is highly 
problematic. The real social value of the agrarian reform, 
on the contrary, depends on its economic outcome, and 
if this latter is negative, the former can yield no positive 
results. 
It will be for economists and agricultural experts to 
say what can be done in this connexion, and where the 
weaknesses that must be remedied lie. Clearly, however, 
unless adequate credit facilities are available and the 
farm worker is given technical training (through agri-
cultural extension services and rural education), no 
steady progress can be made. Bolivia's shortcomings in 
these respects seem plainly apparent despite legislation 
and praiseworthy but as yet limited efforts such as 
supervised credit. What is not so obvious is all that 
derives from the persistence of sheer mythologies — 
the myth of the primitive community's switch-over to 
the patterns of modern collective organization, and the 
myth of mechanization for mechanization's sake. 
Because of this, the wholesale creation of co-operatives, 
without the priod collaboration of personnel qualified 
to tackle so difficult a task, and the indiscriminate dona-
tion of tractors and farm implements, have not always 
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The existence of science must not be confused with 
that of an isolated group of learned men, however 
eminent they may be, but depends upon its adequate 
institutionahzation. As this is the major weakness of the 
Latin American countries in general, it is not sur-
prising that present-day BoHvia should be among the 
cases in point. What is more, its situation in this respect 
may be more dangerous than that existing some years 
ago. For the traditional system did permit, though on 
no methodical basis, it is true, the creation of an élite 
composed of Oxford, Sorbonne or Harvard graduates, 
whereas today such a group must be built up within the 
country and in larger numbers, by a systematic effort 
of internal organization and foresight, although it can 
draw upon the several forms of technical and cultural 
assistance from abroad. And in this connexion, what has 
been said of science is applicable, mutatis mutandi, to 
technique. For if it is a fallacy that technique can be 
imported without in some way bringing in its train the 
rational and scientific principles upon which it is based, 
it is equally erroneous to beheve that every kind of 
technique can be imported, or that it can flourish — at 
the necessary levels of discovery and adaptation — 
without becoming institutionalized along with scientific 
research. 
According to the 1950 census, Bolivia had in that 
year 12,409 university graduates, 6,170 persons with 
technical training and 758 with business training of an 
academic type. It should be borne in mind that these 
statistics include both foreign technical experts and 
Bolivians trained abroad. Such data of course speak 
for themselves, and their testimony would be much 
more eloquent still if the aggregate University figure 
were broken down by its various component groups. 
Here Bolivia's greatest problem lies in its university 
tradition itself, for it possesses an exaggeratedly large 
number of universities, more than one of which 
endeavours to cover the entire field of advanced educa-
tion. The solution of this delicate problem, which is 
as much a matter of diplomacy and of local suscepti-
bilities as o f organization proper, is hardly one of the 
most urgent tasks ahead, though it should not be dis-
missed as a complete impasse. It is, of course, of basic 
importance, for the necessary expansion of Bolivia's 
ruling classes calls for real ability rather than mere 
graduation statistics. And while in all countries an 
excessive number of degrees, or of some degrees in 
particular, is a very serious question, the surplus of 
" intellectuals " whose capacities fall below a minimum 
standard only adds to the factors making for dissatisfac-
tion and restlessness which are intrinsically abundant in 
those countries that are under-developed. 
The defects and inadequacy of technical and vocational 
education are apparently so striking that recent Bolivian 
Governments have made every possible endeavour to 
fill up the gaps. 
In the whole field of education and scientific training, 
Bolivia's own efforts have been supported by the efíicient 
aid of UNESCO, of the United Nations Technical 
Assistance Administration and of the United States co-
operation programme.^^ If in the last few years circum-
stances have perhaps not allowed all these projects to 
yield the desired results, the country's economic and 
social stabilization will undoubtedly make it possible 
not only to achieve greater success but to reproduce 
such aciiievements over the wider field required. 
There is one aspect of the social premises of economic 
development in which Bolivia has made positive progress 
during recent years, and has reached a position which, 
at least as a beginning, may be considered favourable. 
For it has broken the bonds of its hierarchical social 
system and has rendered possible the increased mobihty 
which accompanies every development process. 
Bolivia, like other countries of the region, is an excellent 
testing ground for the historico-sociological theory of 
" superimposition". But from the outset the special 
cultural features of the peoples placed in contact have 
hindered correct interpretation of the social stratifica-
tion which has gradually been built up. In this context, 
although the traditional term suggests such an idea, no 
closed caste system has existed, nor have the different 
ethnical characteristics played a decisive part in the 
difficulties o f moving from one internal level to another. 
Politics, military activities and the acquisition of know-
ledge or wealth have always enabled exceptional indivi-
duals to rise in the social scale, whatever their ethnical 
or social origin. Even so, just as the process of racial 
fusion has been less complete than in other countries, 
this social mobility previously outlined was undoubtedly 
slower, because individuals were involved rather than 
strata. However, a detailed study would reveal an 
increasing acceleration in the present century to date, 
especially in urban environments. 
The social and pohtical upheavals of this whole period, 
as well as the composition of the groups which supported 
the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, are in 
themselves clear proof of the transformation brought 
about. In this sense the events of 1950 represent no more 
than the legal and political recognition of this meta-
morphosis. 
By virtue of a solemn official declaration all the linger-
ing remnants of serfdom disappeared in a single day. 
And the principle of equahty of opportunity, hence-
forward the basis of the whole of the legislation, inevitably 
takes on a note of almost lyrical enthusiasm in the 
" Education Code ". But it is facts rather than official 
statements that are really important. In effect, during 
the succeeding years the stratification of society has 
been undergoing such rapid changes that their outcome 
is as yet unknown. The functioning of the structure 
sketched elsewhere was the social mechanism behind all 
these modifications, but unfortunately not the first 
trace of a detailed description of it is available. Some 
groups were ousted from their positions of power and 
prestige ; others found their income or status seriously 
reduced — perhaps only temporarily, as was the case 
with the small middle-class composed of professionals 
** There is a current project to set up, under the auspices of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, a technical training centre capable 
o f meeting the needs of the time. 
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or of medium-scale proprietors and entrepreneurs — 
and, conversely, others emerged as the heirs o f new 
possibilities and as the nucleus of groups destined to 
climb to higher rungs of the social ladder. To indulge 
in conjecture as to the lasting result of all these changes 
— for example, as to the structure of the future class — 
seems unsatisfactory. The essential fact, representing a 
final and positive gain, is the increase in social mobility, 
which is an indispensable requisite of economic develop-
ment. Upon the direction taken by the incipient stabiliza-
tion process, and on the new employment groups created, 
will depend the firm estabUshment and the internal 
mobility of the new social hierarchy. The initial condi-
tions are present for the functioning of the system based 
on intrinsic merit and effort which a modern economy 
entails. 
Although rational methods of productive organiza-
tion are much more frequent in pre-industrial societies 
than is commonly believed, they nevertheless constitute 
the central and universal characteristic of economically 
advanced societies. This concept is formulated by an 
author who rightly adds that the theoretical bases 
in this field are less sound than might be desired, and, of 
course, less reliable in their general conception than 
those which have hitherto been considered in the institu-
tional field. 
In actual fact, as was stated at the outset, the rational 
organization of productive work is far from being a 
novelty in Bolivia, not merely among the large mining 
companies, where it was to be expected, but in agricultural 
and industrial enterprises. Within the traditional inertia 
of the agrarian system of large-scale estates, some 
haciendas were organized on strictly model lines, and 
their fragmentation — even for the time being — has 
had regrettable effects. And, of course, in the field of 
industry, which is that of major interest in this context, 
there are enterprises whose organization in no way 
differs from that of their counterparts elsewhere. 
However, it is still doubtful whether industry as a 
whole had reached the stage of maturity implied by the 
widespread predominance of the rational organization 
of work ; or, in other words, whether the economic 
system functioned with the productive efficiency that 
specialization and the methodical co-ordination of the 
various specialized branches brings in its train. The 
small volume and the youth of Bolivian industry of 
course excuse its shortcomings. But it must be con-
fessed that not much can be said on this subject with 
any accuracy, for want of the necessary research. 
When studies on the entrepreneur and on industrial 
sociology, such as are at present completely lacking in 
the whole of Latin America, can be undertaken in Bolivia, 
it will be possible to reply to the questions which are of 
most interest today. Which have been the prevailing 
types of entrepreneur in Bolivia ? By what general 
characteristics has enterprise been distinguished ? By 
what economic and social ideals were the entrepreneurs 
inspired ? What were and are the attitudes adopted by 
society to enterprise ? What form has been taken by 
human relationships in this sphere ? 
W. E. Moore, op. cit. 
On the basis of the information received from com-
petent observers and of some few approximate data, 
certain comments may be hazarded upon the current 
situation of private enterprise in Bolivia. The abundance 
of names of foreign origin — of the first or second genera-
tion — within the narrow limits of the Bolivian industrial 
census, immediately suggests two conclusions. In the 
first place, apart from its actual youth, Bolivia's industry 
has lagged behind in the sense that little part is played 
in it by local energies, which are absorbed in other 
occupations. Strictly Bolivian enterprise would not have 
advanced by now beyond the commercial phase. This 
means that Bolivian capital has hitherto tended to avoid 
the risks and complications of industrial investment, a 
characteristic which seems to have persisted even in 
recent years. Secondly, the origin of many of the in-
dustries would seem fully to accoimt for the excellence 
of their entirely " imported " organization. 
As regards the situation of industry during the past 
few years, all data seem to coincide in indicating one 
over-all trend, namely, the decline in its productivity 
as a whole. It is precisely in the discussion of this fact 
that the sociological point of view may intervene ; for 
if it can be partly explained by powerful economic 
reasons, difficulties relating to exchange, to imports of 
raw materials or to the replacement of equipment, no 
little inñuence has also been exerted by factors of a 
special character deriving from the striking deterioration 
in the relationships between workers and employers. 
In face of a trade union organization with political 
backing, the contractual weakness of the employer, 
which has dominated labour relationships in recent 
years, seems undeniable. For this reason, neither over-
employment in some industries nor the almost universal 
lack of discipline could be normally handled, and were 
thus added to the ordinary labour difiiculties already 
mentioned. Authority within the enterprise — of whatever 
type it may be — is not only the reflection of clearly 
defined powers of disposal, but also the counterpart of 
the rational organization it sets up. No wonder if this 
has also intrinsically deteriorated in one way or another. 
It is impossible at this juncture to examine the relative 
influence exerted by economic and social factors on the 
decline in productivity, and how far those adduced do 
or do not constitute sufficient justification for given 
behaviour patterns — the flight of capital, the absence of 
new investment, etc. 
Mention has been made elsewhere of the part played 
in this state of affairs by ideological wavering in official 
circles. And, as is natural, to these vacillations must be 
attributed the creation of negative attitudes towards 
enterprise, more or less widespread or openly declared. 
It is therefore needless to insist that the situation hangs 
upon a clearcut decision as to the ends and means of 
economic development. If it is believed that private 
enterprise can and must make some sort of contribution 
to such growth, the conditions under which it can exist 
must at the same time be restored, by means of a transi-
tion from the neglect of everything that might induce the 
mass of the population to shake off its apathy, to the just 
but firm re-estabUshment of labour relationships under a 
well-defined legal system. Intermediate steps will have 
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union organizations of one kind or another. In the 
course of time, the trade unions have become an almost 
constitutional element not only of the industry of these 
countries but of the whole of their public life, and this, 
with shades of difference, applies as much to the Anglo-
Saxon tradition as to the continent of Europe, where 
there is more propensity towards a fighting spirit and 
the class struggle. Consciousness of co-responsibility, 
firmly based on their own interests, governs the strategy 
and the actions of trade-union policy, without entailing 
the renunciation of its essential aims. It is understan-
dable that in the less developed countries a very different 
situation should prevail. The trade union, which has 
merely inherited methods and doctrines that it has not 
itself hammered into shape throughout long years of 
experience, may sometimes make demands that outstrip 
real possibilities and operates as a rule in a more hostile 
environment, which compels it to voice stronger protests. 
How far such action may hamper incipient economic 
development, and whether it is or is not feasible to 
accelerate the transition from one stage to another, are 
questions to which no general reply can be given, and 
which fall outside the scope of the present topic. 
The situation of trade-unionism in Bolivia displays 
no new or surprising features in this respect. Fashioned 
in the course of its short career, by the methods common 
to the whole of Latin America, in the combative tradi-
tions of the continent of Europe, it preserves the same 
attitude along with the same ideology. But its most 
characteristic feature at present is rather to be found 
elsewhere, namely, on its rapid growth under the pro-
tection of pohtical activities and the State. In this sense, 
its position seems abnormal and definitely temporary. 
For in their association with poHtics in the more advanced 
industrial countries the trade unions have either become 
a mere cog in the machinery of economico-administrative 
organization in totalitarian states, or one more element 
of political pluralism in the life of the democracies. But 
a situation of ambiguity with respect to political power 
and the authority of the trade unions, in which the 
latter both gains in exclusive social influence and loses 
in responsibility, corresponds only to a particular 
revolutionary moment and must in the long run take 
definite shape along one or other of the lines indicated. 
It is thus not to be wondered at that Bolivian trade-
unionism has in the last few years been more superficial 
than basic, and that given the economic circumstances, 
there has been a tendency towards utihzing it as an 
instrument of obvious sinecurism. In view of these 
features and of the present situation, it was impossible 
that its influence should be other than negative in matters 
of disciphne and labour relationships. All this does not 
imply a waste of time. On the contrary, trade-unionism 
in Bolivia has been shaped by experience ; it has, in its 
enthusiasm, gone so far as to accept responsibilities 
which it has not been strong enough to carry, and its 
leaders have had the opportunity of learning what national 
responsibility means. There is consequently every reason 
to hope that when it is once more operating within its 
own due limits, it will make a constructive contribu-
tion to Bohvia's economic development. 
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INDEX CLAUSE I N DEFERRED PAYMENTS * 
PREFACE 
This article deals with a subject which has already 
attracted attention in Latin America, the issuing of 
bonds that keep their " real" value. It is difficult, in 
countries which suffer from inflation, to find a market 
for fixed-interest securities because investors fear that 
the purchasing power of the invested capital and of the 
annual interest payments will dwindle away as prices 
increase. The article describes a device used in some 
countries, mostly in Europe, to cope with this problem : 
a clause is inserted in the loan agreement which entitles 
the investor to receive not only the nominal interest 
and amortization payments but also an allowance for 
any rise in prices as reflected in the fluctuations of a 
specified price index from the day of issue of the loan 
to the day of payment. The article starts with an account 
of various ways in which a number of countries have 
applied this device in practice. The theoretical aspects 
are discussed in the light of the literature on the subject, 
references to which are given for those who wish to 
learn more about the subject. 
The index clause in deferred payments is a device 
aiming at stabilization of the value of financial invest-
ments and the return on them in terms of a value index. 
The payment of the principal or of the interest, or both, 
is varied according to changes in the index chosen. 
The index can be defined in different ways depending 
upon the aims pursued and upon available statistics. 
Also the link between payments and index changes can 
be constructed in different ways. 
To give an immediate, practical idea of what an index 
clause is, section I of this paper describes different types 
of clauses now in effect in some countries. 
Section II contains a discussion of the incentives for 
different kinds of lenders and borrowers (including the 
government) to use an index clause in their operations. 
The next section provides an analysis of the nature of 
a market for financial investments embodying an index 
clause, and discusses price formation in that market. 
This analysis is focused on a discussion of the factors 
which will determine the difference, if any, between the 
* Prepared by the Fiscal and Financial Branch, Bureau o f 
Economic AfiFairs, United Nations Headquarters. 
effective remuneration of indexed and non-indexed 
assets under varying assumptions about the nature of the 
clause. 
Against the background of this analysis of the prerequi-
sites and functioning of such a market, section IV is 
devoted to the implications for the economy as a whole 
of the introduction of indexed financial assets. 
Some technical notes referring to the problems 
discussed in sections II and III are given in section V 
for those readers who wish a detailed exposition based 
on equations and diagrams. 
Not very much has been written on the theory and 
practical working out of this device on deferred claims. 
The most important contributions seem to have come 
from Scandinavia : from Finland, which is the country 
that has gone farthest in applying the index clause to 
the credit market ; and from Denmark and Sweden, 
where studies have been undertaken on the initiative of 
the governments. This article draws heavily on these 
sutides, but frequent reference is also made to other 
literature, of which the titles are given in a reading list 
at section VI. 
It must be kept in mind throughout the discussion 
that the devices and policies discussed here make sense 
only in an economic environment characterized by 
considerable experience with inflationary developments. 
Its meaning and purpose would probably be easier to 
explain to people in certain European and under-
developed countries than to people in the United States 
and Canada, for example. Only to the extent that the 
notion of deterioration in money values because of 
rising price has pervaded the economic reasoning of 
businessmen, bankers, savers and others will it be 
possible to make the functioning of the index clause 
understood and will it be worthwhile even to start to 
contemplate its introduction. It would, on the other 
hand, also be noted that a serious discussion or actual 
use of an index clause by no means implies a defeatist 
attitude towards the possibility of combating inflation. 
On the contrary, it can be viewed as an instrument which, 
under certain circumstances, can reinforce a long-range 
anti-inflationary policy and lead to its success. This 
will be discussed in the concluding section, but should be 
kept in mind throughout. 
I. RECENT EXPERIMENTS WITH AN INDEX CLAUSE IN THE CREDIT MARKET 
1. Finland 
The Finnish Government issued in 1945 a ten-year 
amortization loan of 18 biUion marks. The bonds were 
provided with an index clause and were used as indemnity 
to the people who evacuated Karelia and other territories 
ceded to the Soviet Union. The domestic wholesale 
price index was applied in repayment of the principal, 
with full compensation for every 10 per cent increase 
above the price index base and without stipulations 
about an upper limit for the rise in the price index 
subject to compensation. The loan had been fully repaid 
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years. At the same time an ordinary loan was floated 
at a 6 per cent rate of interest. A new indexed loan was 
floated in June 1954. 
In November 1954 the Groupement de VIndustrie 
Sidérurgique issued a 6 per cent loan linked to the price 
of steel as well as to the total production of the borrower. 
For each 10 per cent increase in the steel price beyond 
30,000 francs per ton, the interest and amortization are 
increased by 2.5 per cent (that is, 25 per cent price com-
pensation), and for each 10 per cent increase in total 
production beyond 10,500 tons of steel, interest and 
amortization are increased by one per cent. In later 
issues amortization and interest payments have similarly 
been tied to the turnover of the group. The last one in 
a series of four loans was issued in October 1956, tied 
to any increase above the turnover of 500 billion francs 
achieved in 1955/56. 
4. United States 
In 1925 the Rand Kardex Company issued bonds tied 
to the wholesale price index of the United States Bureau 
of Labour Statistics. The initiative for the loan came 
from Irving Fisher, who was co-owner of the company. 
It was not successful, however, and was converted after 
a few years to preferential shares and ordinary bonds. 
5. People's Republic of China 
In 1949, widespread use was made o f " parity deposits ", 
that is, deposits linked to the price of a " basket" of 
certain essential commodities in specific quantities. The 
parity basket contained rice, cotton fabric, peanut oil 
and coal briquettes. The price of the basket was estimated 
daily and used for immediate adjustment of the deposits. 
Workers with incomes beyond a certain minimum had 
to deposit a part thereof. Bank loans are also reported 
to have been converted to a purchasing power basis, 
thereby providing the banks with the necessary hedge. 
In 1950, bonds were issued according to the same prin-
ciple, their value being based on the prices of rice, flour, 
cotton cloth and coal. 
The adjustments for price movements worked in both 
directions, so that, when prices started to fall in 1950, 
this type of deposit lost its attraction and was not used 
any more. The parity deposits were therefore abandoned, 
being replaced by " guaranteed " deposits adjustable only 
upward and linked to commodity prices selected accord-
ing to their importance for different regions. In the 
cotton region, for example the value of the deposits 
was linked to the price of raw cotton to induce farmers 
to accept deposits instead of keeping their product for 
speculation in the event of price increases. 
The indexed deposits were abandoned in 1952 but 
seem to have constituted a powerful incentive to bank 
saving, thereby decreasing the holding of currency, as 
well as speculation and private loans channelling the 
funds via bank loans to activities favoured by the 
Government. 
6. Sweden 
Kooperative Forbundet (the Co-operative Association) 
issued in 1952 a 3 per cent loan tied to the cost-of-living 
index. Full compensation with regard to the principal 
is given for any rise in the index, but not for more than 
a total increase of 50 per cent of the initial nominal 
value. 
7. Iceland 
Landsbankin Islands issued a 5.5 per cent indexed 
loan in November 1955 to be used for financing residential 
building. The loan is repaid by drawings over a period 
of fifteen years, the payments being regulated according 
to the retail price index. At the same time a non-indexed 
7 per cent loan was floated. The yield of the two loans 
will be about the same if one expects a price increase 
of 35 per cent (about 2 per cent yearly). 
8. Chile 
The Banco del Estado has announced an issue of 
1,500 million pesos in " adjustable bonds " to be placed 
with oflicial organizations and provident institutions. 
Of this total 1,000 million pesos will be for agricultural 
development, and the nominal value of these bonds will 
be based on the market price of a metric quintal of wheat ; 
500 million pesos of the loan will be devoted to workers, 
housing construction, and the nominal value will be 
based on the cost of one square metre of concrete 
construction. The interest rate is 3.5 per cent. 
II. THE INDEX CLAUSE AS AN INCENTIVE FOR BORROWERS AND LENDERS 
1. The private lender 
The index clause can be applied either to the interest 
on a loan or to the principal, or to both. If applied to 
the interest, it ensures the lender a future income stabilized 
in real terms. When applied to the principal, the investor 
is assured of the future purchasing power of his current 
savings. A variety of purposes can be served by these 
two forms of index clauses, such as assuring income in 
old age or providing for children's education, over a 
period of time, or the fulfilment of diflerent purposes 
for saving (a house, for example, or a business). Actually, 
a combination might be desirable, as in the case of a 
man saving in order to have a certain purchasing power 
available at a future date with the ultimate purpose of 
draw ng a guaranteed real income from his savings. This 
could be implemented by a savings plan with a guaranteed 
purchasing power at a future date and the option of 
acquiring an investment with guaranteed future yields 
at that date. 
It would certainly be possible to have side by side 
bonds which carried an index clause regulating interest 
only, or principal only, thus satisfying the different 
aspirations of lenders. But such an arrangement creates 
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difficulties from at least two points of view. For one 
thing the payments on bonds which carry only one type 
of regulation are sometimes difficult to estimate. This 
applies especially to annuity loans. When both the 
interest and the principal are regulated, the computation 
is much easier.^ Another disadvantage is that it is quite 
difficult for a buyer to evaluate a market in which these 
two types of bonds exist side by side.® The greater the 
variety of index clauses that are introduced, the more 
obstacles will be created for the smooth and com-
prehensible price formation of the bond market. From 
this point of view the ideal would be to use one single, 
simple clause, if no special saving purposes are considered. 
This general statement also applies to clauses with 
" partial " compensation, with " one-way " compensa-
tion, with" roofs "and " floors", "escalator clause", etc., 
which will be discussed in a later section. A bond with 
both principal and interest regulated would offer an 
investment to both classes of buyers referred to above, 
even if they might have to pay a little more for protection 
which is not their primary objective. 
The savings objectives just discussed are, of course, 
usually achieved through bank savings, investments in 
ordinary bonds or by different kinds of insurance, all 
of which, however, are exposed to deterioration in value 
when prices increase. The very purpose of the index 
clause is to prevent this deterioration and thus encourage 
savings which would not occur otherwise. It has been 
argued that investment in shares would serve the same 
purpose and that an index clause therefore is not needed. 
It is obvious, however, that shares for various reasons 
do not appeal to many groups of potential savers. It 
may to a large extent be a question of saving habits, 
which are not easily changed. People who would save 
through deposits or bonds but do not because of their 
deterioration in purchasing power would not consider 
buying shares, but might buy bonds or use deposits 
with an index clause. Shares from the point of view of 
solidity definitely belong to a more risky class of securities 
than bonds, and many people just do not want to take 
any kind of risks in placing their savings. It is exactly 
because of the presence of another type of risk — the 
price risk — implied in deposits and ordinary bonds, 
that savers may shy away from these investments. If 
the price risk is eliminated by an index clause, savings 
may again materialize. 
In many under-developed countries shares are simply 
not available because those that do exist are often pri-
vately placed in the hands of a few. For that matter, 
bonds may not be available either but could, as will 
be argued later, be issued by the Government under 
certain conditions. Now, even if shares are available, 
and if they are considered as eligible investments by the 
majority of savers, in many cases they probably still 
could not be considered a satisfactory alternative to 
indexed securities. The reason is that shares may provide 
only partial protection against decreases in the value of 
money. The outcome of a Danish study of this matter 
is that, whereas in the period 1949-1954 retail prices 
® Reference No . 9, pages 41 and 42. 
» Reference No. 10, page 42. 
had on an average increased by 100 per cent compared 
with 1936, the value of the shares studied has on an 
average increased only 20 per cent and their yield only 
40 per cent, due regard being paid to issues of free shares, 
shares made available to holders at favourable prices, 
and similar transactions. (The increase in yield is also 
probably overstated, since the development in 1949-1953 
is compared with a situation of unusually low yields 
before the war.^) To take another example, in Israel 
the general price index rose 169 per cent between 1950 
and 1955, whereas the average price of ordinary shares 
increased by 117 per cent only and preference shares 
only by 66 per cent. The average price of Government 
debentures did not increase at all. The price of debentures 
linked with foreign currencies, on the other hand, 
increased about as much as general prices, by 171 per 
cent.® 
If it is generally true that shares cannot give satisfactory 
protection against price increases — but this question 
needs to be investigated more thoroughly — the different 
varieties of securities with mixed share-bond features, 
such as preferred stocks, convertible debentures and 
participating debentures, would not give the kind of 
protection offered by index bonds either. Participating 
debentures may be advantageous from the point of view 
of the entrepreneur in that they vary with the income 
of the enterprise, but for the holder they give only the 
(partial) protection of the share with regard to yield, 
with the principal no better safeguarded than in the case 
of an ordinary bond. 
The appeal to the saver to invest in indexed financial 
assets will to a large extent depend upon the index used 
in the clause. Again one has to distinguish between those 
who wish to secure for themselves a future steady income 
and those who save in order to put into effect a project, 
for which they need an assured future purchasing power. 
In the first case some kind of over-all purchasing power 
clause is most convenient; in the second case special 
indices may have to be used. The " Save to Build" 
and " Citrus Grove through Saving " projects in Israel, 
described above, are good examples of specific indices 
serving long-range saving purposes, in these cases it is 
a question not of general bond issues but of limited 
schemes appealing to special of savers. But a clause 
using such special indices would not be suitable for other 
groups of savers, since the movement of such indices 
may erratically or systematically deviate from the trend 
of the general price index. 
From the point of view of the issuer, it is preferable 
to have the index closely tied to the income of the enter-
prise or agency (see below), but that may not appeal 
to investors if they are not prepared to take the product 
of the issuer as payment — as in the case of the French 
railway bonds. Such public or semi-public enterprises 
as gas or electricity production or railways, which could 
be envisaged as issuing bonds linked to their tariffs, 
may also be able to keep the tariffs artificially low by 
covering a deficit by aid from the Government's budget. 
The same element of manipulation is also present if 
4 Reference N o . 9, pages 59 to 68. 
Reference No. 7. 
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rents are used in an index clause. Tariffs and rents are 
often regulated, precisely during periods of price increases, 
that is, when the index clause protection is most needed. 
In most cases the objectives of the lenders would be 
achieved if the index clause referred to regulation accord-
ing to changes in the cost of living or in retail prices. 
This is, as already noted, the most common clause used 
in those countries where the scheme has actually been 
put into effect. The domestic wholesale price index has 
been used in some instances — this type of clause might 
be more desirable from the point of view of the entre-
preneurs, as it may be more closely related to their 
income than is the cost of living. 
From several points o f view a clause related to a 
wage index would be a more satisfactory and clear-cut 
proposition than the others. This is especially true in 
those cases where changes in productivity affect the 
dixtribution of income between income derived from the 
holding of financial assets and other types of income. 
Productivity losses caused by bad harvests or rising 
import prices or other factors should be carried by the 
whole economy ; price increases caused by these factors 
should not be compensated by an index clause. But 
neither should payments on financial contrasts be revised 
downward if productivity increases cause price decreases 
(that is, if the clause operates symmetrically in both 
directions). If, for example, a good harvest leads to 
declining costs o f living, the holders of financial assets 
also should benefit from this and not be penalized by 
the operation of the clause if no special reasons exist 
for changing the distribution of income in favour of 
other income receivers. The simplest way to correct 
the price index for productivity changes would be to 
use the wages index instead. This is probably as close 
as one can get to an expression for the development of 
the average income of the economy and should not be 
more difficult to compute than a price index. Productivity 
changes reflected in prices will then not affect the index, 
whereas the asset holder will be on an equal footing with 
wage-earners with regard to productivity changes reflected 
in wages. The saver will thus be assured that a saving 
corresponding to one hour's work today will also buy 
him one working hour's worth at a future date, that is, 
that he will benefit from productivity increases reflected 
in rising real wages which may have taken place in the 
meanwhile. And as long as there is not a material change 
in profit margins — which there hardly is in the long 
run — the distribution of income between the holder 
of financial assets and others will not change either, 
that is, his real income will move along with the real 
national income. This use of the wage rate in the index 
clause has been advocated by Professor Jorgen Pedersen.® 
If it is desirable to make index bonds especially attrac-
tive, they may be made tax exempt with regard to the 
yield as well as to the payments received by adjustment 
of the principal. In this way a preliminary resistance 
towards the bonds may be overcome, or a market opened 
up in an economy where no demand for financial assets 
previously existed. In fact, most of the index bonds 
described earlier (especially the Finnish bonds) have 
been provided with this feature. It might also be desirable 
to amortize the bonds by annual lottery drawings, giving 
the participants a demonstration of the working of the 
clause. This presumes, o f course, that the principal and 
not only the interest is index-regulated.' In this context 
the lottery feature of the " Save to Build " project in 
Israel is of considerable interest. 
The lender would normally have to make a sacrifice in 
order to get the desired protection against a deterioration 
of the real value of his financial investment. In an eco-
nomy where ordinary bonds are already on the market, 
this sacrifice or " opportunity cos t " would materialize 
in the spread between the effective rate of interest on ordi-
nary bonds and that on index bonds. (The formation 
of the relative prices o f the two types of bonds will be 
discussed in section III.) Given a certain spread between 
the effective rates, the index bonds would be bought 
by those investors who would consider the " opportunity 
c o s t " low compared with the value of the protection. 
This evaluation would then depend upon their expecta-
tions with regard to the future development of the index 
used in the clause. The spread between the effective rates 
would, on the other hand, also create the necessary 
incentive for some borrowers to go into the market 
where investments with an index clause are available. 
Expectations among lenders of high future prices and 
expectations among borrowers of low prices would 
obviously further the establishment of such a market. 
A distribution of expectations among lenders and 
borrowers would tend to distribute the loans between 
the two types, and even identical expectations would 
not prevent the establishment of a market for indexed 
securities (cf. below). In the event that the market for 
non-indexed securities is restricted or nationed, the 
" opportunity cos t " for the lender may very well be 
negligible or even negative. 
2. The private borrower 
The lender thus benefits from the index clause in-
asmuch as it removes the risk of deterioration of his 
financial investment. But the index clause also removes 
a risk element as far as the borrower is concerned. In 
an economy where expectations of price increases pre-
dominate, the rate of interest contains an element of 
compensation for this expected development. The 
cautious entrepreneur who does not take this expected 
price increase for granted may not be willing to borrow 
at the prevailing interest rate although his project is 
otherwise perfectly sound. Borrowing by means of a 
loan with an index clause should enable him to achieve 
an effective rate of interest which does include an extra 
" fee " for expectations of rising prices. He would then 
be sure that he would have to pay for the price increases 
only when he is really able to do so, that is, when they 
materialize. Entrepreneurs choosing this type of loan 
will therefore be those who do not base their investment 
calculations on expectations of rising prices. A loan 
tied to an index would also make them less apt to abstain 
from investments because of expectations of falling 
® Reference No . 9, page 40. ' Reference No. 3, pages 27-28. 
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prices. Use of the clause would, in other words, have 
the effect that investments will less than otherwise be 
influenced by speculation in changing price levels which 
would dampen economic fluctuations. One could even 
visualize the enforcement by law of this clause for dif-
ferent types of borrowing in order to achieve a rational 
selection of investment in a situation which otherwise 
would call for credit control or rationing.® 
It might happen that interest rates remain compara-
tively low even in the face of constantly rising prices, so 
that the borrower would be better off choosing the 
conventional form of contract. But this only holds for 
those borrowers who actually can get a loan at low 
interest. It might well be that the low interest rate is 
enforced by law or social custom or is just an indication 
of a rationing of credit. If a market for index bonds 
is created and free price formation is allowed, the 
ordinary interest rate would increase, reflecting the 
scarcity of lendable funds and making index loans com-
petitive and attractive to these borrows who did not 
have access to credit previously. Derationing would then 
be achieved while at the same time a certain element of 
efficiency in the distribution of credits would be in-
troduced.® 
The financing of enterprises with index bonds might 
have a favourable effect on retained earnings in countries 
where corporations are constantly under pressure to 
disperse large dividends. This is the case in many under-
developed countries, with the consequence that self-
financing and real investment are severely hampered. 
It might not be possible to issue ordinary bonds, but 
index bonds may have some appeal and would protect 
the enterprise from exaggerated claims for dividends. 
The financing of investments would then be facihtated 
in two ways : by access to an additional form for borrow-
ing and by an opportunity to preserve a larger part of 
profits for self-financing. The size of the profit itself, 
of an enterprise borrowing with an index loan, compared 
with that in the case of a non-index loan, would depend 
upon the actual development of prices as against expecta-
tions, as these were reflected in the spread between the 
two interest rates at the date when the borrowing took 
place. This spread is an indication of what the market 
thinks should be the compensation in the form of a 
lower interest for what the borrower has to pay for 
future price increases on account of the index (of. sec-
tion III). If the borrower thinks that this compensation 
is more than ample — that prices will not increase as 
much as the market thinks — there is an incentive for 
him to borrow by an index loan. 
As a counterpart to the case of the lender, certain 
borrowers would find an incentive in going into the 
market for index securities because their price expecta-
tions do not agree with the " market expectation " as 
it is expressed in the difference between ordinary bond 
interest and that on index bonds. This incentive would 
naturally prevail among the lenders who expected the 
highest price rise and the borrowers who expected the 
lowest. 
The profits of the enterprises — and thereby the 
incentive for the index clause and the impact on the 
whole economy — will also depend upon the way in 
which the index-regulated payments are incorporated 
into the cost calculations under a process of rising prices. 
If replacement costs are used in the calculations, the 
clause would not seem to make any difference to the 
pricing procedure. If increases in wages, raw materials, 
and such factors are immediately accounted for and a 
given markup apphed to costs inclusive of depreciation, 
then the compensation to the lender for interest and 
amortization is withheld in the enterprise but could be 
extracted by an index regulation. 
The net worth of an enterprise increases during a 
process of rising prices as the real assets increase in 
money value, whereas the monetary liabiUties remain 
unchanged. This increase in the net worth may act as 
a " bufl"er " against the immediate use of replacement 
costs, which nevertheless have to be accounted for sooner 
or later. The index clause applied to amortization and 
interest would cut short this adjustment process since 
no increase in net worth would materialize, and the 
" buffer " therefore would be removed.^" 
It can be argued that use of a wage index in the clause 
would be preferable for the barrowers as well as for 
the lenders. Normally, the wage cost index varies in 
the long run more than the cost of living index since 
the latter contains elements of considerable inertia. This 
would tend to make a wage index a better approximation 
to most factory prices, which also normally vary more 
than retail prices. But in an inflationary period the 
middleman — especially in under-developed countries — 
is in a strategic position to charge what the traffic can 
bear, and retail prices can easily get out of line with 
factory prices, and thereby also with the capacity of the 
enterprises to pay their loans if keyed to the retail price 
index. A wage cost clause might under such circumstances 
be more suitable. It would also prevent cost increases 
resulting from decreased productivity from causing either 
additional price increases or shrinking profit margines. 
The wage clause would, on the other hand, be helpful 
in clarifying for wage-earners the mechanism by which 
wage increases which do not correspond to productivity 
increases are automatically transmitted into cost and 
price increases which make the expected gains in real 
wages illusory. 
Neither a price clause nor a wage clause may, however, 
be sufficiently correlated with the price of the product 
of the enterprise. From the point of view of the entre-
preneur, the ideal index to be used would be one which 
refers to the changes in price of his own product, which 
for a number of reasons can deviate from a general 
index. This was achieved in the case of the French 
industrial bonds described in an earlier section. From 
this point of view the wholesale price index might be 
more attractive to the borrower than a retail price index 
8 Reference No. 10, pages 180, 213-14. 
® Reference No. 1, pages 7 and 8. 
The question of the effects on the price policy of entrepreneurs 
o f index clause loans has hardly been touched upon in literature. 
Some references to the problem are found in Finnish reports and 
articles fcf. references No . 11, No. 12 and No. 13). It is, however, 
to a large extent an institutional problem and must be referred to 
cost and price structures in the specific countries under discussion. 
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but, again, would perhaps give insuíBcient incentive to 
the lender. The nature of the index clause thus constitutes 
a dilemma, since the lender and the private borrower 
often may have different preferences, and the preferred 
indices are not correlated or at least not in the short 
run. A wage index clause may represent a compromise 
acceptable to both parties. 
Widespread use of securities with an index clause 
would make it possible for an enterprise to put its 
planning on a more " real" basis than would otherwise 
be the case. Thus, devaluation of depreciation reserves, 
for example, could be counterbalanced by investments 
in such securities. In under-developed countries, enter-
prises — especially the smaller ones — often do not pro-
vide for such reserve funds because of the risks involved 
in holding financial assets. ^ ^ 
It should also be noted that the revaluation of the 
assets and liabilities of a firm necessitated by an index 
clause actually will result in a variation in the net worth 
which is smaller than that which otherwise would have 
taken place. ^ ^ A systematic distribution of the financial 
liabilities and assets of an enterprise between invest-
ments of the index and non-index types would — at 
least theoretically — make it possible to stabilize the 
net worth even if the index used in the clause varied 
more or less than the price of its real assets. The pre-
sumption is, however, that the entrepreneur has a definite 
idea of the future relationship between these prices. He 
can then borrow in the index securities market and lend 
to the ordinary market to such an extent that his net 
worth is stabilized if his anticipation of the relationship 
between the prices is correct and no matter which absolute 
levels these prices actually reach, i® This matter is further 
explained in note 1, section V. 
3. The Government 
Under this heading only the purely " treasury " aspects 
of loans tied to an index are discussed, monetary policy 
in general in the field of index securities being discussed 
in section IV on the over-all implications on the economy 
of this device. 
The potential interest of the.Treasury in issuing index 
bonds was pointed out by J. M. Keynes in 1924 in a 
paper to the Colwyn Committee. If a demand for such 
bonds exists, they could be issued at an interest rate 
lower than the ordinary rate, and the Treasury would 
benefit from it. Such a demand would presumably exist 
even if actual price tendencies did not point in any 
definite direction. Actually, the gain to the Treasury 
would be the larger the more people expected price 
increases, provided the Government succeeded in pre-
venting these price increases from taking place. If the 
scheme is a link in a stabilization programme which 
becomes effective, this will in itself ensure the profitable-
ness of the device. If, on the other hand, the Govern-
ment borrows in an orthodox way, the success of the 
stabilization programme will imply a future heavy cost 
because of the high interest rates that certainly would 
Reference No . 3, page 27. 
Reference No. 1, page 15. 
Reference No. 10, page 180. 
have to be paid on ordinary bonds in an inflationary 
situation.!^ A high level of the ordinary rate of interest 
may even very well be part and parcel of a stabilization 
programme and thus make high costs unavoidable on 
ordinary Government bonds. 
If, on the other hand, stabilization is not achieved, 
the income of the Government probably would increase 
along with prices so that no particular difBculties would 
arise in connexion with payment of interest and amortiza-
tion. At the same time future expenses for the debt 
amortization and interests become more uncertain, 
which may cause some difficulties for the annual or long-
range budgeting. Naturally, the Government might then 
have been better off if it had borrowed by means of 
ordinary bonds. In such a case it would even have been 
preferable to borrow altogether by a floating debt. Such 
a method, however, does not fit into a stabilization 
programme. It might temporarily extract forced savings 
from the public by the decrease in money value on 
holdings of Goverimient bonds and interest thereon, but 
it also hampers the development of the capital market, 
as has been the case in several under-developed countries. 
If a Government has a choice of a loan by ordinary 
bonds or by index bonds with a lower effective rate of 
interest, the choice of the former actually implies specula-
tion in rising prices. The choice of the latter, on the 
contrary, would manifest the beUef of the Government 
in stable prices — at least as far as the Treasury point 
of view is expressed in the choice. Thereby the public 
might be induced to adjust expectations in the same 
direction and this obviously would be a most important 
achievement in a stabilization programme. 
The question has been raised whether the Govern-
ment should not use the proceeds from sales of the loans 
to invest in real capital in order to secure future pay-
ments.^® The answer seems to be the same as in the 
case of any other kind of Government borrowing. The 
investment programme of the Government should be 
based on considerations with regard to the over-all 
economic situation and the priorities of all kinds of invest-
ment (public as well as private) and not linked to the 
special needs or form of the borrowing. 
4. Financial intermediaries 
If index securities started to pervade the capital market 
in any country in the form of bonds issued by the Govern-
ment or by private borrowers, the banks and the insurance 
companies would be hard pressed to follow suit. These 
institutions would, however, encounter the technical 
difficulty of synchronizing the time structure of their 
index assets with their liabifities. This problem certainly 
exists also in the case of ordinary financial assets and 
liabifities but in a more manageable and comprehensive 
way. At least, in the case of the banks, it would hardly 
be possible to adjust the maturity of the index asset 
holdings to that of deposits unless the latter were made 
available on very long term only. Another solution is 
given in the Finnish system, but it is, as indicated before, 
usable only under certain circumstances, not always 
" Reference No. 1, page 8. 
Reference No. 1, page 11. 
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present. An alternative would be that banks hold private 
or public index securities as a counterpart to deposits 
tied to an index. But then the banks would run the risk 
that at unforeseen points of time they would have to 
market index clause assets to meet contingencies arising 
from runs on the deposits. This again is a risk impUed 
also in ordinary banlcing, but the price risks involved 
in selling securities are of necessity larger than those 
involved with ordinary bonds. The market values of 
the former would not only be influenced by current 
expectations about future interest rates, but expecta-
tions about the future course of the general price level 
would also directly influence their prices. If prices have 
been rising considerable for a period of time, the value 
of deposits would be correspondingly high. But bonds 
held by the banks as a counterpart to deposits would 
have a market value determined not by actual prices 
but by expected future prices. If expectations generally 
turn downwards, the market values will do the same 
(cf. next section of this paper). In exactly such a situation 
a run on deposits can be expected — when their money 
value is still high but is expected to fall i® — but the 
market values of the bonds held by the banks as backing 
would already have fallen and might be sold only at 
a heavy loss. The only rational answer to this dilemma 
seems to be stabilizing operations by the Government 
(the central bank) as has been pointed out in two reports.^' 
(This will be discussed further in section IV under the 
heading " Government policies ".) 
The above-mentioned problem seems to be less serious 
as far as insurance companies are concerned. The Finnish 
example seems to show an insurance business can be 
run on an indexed basis. 
It should be noted that, even if the index clause of the deposit 
provides a " floor " below which the index cannot be adjusted, 
the index would nevertheless be subject to downward revisions 
once it has risen above this floor. 
" References 9 and 10. 
To give full coverage to the insured, the bonds held 
by an insurance company must have an index clause 
with regard to both interest and principal. At the same 
time the premium also must be regulated according to 
the index. For, while the liabihties of the company 
depend only on the index at the date of final payment, 
its ability to pay this final indexed payment will depend 
upon the whole stream of premium payments at different 
intermediate dates and therefore also on the course of 
prices in between. The company will be covered only 
from the date the premium is paid ; the insured therefore 
must cover the intermediate price increase from the 
contracting date of the insurance until the different dates 
when premiums are paid by paying corresponding index-
regulated premiums. If the premiums are not regulated, 
the insured will get more than full compensation in a 
period of rising prices.^® The calculation may also be 
based on an estimate of the trend in prices, which would 
have to be on the non-conservative side, and involve 
the possibility of redistribution to the insured of any 
accumulated surplus.^® 
It would be possible to envisage more limited schemes 
providing at least partial coverage for the insured. A 
simple one is to permit the insurance companies to 
invest in shares or in index bonds and to vary the pre-
mium redistribute a surplus according to the yields and 
value increases of these assets. In such a case the insurance 
company will also function as an investment trust. This 
kind of scheme is contemplated in the United States 
by some insurance companies. An elaborate scheme along 
the same lines has been proposed by J. G. Koopmans.^" 
According to it, the premiums as well as the insurance 
are paid in unit values measured in terms of the value 
of the investments made by the companies. 
18 Reference No. 9, page 34. 
Reference No . 10, page 240. 
Reference No. 5. 
III. THE PRICES OF INDEX BONDS 
This section is devoted to a discussion of the function-
ing of a market in which index and non-index bonds 
are available side by side. First, the question arises in 
which way the available capital will be distributed among 
the different ' onds. Secondly, the nature and level of 
the equilibrium rate on index bonds is discussed. It is 
assumed throughout that a well developed market exists 
with free price formation. (Imperfections in the market 
which may be frequent and important have to be treated 
as deviations from — and usually as simplifications of 
— this theoretical case.) It is also assumed that a " com-
plete " clause is used, that is, a clause with 100 per cent 
compensation operating both ways and without any 
limitations with regard to the increase in prices. Different 
kinds of incomplete clauses are discussed at the end of 
this section. 
1. TTie nature of the market for such securities 
Even if expectations with regard to future prices were 
fairly uniform among buyers and sellers of bonds and 
even if these expectations pointed towards stable prices, 
one could still envisage the establishment of a market 
in bonds tied to an index. The expectations would be 
probabilities, and the probability, however small, of a 
significant price change would imply a risk. The borrower 
and the lender should in many cases be willing to pay 
a price to eliminate this risk — a kind of precautionary 
motive for lending in real terms (if there is a probability 
of a price increase) or borrowing in real terms (if there 
is a probability of a price fall). But the real case for 
such bonds and a forceful factor in sustaining a market 
would be widely held expectations of substantial price 
changes. It should be pointed out that it does not matter 
if these price expectations go in the same direction, for 
example, towards a price increase. It is sufficient that 
they are of different magnitudes. The market would be 
a meeting ground for the lenders who expect the highest 
price increases and the borrowers who expect the lowest 
price increases. Such a lender would be willing to sacrifice 
a significant part of the interest on an ordinary bond in 
order to achieve protection, that is, he would be willing 
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to pay a comparatively high price for a bond based on 
an index. A borrower, on the other hand, who does not 
expect such a high price increase as is reflected in the 
afore-mentioned lenders' bid would be willing to issue 
bonds tied to an index provided that the higher price 
— lower effective yield — thereby obtained would more 
than compensate him for his estimate of the risk involved 
in borrowing in " real " terms. The " marginal " sellers 
and buyers of such bonds — that is, those who are almost 
indifferent to transactions in indexed as against ordinary 
bonds — would have about the same expectation of the 
future development of the index used in the clause, and 
their expectations would be reflected in the established 
prices of the market. If the marginal transactors expect 
rising prices, then there will be a premium on the bond 
with an index clause and a lower effective yield com-
pared with an ordinary bond. The premium and yield 
difference corresponds to the compensation the buyer 
would expect to receive through the index clause and 
the seller would expect to pay. The marginal transactors 
would then — according to the calculations — be about as 
well off as if they had issued — or bought — ordinary 
bonds instead of indexed ones. 
The " intra-marginal" holders of index bonds definitely 
expect a gain from their holdings compared with the 
alternative of holding ordinary bonds. The higher their 
price expectations, the higher their expected gains. They 
would be willing to hold index bonds even if the yields 
were lower than the established market yields, although 
continuous decreases of the yield (in relation to the yield 
of an ordinary bond) would bring into the market a 
continuous stream of sellers for whom the holding of 
index bonds no longer would seem to be profitable. 
The holders of ordinary bonds, on the other hand, 
think that the extra cost of buying a bond with an index 
clause is not profitable, because the index will not rise 
enough to cover the extra cost. To these groups naturally 
belong also those bondholders who expect price decreases. 
This reasoning can be applied in the same way to the 
intramarginal issuers of index and ordinary bonds. 
Bondholders and bond sellers can thus be stratified 
according to their expectations, and this stratification 
shapes the market and determines the activation of 
potential buyers and sellers as the spread between the 
two rates changes. A more detailed exposition of this 
problem is given in section V, note 2. 
2. Price formation in the market for indexed securities 
Since the market equilibrium has now been discussed 
in general terms, it is convenient to get a more precise 
idea of the equilibrium rate itself (that is, the rate, the 
level of which has been illustrated by the intersections 
of the curves used in the diagrams of note 2). The 
following example giving a concrete illustration may be 
quoted from the Danish report.^'^ 
An ordinary loan of $1,000 at 4 per cent interest being 
compounded yearly will after thirty years have a value 
of $3,243. The lender may consider, as an alternative, 
investing in an index loan for which the interest as 
well as the principal are regulated according to changes 
in the price level. If he then expects a price increase of 
45 per cent over the period, according to his calculation, 
he will be just as well off with a 2.7 per cent index loan 
as with the ordinary 4 per cent. Both will give the same 
yield over the period, assuming, of course, that prices 
increase as much as he expects. If he expects prices to 
increase by 80 per cent, he can lower his claims on the 
index loan to a yield of 2 per cent. Thus, if the market 
yield of index bonds is 2.7 per cent and the ordinary 
rate 4 per cent, all lenders with higher price expectations 
than 45 per cent would lend on the market for indexed 
securities. If the rate on index loans falls — the ordinary 
rate being stable — holders of index loans would start 
to sell, but those expecting a price increase of 80 per 
cent or more would not contemplate selling until the 
rate has fallen to 2 per cent. From the point of view 
of the borrower, a market rate of 2.7 per cent on index 
loans would mean that he should borrow in that market 
only if he does not expect prices to increase more than 
45 per cent. If he expects them to increase more, he 
should, of course, borrow in the ordinary market. 
If the index rate of 2.7 per cent and the ordinary rate 
of 4 per cent thus prevail side by side, the " marginal " 
borrower and lender expect a price increase of 45 per 
cent, which is reflected in the difference between the rates. 
All intra-marginal holders of index loans would have 
higher price expectations, and all holders of ordinary 
loans lower expectations than the marginal holder. If 
this were not so, there would be scope for arbitration 
between the ordinary market and the market for index 
securities. It has been pointed out by Professor Palander ^^  
that price formation on the " index" market can be 
explained in terms of an ordinary market plus a forward 
market in " real" loans. If I lend $100 in the ordinary 
market at 4 per cent to be paid in a year, I command 
$104 at that later date. If at the same time I can buy 
a future, value-guaranteed financial asset for $101 to 
104 
paid in a year, I will be assured — = 103 (approximately) 
of the " real" asset by committing my future proceeds 
from the ordinary lending to the forward market for 
real loans. The implication of the combined transactions 
is the same as if there had existed a present market for 
index loans in which I had lent at 3 per cent. 
Unhampered arbitrage would actually mean that 
everybody who had expectations deviating from those 
reflected in the market rate would go into the market. 
Anybody expecting a price increase of more than one 
per cent would borrow in the ordinary market at 4 per 
cent and lend in the " real" forward market at 3 per 
cent. Opposite arbitrage would be undertaken by those 
expecting an increase of less than one per cent or a 
price fall. Limitations on borrowing and/or increasing 
borrowing costs would, however, limit these kinds of 
operations. As has been pointed out, there are also 
other factors than price expectations, such as special 
risk evaluations, which influence the distribution between 
the two markets. 
Reference No . 9, page 43. " Reference No. 10, pages 173 et seq. 
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It is obvious that the lender in extreme cases may have 
to settle for a negative yield when buying an index security 
— that is, he would have to pay such a high price that 
he would suffer an absolute loss in money terms if no 
regulation materialized. Such an investment would be 
motivated by expectation of a yearly rate of price increase 
exceeding that of the ordinary rate of interest. The alter-
native of holding cash instead of securities prevents the 
ordinary interest rate from becoming negative but does 
not provide the same " floor" for the rate on index 
securities. The alternative of holding cash would, on 
the other hand, prevent the rate on these from falling 
below the expected rate of price decline.^® 
In conclusion it may be said that the price expecta-
tion is reflected in the difference between the ordinary 
rate and the rate on index securities. If the ordinary 
rate is 4 per cent and the index rate 3 per cent per year, 
the difference of one per cent indicates the price increase 
expected by the marginal speculator. This conclusion is, 
however, only approximate. It is possible to work out 
the result more precisely. This has been done in the 
report of Professor Palander referred to several times. 
Note 3 in section V restates some of his arguments for 
the reader who wants a clear understanding of the effects 
on the prices of index bonds of changes in price expecta-
tions and of changes of the ordinary interest rate. 
3. Incomplete index clauses 
The discusssion has so far only considered bonds 
with complete index clauses. One can, however, envisage 
several deviations from a complete clause, deviations 
which of course will be reflected in differences between 
yields of bonds with incomplete and complete clauses. 
The clause can be incomplete in the following ways : 
(a) only the principal or only the interest is regulated ; 
(b) there is a " ceiling " or a " floor " for the index com-
pensation ; (c) there is only a partial index compensation 
(although unlimited in amount) ; (d) the index com-
pensation is " escalated " in comparison with the index, 
that is, takes place only stepwise. 
Of two otherwise similar bonds, the one with regulated 
principal would in most cases be more favourable for 
the lender than the one with regulated interest if prices 
increase. The opposite would be true if prices fall. This 
would be the case, for example, if the price index changes 
at an even rate. Only in such a case as when a price 
increase is concentrated in the earlier stages of the term 
of the bonds and then prices decline just before the 
maturity date would the bond with interest regulated be 
decidedly more favourable than in the case of index-
regulated principal. If an increase takes place in the 
price index on which the clause is based just before the 
maturity date, the holder of a bond whose principal is 
regulated would benefit just as much as if the increase 
had prevailed during the whole period, whereas if the 
index affects interest only he would hardly be better off 
than with an ordinary bond.^^ This difference in 
Reference No. 1, pages 12-13. 
¡¡^  Reference No. 3, pages 34-35. 
attractiveness between the two types of bond would 
naturally be reflected in differences in their effective 
yield. 
In the second type of index clause listed, there is a 
provision for a floor or a ceiling below or above 
which the clause does not operate. A most common 
feature is that there is a floor, represented by the value 
of the index at the date of issue. This acts as a guarantee 
that the lender will not be worse off than if he had 
purchased an ordinary bond. Such a bond would pre-
sumably be more attractive than a bond without such 
a floor. It should be noted, however, that once prices 
have risen — that is, the index has risen above the floor 
— the clause wiU operate in both directions and the 
holder will be exposed to losses. His bond will now be 
a less favourable proposition than a similar " one-way " 
bond issued at a later date — that is, with a higher 
floor. This would tend to make a difference in the yields 
of the two bonds although they are of exactly the same 
type even with regard to date of maturity. If, on the 
other hand, prices start to fall from the date of issue, 
the index bond becomes equivalent to an ordinary bond 
in the whole range between the (fallen) index and the 
floor.^® This makes for a complexity in the market 
which does not seem to be counterbalanced by the mainly 
fictional advantages of the floor arrangements. It may 
be argued that if prices fell — presumably in a depres-
sion — no " contra-cyclical " effect would ensue unless 
there were a floor to keep up the purchasing power of 
the bondholders .But that, again, would hold only for 
newly issued bonds for which the floor was still operative. 
And the more the purchasing power and liquidity of 
the borrowers — the enterprises — are improved, the 
more those of the lenders worsen. 
Much the same can be said about a " ceiling Once 
the ceiling set in the index clause has been approached, 
the holder wifl be in a less favourable position with 
regard to the marketing of his bonds. The value of his 
bond is now less than that of a comparable ordinary 
bond since it cannot benefit any more from price increases 
but is exposed to revisions downwards from the ceiling 
all the way down to the floor. Again, it seems to be 
more reasonable to work with a " complete " clause, 
thereby avoiding the complications which follow from 
an incomplete one. 
The clause can provide that only a part of the loan 
is given compensation for changes in the index ; thus 
one part of the loan is ordinary and the other fully 
covered. But this " partition " of the bond will vary 
with changes in the index.^ ® If prices have doubled at 
a certain date, the " indexed " part will double its weight, 
and at that date the bond is equivalent to a newly issued 
bond which is covered by a 67 per cent index clause. 
Or — put in another way — it would be worth more 
than an identical bond issued at a later date (but with 
the same maturity date). This can be illustrated by the 
figures given below. 
Reference No . 10, pages 37-38. 
Reference No. 3, page 19. 
Reference No. 10, pages 38-39. 
Ibid., pages 35-36. 
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1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 2 0 0 1 5 0 1 5 0 2 0 0 1 
1 0 0 4 0 0 1 5 0 . 3 0 0 4 0 0 2 
Bond 1 has a nominal principal of 200, regulated 50 per 
cent, that is, with half of it regulated 100 per cent accord-
ing to the index. If prices double in one year, the bond 
is worth 300 and the indexed part then carries a weight 
of two-thirds. This bond may now be compared with 
a newly issued bond of the same amount with the same 
50 per cent index clause (bond 2). If prices again double 
over the next period, bond 1 will have a higher value 
than bond 2 (500 compared with 450). Again, it can be 
seen that the use of an incomplete clause makes a com-
parison between the yields of different bonds com-
plicated and thereby may hamper a smooth functioning 
of the market. 
A variety of escalator clauses have been used for 
different indexed securities. The differences concern the 
size of the " steps " in the escalator. For the same bond 
there can also be a difference, for example, as between 
the introductory and the following steps. These provisions 
usually aim at a simplification of the procedure of pay-
ments but also prevent comparability between bonds 
which differ in this respect. It would therefore be ad-
visable, when a market for index bonds is opened up 
and an expansion is envisaged, to aim at uniformity 
of the clause from the beginning. This naturally also 
goes for the different varieties of incompleteness of the 
index clause discussed above. 
IV . THE ROLE OF A CREDIT MARKET FOR INDEXED SECURITIES 
So far the credit market for indexed securities has 
been discussed only as a part of the financial sector. 
It remains to consider its role in the wider context of 
the economy as a whole. The introduction of such 
securities wiU presumably affect the totals as well as the 
distribution of investment and savings and may thereby 
have a significant influence on the development of the 
economy. The force of this impact will naturally depend 
on the scope and range granted to the operation of the 
index clause, which in turn will depend upon the Govern-
ment policy envisaged in this field. These three aspects 
of indexed securities will be briefly discussed in this 
section : the impact on the economy, the scope of the 
clause and the problems arising from different financial 
policies. 
1. The impact on the economy 
One of the primary aims in using an index clause 
would be to increase the amount of saving and to pro-
mote a more rational distribution of real investments. 
The mechanism by which these aims may be realized 
have been discussed to some extent in section II. In 
practice, success would of course depend on the institu-
tional structure and the economic situation and outlook, 
to which the scope of the clause and Government policy 
would have to be adapted. Any effect achieved has to 
be evaluated in terms of the administrative and other 
costs incurred. It should be noted that the impact on 
saving cannot be measured simply by the apparent 
holdings or increase in holdings of indexed assets. 
Especially at the start of the project a considerable shift 
from non-indexed to indexed assets could be expected. 
This would not imply " new " current savings. But it might 
very well mean a cutting down of expenditures otherwise 
planned for a more or less distant future and a transfer 
of a " floating " part of the liquid stock into more stable 
holdings. Such a transfer of assets to the indexed types 
This section gives only a bare outline and should be accom-
panied by a discussion of the applicability of the clause in different 
institutional environments, notably in the under-developed countries. 
may be just as important as " new " saving and it is, 
as a matter of fact, hardly possible to draw a clear line 
between the two types of elTects. 
It has been pointed out that there is a risk that " real " 
balances would be diminished and cash transferred to 
indexed securities if such a superior, liquid substitute 
should be offered.®" The demand for goods and services 
may thus be initially increased if private sellers of indexed 
securities use the acquired purchasing power for real 
investments. This could, however, be prevented by 
Government operations, that is, by sale of index bonds. 
These initial operations, in order to avoid an increase 
in " surplus cash ", may have to be comparatively large 
if the Government also has to take up ordinary securities 
in order to stabilize their prices. It should in any case 
be possible to achieve a considerable initial effect of 
shifting the existing stock of financial assets towards a 
lower degree of liquidity and a higher degree of stability. 
An increase in current savings, on the other hand, has 
to be envisaged as a slow process, picking up speed 
as habits of saving are changed and new layers of potential 
savers are reached. It the scheme is worked properly, this 
process should be cumulative. There should be a com-
paratively strong trend component in the " indexed " 
saving if an appeal can be made to potential savers who 
previously have shrunk away from the risk of deteriora-
tion of the money value of their savings. In under-
developed countries, there often exists a significant 
" luxury " consumption difficult to reach by taxation, 
which might be tapped if the alternative of value-stable 
saving is offered.®! 
5» Reference No . 1, pages 10-11. 
It has been estimated that, in Chile in 1951-1953, personal 
consumption out of profits, interests and rents represented on 
average 22 per cent of gross national income (secretariat of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, based 
on data from the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción). Tf 
consumption o f these incomes were reduced to the same percentage 
as in the United Kingdom (30 per cent, as against 60 per cent in 
Chile), it would be equivalent to raising the rate of net investment 
from 2 to 14 per cent of net national income (cf. Kaldor, " Economic 
Problems o f Chile shortly to appear in this Bulletin). 
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From a cyclical point of view, the holding of indexed 
assets would probably have a stabilizing effect on the 
economy, especially in comparison with the holding of 
ordinary financial assets. There would be a relatively 
strong inducement to retain the indexed securities in 
periods of rising prices and to dispose of them in times 
of falling prices.®^ The holding of ordinary financial 
assets is stabilizing in an economy in the sense that 
the owners become poorer during inflation and vice versa 
during deflation. But this argument carries little weight 
when the inducement to hold those assets at all is very 
small, precisely because of the inflation, which thus might 
completely prevent the establishment of a security market. 
One also has to consider the favourable effect on the 
urge for anticipatory spending during an inflation which 
presumably would be achieved by the availability of 
indexed assets.®® As for the reduction in the money 
value of indexed assets during a deflation, this may be 
remedied by stabilization of the asset prices by Govern-
ment operations. 
The effect on profits of the use of the index clause 
should also have a stabilizing effect on the economy. 
It would be harder for enterprises to make " windfall" 
gains, whereas, on the other hand, their " real" debt 
burden during a deflation would be alleviated compared 
with their situation in case they had borrowed by ordinary 
loans. The linking of payments of interest and principal 
to prices (or wages) would make speculative borrowing 
and investments based on price expectations much less 
attractive and, as pointed out before, tend to achieve a 
more rational distribution of real investments. It could 
also be expected that holdings of indexed securities 
would be substituted for real investment of low social 
value undertaken only because of the lack of value-
stable financial assets. During a deflation, entrepreneurs 
would become less hesitant to invest, since expectations 
of falling prices would no longer play an all-important 
role in their calculations. 
The spread of the " index-mentality " already present 
in most countries in regard to wage contracts would 
therefore tend to remove illusions about gains to be 
made from price increases. This would especially be the 
case if the clause was linked to a wage index. Wage-
earners would then realize that wage increases would 
spread to other costs as well, and — if not substantiated 
by increases in productivity — would immediately be 
transferred to price increases. Entrepreneurs, on the 
other hand, would be more reluctant to grant wage 
increases if financial costs were automatically involved 
as well, so that a wage increase could be granted only 
through a corresponding price increase. It might thus 
be possible to brake the wage/price spiral which is an 
important element in the inflationary trend in many 
countries. Groups which formerly borrowed by ordinary 
loans and were forced to borrow through " indexed " 
loans would lose interest in an inflationary develop-
ment, making the resistance to a stabilization policy 
correspondingly easier to overcome.®'^ 
2. The scope of indexed securities 
The impact on the economy of the introduction of 
indexed holdings would, to a large extent, depend upon 
the standards adopted for maturity, redemption, market-
ability and limitations on holdings. 
It could be argued that at the beginning, when the 
system was tried out, holding should be limited in order 
to permit a gradual adaptation of the new device.®® If, 
on the other hand, the aim is to achieve a significant 
anti-inflationary effect from the very start, holdings should 
be unlimited.®® The savings aspect of the scheme might 
be stressed if the indexed assets are given a comparatively 
extended duration. One could even envisage a scheme 
combining duration and limits on holdings in order to 
achieve a maximum saving effect. The purchase and 
holding of long-term indexed assets would then be 
permitted in larger amounts than that of short-term 
assets.®' 
The effect aimed at by giving the indexed securities 
a relatively long duration would, however, be curtailed 
if the securities had an unlimited marketability. If the 
savings aspects of the scheme were to be stressed, it 
should be constructed as a clear-cut alternative to the 
short-term securities with unlimited marketability avail-
able in abundance in many countries. The features of 
the scheme would then provide safeguards against spe-
culative transfers into other kinds of assets in addition 
to those incentives inherent in the device itself. This 
might be achieved by a system of inscribed limited 
holdings marketable only by inscribed transfers.®® 
Redemption prior to maturity in specified cases would 
be an alternative to marketability in assuring a certain 
liquidity in such emergency cases as death or disability 
of the owner.®® Redemption could be envisaged at 
nominal values and with or without the ordinary rate 
of interest or even at the value indicated by the actual 
position of the index.^ ^- As pointed out several times 
before, this last-mentioned matter — stabilization of the 
market value of indexed securities — represents one of 
the central problems of the management of the system. 
Without a stabilization policy, the market for indexed 
securities probably has to be comparatively modest in 
scope, restricted to specific schemes stressing the savings 
effects of stable holdings of long duration and limited 
marketabihty. If a wider scope is aimed at, that is, if 
the intention is to let the scheme pervade the whole 
credit market, including all financial institutions, then 
a definite need for large-scale Government responsibilities 
would arise. 
Reference No. 3, pages 16-17. 
R. Goode, " A Constant Purchasing Power Savings Bond 
National Tax Journal, vol. IV (Lancaster, Pa.), December 1951, 
page 339. 
Reference No. 10, page 215. 
Reference No. 3, page 32. 
3» Reference No. 2, page 338. 
3' Reference No . 3, page 33. 
Ibid., page 34. 
39 Reference No. 9, page 31. 
«» Reference No . 2, page 336, 
Reference No . 10, pages 43-44. 
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3. Government policy 
At the core of a large-scale scheme for indexed securities 
is a mechanism for checking excessive swings in the 
value of institutional holdings, those of banks as well 
as o f insurance companies. Naturally ordinary bond 
holdings would presumably fluctuate considerably more 
since an additional speculative factor is introduced, that 
is, the anticipated changes in the price level. (There 
could be cases when the prices of the index bonds were 
more stable than those of the ordinary bonds, notably 
when the ordinary rate of interest and price expectations 
move together ; see section V, note 3.) 
The simplest method of providing financial institutions 
with coverage for their indexed liabilities would be to 
let them hold index-regulated Government bonds. Those 
bonds are then always available when a need arises for 
the institutions to replenish their indexed holdings in 
order to match their indexed obligations to the extent 
that indexed loans cannot be placed with private 
borrowers. Alternatively, the Government can aim at a 
stabilization of the value of indexed securities by open 
market operations as described before. Generally 
spéaking, the Government would have to counteract 
variations in the supply of private indexed securities in 
order to stabilize the market.^^ The additional opportu-
nities for the Government to stabilize price expectations 
by stabilizing the prices of index bonds have also been 
discussed above. 
Reference No. 9, page 24. 
It remains to consider the conditions most suitable 
for the introduction of one variant or another of the 
scheme. In general, not very much can be said here since 
the credit market structure and economic situation would 
have to be discussed in detail in the case of each parti-
cular country. Two different situations may be mentioned 
as examples of cases which might be especially suitable 
for the use of indexed securities.^^ In one case a country 
has chronic inflation and a high velocity of money 
circulation. In such a situation, it would be appropriate 
and useful to promote the use of private indexed securi-
ties. When inflation has to be taken as a datum, in the 
short run at least, an index clause may be unavoidable 
if any kind of habits of saving are to be developed. 
Increased opportunities for the sales of Government bonds 
might induce wasteful spending instead of diverting it 
and may discredit the use of the device in the private 
sector if the Government defaults on the bonds. A 
second opportunity is to use the scheme as a preparation 
for, or as an integrated part of, an over-all stabilization 
programme. If securities with an index clause are al-
ready in use in the private sectore before introduction 
of the stabiUzation programme, the political resistance 
towards it from debtor groups may be significantly 
reduced. The Government may make a considerable 
gain if the stabilization materializes, and the sale of 
Government indexed bonds may in itself inspire confi-
dence in the success of the programme. To these two 
examples could probably be added several others, both 
of unlimited use of the index clause and of its applica-
tion in specific fields for specific purposes. 
Reference No. 1, pages 17-18. 
V . TECHNICAL NOTES 
Note 1. Hedging in the market for indexed securities as 
a means of stabilizing the net worth of an enter-
prise. 
Suppose that the owner's equity is a, that the expected 
change in the general prise factor incorporated in the 
clause is 100 p per cent and that the expected relation 
between changes in the special price (value) of the real 
assets of the enterprise and changes of the index is t. 
The borrowing of the enterprise by indexed loans is x 
times the owner's equity and is used for ordinary lending 
(for example, trade credits). The problem is to find the 
value of X that secures an increase in the money value 
or the owner's equity along with an increase of the 
index of the clause, that it secures a stable real net 
worth = (1 - f p)a. The balance-sheet of the enterprise 
after price increases have taken place can be made out 
as foUows : 
Debit Credit 
Indexed liabilities 1 (1 + p) x 
Non-indexed financial assets ax 
Real capital a (1 + tp) 
Owner's equity a (1 p) 
To achieve stabilization of the owner's equity the 
" hedging" has to amount to x = t — I, a formula 
derived by making the sum of the debit items equal to 
the sum of the credit items. If the value of real assets 
is expected to rise or fall three times as fast as the general 
price index used in a clause (t = 3), then the enterprise 
would borrow an amount twice the owner's equity in 
the indexed market and lend the same amount in the 
ordinary market (x = 2). Starting with an owner's equity 
a = 100, the enterprise takes an indexed loan ax = 200, 
which is counterbalanced by the same non-indexed 
lending. A price decrease of 20 per cent (p = — 0.2) chan-
ges the real asset value to 40, the indexed financial liabi-
lity to 160 and leaves the non-indexed financial asset un-
changed. The residual net worth will then be 80 and 
has changed in the same proportion as the general price 
index ; that is, its real worth is unchanged. 
If t < 1, that is, if the value of the real assets o f the 
firm changes more slowly than the general price index 
(the clause index), then the " hedging " implies borrowing 
in the ordinary market and lending in the indexed market. 
The borrowing should amount to (1 — t)a. li t — 0.5, 
the borrowing would be 0.5a. An increase of the index 
by 20 per cent (p = 0.2) along with an increase in the 
money value of the real assets by 10 per cent would 
increase the net worth by 20 per cent, that is, just as 
much as the general price increase. 
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Note 2. Diagramatic interpretation of equilibrium in a 
" double market". 
The nature of the market equilibrium can be illustrated 
by diagrams. Diagrams of a similar type are used in 
reference No. 9, see section VI. 
In figure 1 the effective yield of index bonds is 
measured along the y axis and the bond holdings along 
the jc axis. The D and S' curves denote the demand for 
and supply of index bonds. The intersection between 
the curves D^ and S determines an equilibrium " indexed " 
rate r and a holding a of index bonds. As the curves are 
symmetrical the total market 2a is equally divided between 
index bonds and ordinary bonds. The symmetry of the 
curves implies a symmetrical distribution of price expecta-
tions among buyers and sellers. (The curves can only 
denote the behaviour of private borrowers and sellers, 
since the Government presumably may react otherwise. 
The effect of the intervention through open market 
operations is illustrated in figure 2.) If the sellers of 
bonds generally expected higher prices (lower effective 
rates) than the buyers, the S curve would be situated 
further to the left, the equilibrium rate would be lower 
than r and the share of the market taken by index bonds 
smaller than a. It might very well be that the borrowers 
— that is, the entrepreneurs — have on an average higher 
price expectations than the lenders. This would than 
tend to limit the share of the market taken by index 
bonds.4' The equilibrium illustrated is " partial" in the 
sense that total demand for bonds and the " ordinary " 
bond rate is assumed to be given. Therefore properly 
speaking the diagram only illustrates the determination 
of the spread between the ordinary and the index rate, 
whereas absolute levels are determined by all those 
factors which are incorporated in the theory of the 
ordinary rate of interest. 
Figure 1 
equilibrium rate r, so that a slight increase of the yield 
on index bonds would cause a considerable increase in 
demand for them from those who want to switch from 
ordinary bonds. The implication is that the price expecta-
tions of the holders of ordinary bonds are concentrated 
around a value which just about makes an indexed invest-
ment unprofitable at the current rate r. Below r, on the 
other hand, the curve D^ is inelastic, meaning that holders 
of index bonds would generally hang on to their invest-
ments if the yield r was lowered from its equilibrium 
position. Contrary to the case of the holders of ordinary 
bonds, their expectations thus are not concentrated 
around that of the " marginal " holder. The special form 
of the curve Dg would therefore have a stabilizing effect 
for movements of the " indexed " interest upwards but 
account for instability in movements downward com-
pared with the situation pictured by the curve D^. 
This type of diagram can be effectively used to illustrate 
the meaning of " inter-market operations Govern-
ment transactions in index and ordinary bonds aiming 
at a desirable constellation of the two rates. This is 
shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2 
In figure 2 the equilibrium rate is r^, and the index 
bond holding a, the index bonds taking the larger part 
of the total market. The central bank might now want 
to raise the " indexed " rate from r^ to rg, in an effort 
to achieve, for example, a revision downward of the 
expectations of the market about future prices. The bank 
would then start to supply index bonds at prices more 
favourable to the buyer than that corresponding to the 
effective yield r^. At the rate rg the demand for index 
bonds would have increased to c, so that c — a index 
bonds would have to be sold and a corresponding amount 
of ordinary bonds bought by the central bank. But at 
the same time the supply of ordinary bonds would tend 
The demand curve Dg in figure 1 denotes a less sym-
metrical distribution of expectations of the bondholders 
than does D^. The curve is very price-elastic above the 
Reference No. 9, pages 24, 44. 
The term is Professor Palander's ; cf. reference No. 10, 
page 212. Professor Palander has used a diagram with " iso-curves " 
in order to illustrate the effect, of open market and inter-market 
operations. With this technique it is possible to study simultaneously 
the variations of the money rate and the " indexed" rate. This 
case is perhaps more interesting than that discussed in the text 
but also more complicated. Cf. reference No. 10, pages 196-199. 
87 
-to decrease since the issues of index bonds would be 
converted into ordinary bonds at maturity or conversion 
dates or the issuer might try to repurchase his own 
bonds in the open market. If the supply could respond 
immediately to the preferences as expressed by the curve 
S, the central bank would have to absorb additional 
a — ¿ i n ordinary bonds and supply a corresponding 
amount to the market for index bonds. The operation 
would not cause any significant change in the money 
supply since it is mainly a question of exchanging one 
type of bond for another. The net result or cash effect 
caused by these transactions would mainly depend upon 
how the central bank went into the market. The bank 
could, for example, immediately " post " the index bond 
price corresponding to r^ and at that price sell all the 
index bonds demanded. Alternatively, the bank could 
try to decrease the price, only stepwise, thus offering 
effective rates ranging from to r^ according to the 
gradual appearance of a demand for index bonds in 
the market. The last-mentioned method would obviously 
give the largest sale return. For purchases of ordinary 
bonds the same alternatives could be envisaged, and the 
combined effect on the money supply would depend on 
the methods chosen. Naturally, the authorities would 
use both financial resources and skill to proceed in this 
type of operation. 
Figure 3 
Figure 3 gives an idea, although very inadequate, as 
to what would happen to the indexed rate if expecta-
tions about future prices change. The ordinary rate has 
still to be assumed as given, since the diagram only 
reñects a partial equilibrium, and a total equilibrium 
analysis requires a much more complicated theoretical 
apparatus. The assumption corresponds, for example, 
to a situation in which the central bank pegs the ordinary 
rate but allows the indexed rate to fluctuate or in which 
the market for index bonds is so small that fluctuations 
in the indexed rate would not materially affect the 
ordinary rate. 
Let it first be assumed that the lenders revise their 
price expectations upwards. This implies a shift of the 
demand curve (D,) to the right (D^) and a equilibrium 
position from intersection point No. 1 to No. 2 with 
a lower effective indexed rate (that is, higher bond prices) 
and an increased market for index bonds. It might be 
natural to assume a similar revision of the expectations 
of the borrowers, but if the supply is inelastic the change 
in their expectations would not affect the short-run 
equilibrium. In the long run, however, the supply curve 
would then shift to the left (Sg) as the supply is reduced 
according to the higher expectations. If the shift is 
symmetrical to that of the demand curve, the new equi-
librium position (No. 3) is characterized by a lower 
equihbrium rate but an unchanged distribution of the 
market between index and ordinary bonds. Finally, the 
possibility has to be considered that expectations change 
in opposite directions. Assume, for example, that the 
lenders generally revise their expectations downwards 
and the borrowers theirs upwards. If the change is 
symmetrical (as denoted by D^ and S^), there will be 
no change in the indexed rate (No. 4). Again, this case 
does not seem to be very realistic. It can, however, be 
interpreted in a meaningful way. The same kind of curve 
shifts would take place if both lenders and borrowers 
allowed for a risk premium in dealing with index bonds. 
Given the same range of " objective " probabilities of 
future price changes, the borrower might give an addi-
tional " subjective " weight to the risk of price increases 
and the lender a corresponding additional weight to the 
risk of price decreases. The market effect of these lopsided 
evaluations obviously would not affect the equihbrium 
rate but would restrict the market for index bonds 
compared with the case of " objective " evaluations. 
Note 3. Determination of the equilibrium rate 
Professor T. Palander uses an elaborate system of two 
accounting standards — one real and one nominal — and 
thereby gives the theory of the index bond a formal 
dress of the same design as the theory of fluctuation 
in foreign exchange rates. He also works with differ-
ent interest rates in order to give a consistent ex-
planation of the interrelations between the market for 
index bonds and the ordinary market (real rates and 
nominal rates, both of which can be either " o w n " 
rates or " cross" rates). The following is an attemp 
to extract some main elements of his arguments.'^ ® 
An exact theory for the indexed rate necessitates the 
introduction of the instantaneous rate of interest in the 
calculation of effective yields. This approach, used in 
insurance mathematics, is also necessary in order to 
simplify the expressions. It means that, when calculating 
the future value Kt of an investment Ko, the expression 
Kt = Ko e« is used instead of Kt = Ko Ó + i)' (for the 
same value Ki the instantaneous rate 100 r per cent 
will be somewhat smaller than a rate of 100 i per cent 
based, for example, on an annual or semi-annual accrual 
basis). 
If a bond indexed both with regard to interest and 
principal has a market value Ko a nominal rate of interest 
100 / per cent and is redeemed by the amount KT at a 
future date T, its effective yield 100 r per cent can be 
calculated according to the ordinarv formula : 
Reference No. 10. oaees 189 et sea. 
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1. Ko == / e-« i dt + e-" Kt 
o 
The solution of this formula is given below : 
2 . K o = (1 - e - " ) + e - " K T 
It should be noticed here that r is a real yield in the 
sense that it is protected against changes in the price 
index used in the clause. The investor chooses the index 
bonds exactly because he expects a future increase in 
the index at, say, an instantaneous rate of 100 w per 
cent. If an increase materializes, the money yield on his 
investment will be higher than the yield r calculated 
above. It is this corrected yield 100 x per cent that 
should be compared with the yield on an alternative 
investment in ordinary bonds. The expected money 
yield on the index bond can be calculated according 
to the formula given below : 
3. Ko = / e-"» i e'»^  dt + K t 
o 
4. = (1 _ e-(''-w)T) Kt 
X — W 
A comparison between formula 2 and formula 4 shows 
the exact relationship between the (subjective) money 
yield of the index bond, the (real) market rate of that 
bond and the price expectation of the investor : 
X = r w. li the (subjective rate) x on the index bond 
is higher than the market rate of an ordinary.bond, 
the investor will prefer index bonds, and vice versa. 
At the margin the difference between the ordinary bond 
yield and the index bond yield is equal to the expected 
increase in prices, all measured at instantaneous rates. 
If the expectation w is revised upwards, the prospective 
money yield increases correspondingly and makes it 
correspondingly more profitable to invest in index bonds. 
The increased demand will tend to raise the price Ko, 
to lower the " real " yield r and to restore x to its former 
value. At the same time the ordinary bond rate, which 
at the margin also represents the subjective rate x, will 
tend to increase so that in the new equilibrium position 
the increase in w will be offset both by a decrease in r 
and an increase in x. 
The argument has so far been pursued under the 
assumption that Kr is given objective value, that is, 
the nominal value redeemable at the date of maturity. 
If investors consider the possibiKty of selling the bond at 
an earlier date, then Kt, in addition to w, also becomes a 
subjective value. The future value of Kt at a date t before 
maturity will become the expected market value, which 
will depend upon what the market at the time expects 
about future prices. The price expectations of the investor 
concerning the period t are now only relevant as far as the 
prospective accrued interest is concerned — they will be 
determined by what really happens during the period t. 
But his calculation with regard to Kt will be determined 
by his expectations about the market's expectation 
beyond t. He himself may very well expect prices to fall 
beyond t, but if the thinks that the market generally will 
expect rising prices, then Kt will be given a correspond-
ingly higher value, which will be directly reflected in 
the level of x. 
It should also be pointed out that the actual value 
of Kt will depend not only upon future market expecta-
tions but also upon changes in the ordinary rate of 
interest. An increase in the ordinary rate will lower the 
market value of the index bond. In formula 3 we can 
let w denote the marginal price expectation of the market, 
X the ordinary bond rate and Ko the actual market 
value. An increase in x would lower the market value 
Ko. Only in the event that there is a proportionate 
increase in the ordinary rate of interest x and in the 
price expectation w will Ko remain unchanged. Thus if 
there is a positive correlation between the actual money 
bond rate and the expectations of prices at any future 
date, the prices of index bonds will vary less than the 
prices of ordinary bonds.^^ This would be the case, for 
example, if the ordinary rate of interest — and that 
rate only — is manipulated by the monetary authority 
in conformity with the price expectations of the market. 
" Reference N o . 2, page 336. 
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